Heckler v. Ringer, No. 82-1772

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtREHNQUIST
Citation80 L.Ed.2d 622,104 S.Ct. 2013,466 U.S. 602
Docket NumberNo. 82-1772
Decision Date14 May 1984
PartiesMargaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Petitioner, v. Freeman H. RINGER et al

466 U.S. 602
104 S.Ct. 2013
80 L.Ed.2d 622
Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Petitioner,

v.

Freeman H. RINGER et al.

No. 82-1772.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Feb. 27, 1984.
Decided May 14, 1984.
Syllabus

Part A of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, commonly known as the Medicare Act, provides insurance for the cost of hospital and related posthospital expenses, but precludes reimbursement for services which are not "reasonable and necessary" for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury. Judicial review of a claim under the Medicare Act is available only after the Secretary of Health and Human Services renders a "final decision" on the claim in the same manner as is provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for old-age and disability claims arising under Title II of the Social Security Act. Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), to the exclusion of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-question jurisdiction), makes § 405(g) the sole avenue for judicial review of all "claim[s] arising under" the Medicare Act. Pursuant to her rulemaking authority, the Secretary has provided that a "final decision" is rendered on a Medicare claim only after the claimant has pressed the claim through all designated levels of administrative review. In January 1979, the Secretary issued an administrative instruction to all fiscal intermediaries that no payment is to be made for Medicare claims arising out of a surgical procedure known as bilateral carotid body resection (BCBR) when performed to relieve respiratory distress. Until October 1980, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), who were not bound by the instruction, consistently ruled in favor of claimants whose BCBR claims had been denied by the intermediaries. The Appeals Council also authorized payment for BCBR Part A expenses in a case involving numerous claimants. On October 28, 1980, the Secretary issued a formal administrative ruling, intended to have a binding effect on the ALJs and the Appeals Council, prohibiting them from ordering Medicare payments for BCBR operations occurring after that date, the Secretary having concluded that the BCBR procedure was not "reasonable and necessary" within the meaning of the Medicare Act. Without having exhausted their administrative remedies, respondents brought an action in Federal District Court challenging the Secretary's instruction and ruling, and relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (mandamus against federal official), and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to establish jurisdiction. Respondents are four Medicare claimants for whom BCBR surgery was prescribed to relieve pulmonary problems. Three of the respondents (Holmes, Webster-Zieber, and Vescio) had the surgery be-

Page 603

fore October 28, 1980, and filed claims for reimbursement with the fiscal intermediary, and the fourth respondent (Ringer) never had the surgery, claiming that he was unable to afford it. The complaint sought a declaration that the Secretary's refusal to find that BCBR surgery is "reasonable and necessary" under the Medicare Act is unlawful and an injunction compelling her to instruct her intermediaries to provide payment for BCBR claims and barring her from forcing claimants to pursue administrative appeals in order to obtain payment. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, holding that in essence respondents were claiming entitlement to benefits for the BCBR procedure, that any challenges to the Secretary's procedure were "inextricably intertwined" with respondents' claim for benefits, and that therefore respondents must exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to § 405(g) before pursuing their action in federal court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that to the extent respondents were seeking to invalidate the Secretary's procedure for determining entitlement to benefits, those claims were cognizable under the federal-question and mandamus statutes, without the administrative exhaustion requirement of § 405(g). While acknowledging that § 405(g) with its exhaustion requirement provides the only jurisdictional basis for seeking judicial review of claims for benefits, the court nonetheless held that the District Court erred in requiring respondents to exhaust their administrative remedies, since exhaustion would be futile and might not fully compensate respondents for their asserted injuries in view of the fact that they sought payment without the prejudice and the necessity of appeal—resulting from the existence of the Secretary's instruction and ruling.

Held:

1. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is in no sense futile for respondents Holmes, Webster-Zieber, and Vescio, and they, therefore, must adhere to the administrative procedure that Congress has established for adjudicating their Medicare claims. Pp. 613-619.

(a) The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that any portion of these respondents' claims could be channeled into federal court by way of federal-question jurisdiction. The inquiry in determining whether § 405(h) bars federal-question jurisdiction must be whether the claim "arises under" the Medicare Act, not whether it lends itself to a "substantive" rather than a "procedural" label. Here, all aspects of these respondents' challenge to the Secretary's BCBR payment policy "aris[e] under" the Medicare Act. Pp. 613-616.

(b) Assuming without deciding that § 405(h) does not foreclose mandamus jurisdiction in all Social Security Act cases, the District Court did not err in dismissing respondents' complaint because no writ of mandamus could properly issue. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1361 is intended to provide a remedy only if the plaintiff has exhausted all other avenues of

Page 604

relief and only if the defendant owes him a nondiscretionary duty. Here, the above respondents clearly have an adequate remedy under § 405(g) for challenging all aspects of the Secretary's denial of their claims, and thus § 405(g) is the only avenue for judicial review of their claims. While these respondents satisfied the nonwaivable requirement of presenting a claim to the Secretary, they did not satisfy the waivable requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. Pp. 616-619.

2. The District Court had no jurisdiction as to respondent Ringer. His claim is essentially one requesting the payment of benefits for BCBR surgery, a claim cognizable only under § 405(g). Mandamus jurisdiction is unavailable to him for the same reasons it is unavailable to the other respondents. Regarding federal-question jurisdiction, as with the other respondents, all aspects of Ringer's claim "aris[e] under" the Medicare Act. He must pursue his claim under § 405(g) in the same manner that Congress has provided. Because he has not given the Secretary an opportunity to rule on a concrete claim for reimbursement, he has not satisfied the non-waivable exhaustion requirement of § 405(g). Pp. 620-626.

697 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir.1982), reversed.

Edwin S. Kneedler, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Malcolm J. Harkins, III, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondents.

Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents are individual Medicare claimants who raise various challenges to the policy of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) as to the payment of Medi-

Page 605

care benefits for a surgical procedure known as bilateral carotid body resection (BCBR). The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding that in essence respondents are claiming entitlement to benefits for the BCBR procedure and therefore must exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), before pursuing their action in federal court. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration on the merits. 697 F.2d 1291 (1982). We granted certiorari to sort out the thorny jurisdictional problems which respondents' claims present, 463 U.S. 1206, 103 S.Ct. 3535, 77 L.Ed.2d 1386 (1983), and we now reverse as to all respondents.

I

Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq., commonly known as the Medicare Act, establishes a federally subsidized health insurance program to be administered by the Secretary. Part A of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395c et seq., provides insurance for the cost of hospital and related posthospital services, but the Act precludes reimbursement for any "items or services . . . which are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury." § 1395y(a)(1). The Medicare Act authorizes the Secretary to determine what claims are covered by the Act "in accordance with the regulations prescribed by him." § 1395ff(a). Judicial review of claims arising under the Medicare Act is available only after the Secretary renders a "final decision" on the claim, in the same manner as is provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 1 for old age and disability claims arising under Title II of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(C).

Page 606

Pursuant to her rulemaking authority, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395hh, 1395ii (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(a)), the Secretary has provided that a "final decision" is rendered on a Medicare claim only after the individual claimant has pressed his claim through all designated levels of administrative review.2 First, the Medicare Act authorizes the Secretary to enter into contracts with fiscal intermediaries providing that the latter will determine whether a particular medical service is covered by Part A, and if so, the amount of the reimbursable expense for that service. 42 U.S.C. § 1395h, 42 CFR § 405.702 (1983). If the intermediary determines that a particular service is not covered under Part A, the claimant can seek reconsideration by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) in the Department of Health and Human Services. 42 CFR §§ 405.710-405.716 (1983). If denial of the claim...

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1474 practice notes
  • Linquist v. Bowen, Nos. 86-1486
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • June 3, 1987
    ...in Social Security cases. The Supreme Court has reserved the question several times. See Bowen, 106 S.Ct. at 2028 n. 9; Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 2022, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 698, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2556, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); Nor......
  • Johnson v. Saul, Case No.: 20-CV-747 JLS (AHG)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of California)
    • January 25, 2021
    ...EDL, 2008 WL 3823718, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008) (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 766 (1975)) (citing Hecker v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614-18 (1984)); accord Stevenson v. Astrue, No. C 06-05422 JSW, 2007 WL 9711964, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2007) ("The Supreme Court has interp......
  • Delta Health v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human, No. 3:05-CV-436/RV/EMT.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Florida
    • October 17, 2006
    ...and (h) constitute the "sole avenue" for judicial review of a claim arising under the Medicare Act. See generally Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614-15, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984). These provisions channel the claim through HHS's administrative apparatus, thus allowing the agen......
  • Supreme Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Azar, CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-1370
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Western District of Louisiana
    • April 8, 2019
    ...for judicial review for all "claim[s] arising under" the Medicare Act, even to the exclusion of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614-15, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 2021 (1984) (citation omitted). Therefore, if the suit "arises under" the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq., federa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1467 cases
  • Linquist v. Bowen, Nos. 86-1486
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • June 3, 1987
    ...in Social Security cases. The Supreme Court has reserved the question several times. See Bowen, 106 S.Ct. at 2028 n. 9; Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 2022, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 698, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2556, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); Nor......
  • Johnson v. Saul, Case No.: 20-CV-747 JLS (AHG)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of California)
    • January 25, 2021
    ...EDL, 2008 WL 3823718, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008) (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 766 (1975)) (citing Hecker v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614-18 (1984)); accord Stevenson v. Astrue, No. C 06-05422 JSW, 2007 WL 9711964, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2007) ("The Supreme Court has interp......
  • Delta Health v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human, No. 3:05-CV-436/RV/EMT.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Florida
    • October 17, 2006
    ...and (h) constitute the "sole avenue" for judicial review of a claim arising under the Medicare Act. See generally Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614-15, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984). These provisions channel the claim through HHS's administrative apparatus, thus allowing the agen......
  • Supreme Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Azar, CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-1370
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Western District of Louisiana
    • April 8, 2019
    ...for judicial review for all "claim[s] arising under" the Medicare Act, even to the exclusion of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614-15, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 2021 (1984) (citation omitted). Therefore, if the suit "arises under" the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq., federa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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