Heck-Dance v. Inversiones Isleta Marina, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 03-2248(DRD).,Civ. 03-2248(DRD). |
| Citation | 381 F.Supp.2d 50 |
| Parties | Ruble HECK-DANCE, Plaintiff, v. INVERSIONES ISLETA MARINA, INC., et als., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Fernando L. Gallardo, Woods and Woods, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Juan J. Martinez-Rodriguez, Paul E. Calvesbert-Borgos, Calvesbert Law Offices, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court is defendants' Isleta's Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss the Action for Improper Venue, Failure to State a Claim, and/or Lack of Jurisdiction (Docket No. 51). Defendants moves the Court to dismiss the instant action as a result of a forum selection clause contained within the Dockage Agreement entered into by the instant parties wherein said parties voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction and venue of the local state courts as to all claims relating to said Dockage Agreement. For the reasons stated herein, Isleta's Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss the Action for Improper Venue, Failure to State a Claim, and/or Lack of Jurisdiction (Docket No. 51) is hereby GRANTED.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the entry of summary judgment in a case where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir.1993); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 894 (1st Cir.1988).
Summary judgment is appropriate where, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, there is no doubt as to whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir.1987). A "genuine" issue is one that is dispositive, and which consequently must be decided at trial. Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A material fact, is one which affects the outcome of the suit and which must be resolved before attending to related legal issues. Mack, 871 F.2d at 181.
The party filing a motion for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proof to show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thereafter, the burden shifts to the non-movant to provide the Court, through the filing of supporting affidavits or otherwise, with "some indication that he can produce the quantum of evidence [necessary] to enable him to reach the jury with his claim." Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 468 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976). The non-movant cannot rest upon mere allegations or denial of the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Indeed, the non-movant must affirmatively show that "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute [exists] to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of truth at trial." First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 901, 89 S.Ct. 63, 21 L.Ed.2d 188 (1968).
It is well known that the parties to a contract may agree to litigate in a given jurisdiction. As to this matter, the Supreme Court has explained that: "[a] contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderlines and predictability essential to any international business transaction". Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). Contracts for dockage of vessels -the underlying legal conceptare maritime in nature. Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co. v. Boston Harbor Marina, 406 F.2d 917, 919 (1st Cir.1969). Courts should enforce in maritime contracts forum selection clauses unless a party "can clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching". M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1916, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972). Alternatively, a party, in maritime context, must clearly show "that a trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the party] will for all statistical purposes be deprived of his day in court". Id. at 18, 92 S.Ct. at 1917.
In Bremen, a forum non conveniens argument was rejected by the Supreme Court as not determinative when the maritime contract contains a forum selection clause. Id. at 6-9, 92 S.Ct. at 1911-1912. Therefore, when a choice of forum selection clause is applicable, a party's arguments as to forum non conveniens should be excluded and the court must apply the factors delineated in Bremen. (See Cambridge Nutrition A.G. v. Fotheringham, 840 F.Supp. 299, 301 (S.D.N.Y.1994))(standing for the proposition that even when a party argues the forum's inconvenience, that party must still meet Bremen's heavy burden in favor of an existing forum selection clause.) Likewise, it has been held that the mere fact that the forum selected by the parties may be inconvenient does not make the clause unreasonable especially since the alleged inconvenience was known and contemplated at the time of executing the contract. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Airborne Group PLC, 882 F.Supp. 1212, 1215 (D.P.R.1995) (citations omitted). The Airborne court, citing Bremen concluded that public policy concerns urged the enforcement of said forum selection clauses. Finally, forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. at 15, 92 S.Ct. at 1916.1
Since federal maritime law governs the enforceability of a forum selection clause and the instant case arises from a federal jurisdiction maritime Dockage Agreement, the instant case must be examined under the applicable federal law governing the instant dispute. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991); Fletcher v. Port Marine Center, Inc., 1990 WL 255536 (D.Mass.1990). Likewise, when a court examines restrictions in a contractual covenant of forum selection clause, the analysis is governed by the "reasonableness of notice" provided to the contracting parties. Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 867 (1st Cir.1983) (). Therefore, when examining under federal maritime law the "reasonable of notice" provided within maritime forum selection clause in a contract the Court must conduct a two-pronged test. Lousararian v. Royal Caribbean, 951 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir.1991)(citing Shankles v. Costa Armatori, 722 F.2d at 865).
Firstly, the court must examine the facial clarity of the restriction clause and whether its language and appearance make the relevant provisions sufficiently obvious and understandable. The second part of the two prong analysis focuses on "the circumstances of the [contracting party's] possession of and familiarity with the [contract]," which necessarily involves scrutiny of "any extrinsic factors indicating the [contracting party's] ability to become meaningfully informed of the contractual terms at stake." Shankles v. Costa Armatori, 722 F.2d at 865-866. The determination of enforceability must be made on a case-by-case basis.
At the outset, the court notes that plaintiffs in its opposition to the instant motion for summary judgment does not challenge the validity nor the enforceability of a forum selection clause under federal maritime law. Plaintiff's challenge is grounded in the argument that the forum selection clause as agreed by the parties was to be applicable to "all legal matters" as therein stated but because the instant case is not a "legal matter" related to the Dockage Agreement, said clause is unenforceable. Plaintiff sustains that the instant action has been pursued under diversity jurisdiction seeking remedies for Isleta's illegal actions prosecuting its claims at the local state court wherein a null and void attachment against Heck's properties was obtained.
However, since plaintiff's argument is based in the interpretation of a clause within the Dockage Agreement, its claims for relief must be examined as they occurred originally in the complaint. On September 24, 1992, the defendants filed a collection of money case against plaintiff before the local state court alleging lack of dockage payments relating to two plaintiff's vessels for the sum of $2,463.43. (Complaint at Docket No. 1, ¶ 5). The local state court entered default judgment against plaintiff. Latter, pursuant to an agreement amongst the parties full satisfaction of judgment was made in the amount of $5,000. (Complaint at Docket No. 1, ¶ 8). Three years afterwards, in January 1997, a second case was filed by instant defendants against plaintiff regarding other unpaid dockage fees amounting to $6,985.14. However, defendant moved for the voluntarily dismissal in said case and to reopen the first case, and moved to obtain an attachment order to secure the effectiveness of the judgment in the already closed first civil case. The local court issued a Writ of Attachment against one of plaintiff's vessels, to wit the Indigo. (Complaint at Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 11-14).
After attachment was made on the Indigo, plaintiff filed for protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case...
To continue reading
Request your trial