Heckler v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 June 1934
• Docket Number: No. 15.,15.
• Citation: 173 A. 12
• Parties: HECKLER v. BALTIMORE & O. R. CO.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

173 A. 12

HECKLER

v. BALTIMORE & O. R. CO.

No. 15.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 13, 1934.

Appeal from Circuit Court for Allegany County; Albert A. Doub, Judge.

Action by Henry J. Heckler against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed and case remanded, with directions.

Argued before BOND, C. J., and URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, DIGGES, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

Charles G. Watson, of Frostburg, for appellant.

Taylor Morrison, of Cumberland (A. Taylor Smith, of Cumberland, on the brief), for appellee.

ADKINS, Judge.

The questions in this case are raised by demurrer to the declaration, which alleges:

That the defendant is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce and was prior to 1915 operating a railroad with shops in Cumberland, Md., for building and repairing its equipment; that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant to work in its said shops and was engaged in the repair of interstate engines, and while so engaged was severely injured by having one of his legs cut off in or about the year 1915. "That the said defendant, by its claim agent, Walter Harrig and its attorney, Col. George A. Pearre, after suit was brought and before trial thereof, arranged a settlement with the plaintiff on the following terms and conditions; that the plaintiff was to accept the sum of three thousand nine hundred dollars in cash and that the plaintiff would be given steady employment by the defendant during the plaintiff's life, or so long as he was able to do work of any kind about the shops or railroad; that the plaintiff was paid the said three thousand nine hundred dollars, and was given his regular employment as soon as he was able to work, working at the repair of engines until the 31st day of December, 1929, at which time the defendant informed him he was furloughed, and since which time the defendant has given the plaintiff no work; that the plaintiff was employed for eight hours per day at fifty-seven cents per hour, working on said engines; that the plaintiff did his work satisfactorily without any complaint whatever by the defendant; that he was able at the time of his furlough to fully perforin his duties as an employee of the said defendant, always has been and still is capable of performing the said duties; that the agreement on the part of the defendant to give the plaintiff regular employment was considered the major portion of the consideration for making the settlement for the injury to the plaintiff for the loss of his leg; that the defendant has refused to further perform its part of the contract pertaining to the employment of the plaintiff, while the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of said contract, and the said defendant has given the plaintiff to understand that it does not intend to further perform its part of the said contract." The suit is brought for the alleged breach of the contract. It is contended by appellee that the declaration does not state a good cause of action. The only defect in the declaration seriously urged is that it fails to allege express authority in the agent from the board of directors to make the contract sued on, or a ratification thereof by said board after knowledge that it had been made. It may be conceded that by the weight of authority there is ordinarily no implied authority in a claim agent or attorney to make a contract for life employment. But in our opinion the allegation that "the said defendant, by its claim agent, Walter Harrig, and its attorney, Col. George A. Pearre, * * * arranged a settlement with the plaintiff, * * *" is in effect a statement that the defendant made the settlement, and that the named agents were acting by its authority and direction. Whether they did or not is a matter of proof.

In all the eases but one cited by appellee the questions involved were of proof and not of pleading. Carroll v. Manganese Steel Safe Co., Ill Md. 252, 73 A. 665; McGowan v. Finola Mfg. Co., 120 Md. 335, 87 A. 694; Carney v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 162 N. Y. 453, 57 N. E. 78, 49 L. R. A. 471, 76 Am. St. Rep. 347; Maxson v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 117 Mich. 218, 75 N. W. 459; Nephew v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 128 Mich. 599, 87 N. W. 753; Hornick v. Union Pac. R. Co., 85 Kan. 568, 118 P. 60, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 826, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 208; Bohanan v. Boston & Maine R. R., 70 N. H. 526, 49 A. 103; The Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St Louis Ry. Co. v. Green, 126 Ohio St. 512, 186 N. E. 365, 87 A. L. R. 1268.

The only case cited in which the pleadings appear to have been passed on is Heaman v. E. N. Rowell Co., Inc., 261 N. Y. 229, 185 N. E. 83, where the court said:

"The question is whether an allegation in the complaint that an oral contract of employment for life by a corporation was made through its president, can be upheld as sufficient in law. That a contract for employment for life if authorized by the corporation and based on an adequate consideration, will ordinarily be sustained admits of no dispute." Citing several cases. "Alleged contracts of life employment are, however, so unusual as to have been, with rare exceptions, condemned by the courts as unreasonable and unauthorized. The president or other executive officer of a corporation has no authority as such to make a contract that one should remain in the corporate employ for life even under a general power 'to appoint, remove and fix the compensation of employees.' That any board of directors or other persons responsible for the management of a corporation should give such unusual power to an executive officer cannot be implied. Plain language of the managing...