Heckler v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 21 March 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-874,82-874 |
| Citation | 104 S.Ct. 1532,79 L.Ed.2d 878,465 U.S. 870 |
| Parties | Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Petitioner, v. Mildred M. EDWARDS etc |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 grants federal courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of district courts, "except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Title 28 U.S.C. § 1252 provides in its first paragraph for such a direct appeal from a district court judgment holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action to which the United States or any of its agencies, or an officer or employee thereof, is a party. Section 1252 further provides in its second paragraph that a party who has received notice of an appeal under the section shall take any subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court and that all appeals taken to other courts prior to such notice shall be treated as taken directly to the Supreme Court. Respondent filed a class action in Federal District Court against petitioner Secretary of Health and Human Services, challenging the constitutionality of § 211(a)(5)(A) of the Social Security Act, which provides that all gross income and deductions derived from a family business in community property States shall be attributed to the husband unless the wife can establish that she exercised substantially all of the management and control of the business, in which case all income would be treated as the wife's. Although petitioner conceded the unconstitutionality of § 211(a)(5)(A)'s gener-based presumption, the District Court nevertheless rejected petitioner's claim of mootness, held the statute unconstitutional, and granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. The court then found the respondent class entitled retroactively to an allocation of coproprietor income between the spouses' earnings accounts on the basis of labor contributed by each. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, challenging only the District Court's remedy. The Court of Appeals granted respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under § 1291, because direct review could be had in this Court pursuant to § 1252.
Held: A party does not have a right to direct review in this Court under § 1252 unless the district court's holding of federal statutory unconstitutionality is in issue, and hence here the Court of Appeals improperly dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, since only the District Court's remedy was challenged. Pp. 876-885.
(a) While a literal reading of § 1252 would seem to give a party a right to a direct appeal to this Court under the circumstances of this case, the natural sense of § 1252 is that the holding of statutory unconstitutionality, not other issues such as attorney's fees, remedy, or related state-law claims, is what Congress wished this Court to review in the first instance. Pp. 877-879.
(b) Section 1252's structure supports this view. The conclusion inherent in that structure is that not all appeals in a case in which an Act of Congress has been held unconstitutional must be taken directly to this Court, the necessary corollary to the second paragraph of § 1252 being that in the absence of a notice of appeal under § 1252 other appeals in the case will follow the normal route for appellate review. Because direct review is linked to a court's holding a federal statute unconstitutional, the logical test of which appeals from a judgment must be brought directly to this Court and which, standing alone, must follow the normal route of appellate review, is whether the issue on appeal is the holding of statutory unconstitutionality. Pp. 879-880.
(c) The legislative history also supports the view that Congress considered the jurisdictional predicate for mandatory review by this Court to be appealed from the constitutional holding. Congress' concerns in enacting § 1252's predecessor about the separation of powers and the need for certainty and uniformity in the administration of federal law are not implicated in cases in which the Government concedes statutory unconstitutionality by its decision not to appeal that aspect of the district court's judgment. The only justification for exerting this Court's mandatory jurisdiction in a case such as this might be the considerable ramifications of district court orders, but serious consequences alone cannot support the exercise of such jurisdiction. Although remedial aspects of a case are important, the touchstone of direct appeal under § 1252 is not a party's or this Court's own judgment of the significance of a decision. In § 1252 Congress mandated direct review not simply for decisions with impact but rather for decisions whose impact was predicated upon a potentially incorrect exercise of judicial review. A construction of § 1252 that would require this Court to review collateral issues as independent matters, rather than as pendent to the holding of statutory unconstitutionality, would undermine the effectiveness of the direct appeal provision. Pp. 880-885.
Vacated and remanded.
John H. Garvey, for petitioner.
Neal S. Dudovitz, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.
This case raises an issue concerning this Court's mandatory jurisdiction. Federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of district courts, "except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Section 1252 of Title 28 provides for such a direct appeal from a United States court's judgment, in a civil proceeding to which the Government is a party, holding that an Act of Congress is unconstitutional. The issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the Secretary's appeal from a proceeding in which a federal statute was declared unconstitutional, but in which the Government challenged only the district court's remedy.
Respondent filed this suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in October 1980. On behalf of a nationwide class of Social Security applicants and recipients, respondent challenged the constitutionality of § 211(a)(5)(A) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(A), which established a gender-based presumption concerning the allocation of income from family businesses in community property states.1 In pretrial proceedings, the Secretary argued that the constitutional ruling sought by the class was unnecessary because the Secretary acquiesced in judicial precedents holding the challenged provision unconstitutional.2 Indeed, shortly after respondent's complaint was filed, the Attorney General formally notified Congress that the Executive would not defend the constitutionality of the section.3 The District Court nevertheless rejected the Secretary's claim of mootness, and granted respondent's motion for summary judgment.4 According to the Court, although the Secretary "essentially conceded the unconstitutionality of § 411(a)(5)(A)," a ruling on the merits was necessary because the Department was still applying the challenged statutory section.5
Having held the statute unconstitutional, the district court turned to the issue of relief. The unconstitutional provision had provided that all gross income and deductions derived from a nonpartnership trade or business in community property jurisdictions should be attributed to the husband unless the wife could establish that she exercised substantially all of the management and control of the business, in which case all income would be treated as the wife's. Having struck down this gender-based presumption, the court found the respondent class entitled to an allocation of co-proprietor income between the spouses' earnings accounts on the basis of the relative amount of labor contributed by each. Finding that retroactive application of its holding was appropriate under the tests of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the court found that class members "are entitled to a recomputation of their earnings records, extending back to the beginning of Social Security if necessary." Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3959 (ND Cal., Jan. 22, 1982). The court entered judgment March 23, 1982.
The following week the Secretary filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.6 In its docketing statement, filed on May 5, 1982, the Secretary listed only matters concerning the remedy ordered by the district court, noting that the Government conceded the unconstitutionality of the statute.7 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the Secretary's appeal, contending that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 "where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Respondents argued that the Secretary had such a right to direct review to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, because the District Court had held a statute unconstitutional in a civil action to which a United States officer was a party. In a one sentence order dated July 27 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted respondents' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, citing Donovan v. Richland County Assn. for Retarded Citizens, 454 U.S. 389, 102 S.Ct. 713, 70 L.Ed.2d 570 (1982) (per curiam). The Secretary timely filed a petition for certiorari to the Ninth Circuit seeking our review of this dismissal. Because the petition raised an important question concerning this Court's mandatory docket, we granted certiorari. --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1182, 75 L.Ed.2d 430 (1983). We conclude that a party does not have a right to direct review in the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 unless the holding of federal statutory unconstitutionality is in issue. We therefore vacate and remand for reinstatement of the appeal.
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