Heckman v. Sisters of Charity of House of Providence in Territory of Washington

• Decision Date: 22 October 1940
• Docket Number: 27982.
• Citation: 106 P.2d 593,5 Wn.2d 699
• Parties: HECKMAN et ux. v. SISTERS OF CHARITY OF HOUSE OF PROVIDENCE IN TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

106 P.2d 593

5 Wn.2d 699

HECKMAN et ux. v. SISTERS OF CHARITY OF HOUSE OF PROVIDENCE IN TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON.

No. 27982.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 22, 1940

Department 2.

Action by Robert Heckman and Almeda Heckman, his wife, against the Sisters of Charity of the House of Providence in the Territory of Washington, to recover damages on account of an injury suffered by Almeda Heckman when she fell on a sidewalk located on the defendant's property, to the entrance of a hospital building owned and operated by the defendant. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendant appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Hon Calvin S. Hall, judge.

J Speed Smith and Henry Elliott, Jr., both of Seattle, for appellant.

Oscar A. Zabel and W. L. Gibbon, both of Seattle, for respondents.

BEALS Justice.

Robert and Almeda Heckman, husband and wife, instituted this action against Sisters of Charity of the House of Providence in the Territory of Washington, a corporation, for the purpose of recovering damages on account of an injury suffered by Mrs Heckman during the month of September, 1937, when she fell on a sidewalk located on defendant's property, and leading from Seventeenth avenue, in the city of Seattle, to the lower entrance of Providence hospital, the building owned and operated by defendant for the purpose of caring for the sick and infirm. In their complaint, plaintiffs pleaded facts which they contend entitle them to recover judgment against defendant, the material allegations of which were denied by defendant in its answer. The action was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor in the sum of $2,500. From a judgment entered upon this verdict, defendant has appealed.

Error is assigned upon the denial of appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; upon the overruling of its motion to dismiss the action; and upon the denial of appellant's motion for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative for a new trial. Appellant also complains of several instructions given by the court, to which it excepted, and of the refusal of the court to give certain instructions which appellant requested. These assignments of error will be discussed in two groups: First, those by which appellant contends that the judgment is not supported by the evidence; and second, those in connection with the giving and refusing of instructions.

Respondent Almeda Heckman will be referred to in this opinion as though she were the sole respondent.

It was stipulated that appellant is a charitable corporation, and that Providence hospital, which for many years has been conducted by appellant in the city of Seattle, is a charitable institution, within the meaning of the laws of this state.

In connection with the work of this hospital, appellant has for some years maintained a school of nursing, conducting the courses of study in connection with the University of Washington, and appellant has provided board and lodging, during their course of study, to young women who were studying to become graduate nurses. It was appellant's custom to hold, twice a year, a ceremony at which student nurses attending the University of Washington, who had elected to take their hospital training either at Providence hospital or Harborview hospital, in the city of Seattle, should receive their caps. These students continued in attendance at the university, while obtaining practical training at the hospitals mentioned.

It was proposed to hold one of these capping ceremonies at eight o'clock on the evening of September 26, 1937, Miss Betty McCormick being one of the students who was to receive her cap on that occasion. Each candidate for a cap was permitted to invite relatives and friends to the ceremony, and Miss McCormick invited respondent, a friend of long standing, to attend.

Appellant owns an entire block between Seventeenth and Eighteenth avenues, in the city of Seattle, the main entrance to the hospital building being from Seventeenth avenue. The auditorium is not part of the hospital building, but is in a wing of the building occupied by the nurses, the entrances to the auditorium being on Eighteenth avenue. It was in this auditorium that the capping ceremony was to be held.

On the evening in question, respondent went to the hospital, but not knowing just where the ceremony was to be held, entered the grounds from Seventeenth avenue. The main entrance to the hospital is approached by a flight of steps, the vehicle entrance being on the ground level. The driveway for vehicles curves and rises slightly as it approaches the entrance. A sidewalk which passes the steps to the main entrance leads to this driveway, and at the point where it reaches the curb of the driveway, is a little higher than the driveway surface, one inch higher at the right hand side of a pedestrian approaching the driveway, and two and one-half inches higher at the left. Pedestrians entering the hospital on the ground floor follow the curving walk, cross the driveway inclining to the right, and so enter the hospital. Respondent followed this sidewalk, and when she reached the step down on to the driveway, did not notice that the driveway was on a slightly lower level than the sidewalk, and in stepping from the sidewalk, because of the difference in elevation, stepped down and fell, suffering the injury of which she complains.

The way followed by respondent in entering the hospital is used by many persons, the walk is perfectly level, and if a pedestrian is aware of the slight difference in grade between the driveway and the walk, no dangerous situation is presented.

Directly above the entrance, and a little to the right of the end of the walk at the driveway, is an electric light, consisting of four fifty-watt lamps, which light is turned on each day as darkness approaches. At the time respondent fell, it was dark, and respondent testified positively that the light was not turned on. Appellant frankly admits that under the evidence the jury could find that the electric light was not turned on. The site of the accident would be rendered darker by the fact that the hospital building loomed up directly in front of respondent, while the abutment of the flight of steps leading to the main entrance to the hospital would tend to cut off any light which might have come from respondent's right.

In conducting its courses for the training of nurses, appellant was carrying out its general charitable purposes, this branch of its operations being within its proper and necessary functions in the conduct of its hospital. Respondent entered upon appellant's property as an invited guest of Miss McCormick, who was authorized by appellant's agents in charge of the evening's exercises, to invite her friends. Appellant argues that, in accepting this invitation, respondent became a beneficiary of the charitable work conducted by appellant, citing Glaser v. Congregation Kehillath Israel, 263 Mass. 435, 161 N.E. 619; Bianchi v. South Park Presbyterian Church, 123 N.J.L. 325, 8 A.2d 567, 124 A.L.R. 808; and Bodenheimer v. Confederate Memorial Ass'n, 4 Cir., 68 F.2d 507. Appellant then argues that, as under our decisions following the majority rule, a charitable institution such as appellant is not liable for the negligence of its employees, if it has exercised reasonable care in their selection and retention ( Bise v. St. Luke's Hospital, 181 Wash. 269, 43 P.2d 4), respondent is not entitled to recover herein, as no negligence on the part of appellant in selecting or retaining any employee was pleaded or proven.

We cannot follow appellant's argument on this phase of the case. We are not inclined to extend the doctrine that a paying patient in a hospital maintained by a charitable organization may recover for injuries suffered only if the hospital was guilty of negligence in the selection or retention of one of its staff or employees. Respondent was neither seeking nor receiving any benefit which could be classed as charitable. In 13 R.C.L. 948, § 12, is found the following: 'Liability to Strangers and Others Not Patients.--The theories of the immunity of a hospital from liability on the ground of public policy and on the ground that the assets are a trust fund having been very generally rejected by the courts, and the doctrine of waiver by acceptance of benefits being applicable only to patients, the law has come to be that as to others not the recipient of the institution's charity the rule of responsibility for the negligence of its servants and agents is applied as in cases of the ordinary business corporation. Thus, recovery has been had in favor of a stranger injured by reason of the unsafe condition of hospital premises, or by an employee's mechanic...