Heckman v. Williamson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 08 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–0671.,10–0671.
• Citation: 369 S.W.3d 137,55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 803
• Parties: Kerry HECKMAN, et al., on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Petitioners, v. WILLIAMSON COUNTY, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

369 S.W.3d 137

55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 803

Kerry HECKMAN, et al., on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Petitioners,

v.WILLIAMSON COUNTY, et al., Respondents.

No. 10–0671.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Nov. 9, 2011.

Decided June 8, 2012.

Andrea Michele Marsh, Rebecca Ruth Webber, Texas Fair Defense Project, Austin, TX, Harry Williams IV, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., Seattle, WA, for Kerry Heckman.

Henry W. Prejean Jr., Assistant Williamson County Atty., Jana L. Hunsicker, Williamson County Attorney Office, Stephen Christopher Ackley, Williamson County Attorney, Georgetown, TX, for Williamson County.

Michael P. ‘Mike’ Davis, Law Offices of Mike Davis, Round Rock, TX, Jana L. Hunsicker, Williamson County Attorney Office, Stephen Christopher Ackley, Williamson County Attorney, Georgetown, TX, C. Robert Heath, Bickerstaff Heath Delgado Acosta LLP, Austin, TX, for Suzanne Brooks.

Jessie A. Amos, DLA Piper LLP, Houston, TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas Appleseed.

Kurt Howard Kuhn, Kurt Kuhn, PLLC, Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae Law Professors.

Justice WILLETT delivered the opinion of the Court.

A criminal defendant's right to counsel—enshrined in both the United States and Texas Constitutions—ranks among the most important and fundamental rights in a free society. The plaintiffs in this civil action assert that they, and other similarly situated indigent criminal defendants, have been deprived of that right. The court of appeals dismissed their suit, concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. We disagree. While our Constitution requires vigilance lest courts overstep their jurisdictional bounds, courts also must dutifully exercise jurisdiction rightly theirs. Here, the court of appeals erred in concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims are moot. We reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Background

In 2006, petitioners Kerry Heckman, Monica Maisenbacher, Sylvia Peterson, and Tammy Newberry each faced misdemeanor charges in Williamson County—charges that could lead to up to a year in prison. Each claimed to be unable to afford legal representation. And each claimed that he or she had been, or soon would be, denied his or her right to court-appointed counsel.

They sought relief by initiating this lawsuit pursuant to section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. In addition to suing Williamson County, they sued its constitutional county judge,¹ three of its county court at law judges,² and its magistrate judge ³—all in their official capacities.

Heckman, Maisenbacher, Peterson, and Newberry claimed that these defendants (“defendants”) had deprived, conspired to deprive, and allowed others to deprive them of two constitutionally protected rights: the right to counsel and the right to self-representation. Petitioner Jessica Stempko, whose minor daughter was then facing misdemeanor charges in Williamson County, joined them in a third claim: that defendants had deprived them of their constitutionally protected right to open-court proceedings.

These five plaintiffs (“plaintiffs” or “named plaintiffs”) brought these claims not just on their own behalf but for the putative class of all individuals accused of a misdemeanor crime in Williamson County who faced the possibility of confinement and could not afford legal counsel. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief “[t]o stop Defendants' unconstitutional and unfair practices.”

Defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction. First, they asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to intervene in equity into pending criminal proceedings. Second, they argued that Heckman, Maisenbacher, and Peterson all lacked standing to bring their claims and that their claims were moot. They introduced undisputed evidence that since joining this suit, those three plaintiffs had each been appointed counsel and, further, that their criminal cases had concluded. Defendants also introduced undisputed evidence that a visiting judge ⁴ had been the one who refused to provide appointed counsel to Heckman, Maisenbacher, and Peterson—not any of the defendant county court at law judges. Third, defendants argued that Newberry's claims and Stempko's claim were not ripe because they were based on events that had not yet happened (that is, they were not yet far enough along in the pretrial process to have any grounds to make these claims).

The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction. Defendants promptly filed an interlocutory appeal,⁵ leading the trial court to stay further proceedings. Consequently, the trial court did not rule on plaintiffs' petition for class certification—it neither certified the class nor denied certification.

On appeal, defendants renewed their jurisdictional arguments. They also moved to dismiss and filed supplemental briefing, noting that all of plaintiffs' criminal cases had been resolved and that, beforehand, all of them had been appointed counsel. (In the case of Jessica Stempko, who did not face criminal charges, defendants asserted the same with regard to her daughter.) Finally, they asserted that a number of subsequent developments had mooted the claims of the putative class—Williamson County had revised its policies for appointing legal counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants, and had hired additional personnel to ensure that those defendants who needed a lawyer received one.

The court of appeals held that none of the named plaintiffs ever had standing to pursue all of the purported class's claims; for this reason, the court held that none of the named plaintiffs had standing to litigate whether the putative class should be certified. The court held that, for this reason, the claims were moot, as was the suit itself.⁶ It vacated the trial court's denial of defendants' plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the suit for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Thereafter, we granted plaintiffs' petition for review.⁷

II. Appellate Jurisdiction of this Court

Defendants argue that this appeal falls outside the constitutional and statutory scope of our appellate jurisdiction. Because these issues may be dispositive, we consider them first.

A. Interlocutory Appeals

Ordinarily, this Court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from an interlocutory order.⁸ Here, however, we have jurisdiction over this case because the court of appeals' decision conflicts with prior decisions of this Court.⁹ The court of appeals held that, because no named plaintiff had standing on all of the class's claims, no named plaintiff had standing at all.¹⁰ Previously, we have held that a plaintiff's lack of standing to bring some, but not all, of his claims just deprives the court of jurisdiction over those discrete claims.¹¹ Given this conflict, we conclude that this case does not fall outside the statutory scope of our appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals.

B. “Criminal Law Matters”

We next consider whether this case falls outside the scope of our appellate jurisdiction as delineated by the Texas Constitution. Defendants assert that it does, arguing that Heckman's case amounts to a “criminal law matter.” We disagree.

1.

The jurisdiction of this Court—like that of all Texas courts—derives from Texas's Constitution and statutes.¹² Under our Constitution, this Court's appellate jurisdiction “extend[s] to all cases except in criminal law matters.” ¹³ Thus, if defendants are correct and this appeal constitutes a criminal law matter, then we lack the authority to decide it.¹⁴

No one rule clearly defines the content or contours of “criminal law matters.” We do not write on an entirely blank slate, however. To determine whether a case is a criminal law matter, we look to the essence of the case to determine whether the issues it entails are more substantively criminal or civil.¹⁵ Criminal law matters include disputes where “criminal law is the subject of the litigation;” such cases include those “which arise over the enforcement of statutes governed by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” ¹⁶ Criminal law matters also include disputes “which arise as a result of or incident to a criminal prosecution.” ¹⁷

In addition to the principles announced in our own caselaw, we find guidance in the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals.¹⁸ The Texas Constitution gives that court the authority to issue a variety of writs, including the writ of mandamus, “in criminal law matters.” ¹⁹ Thus, the Constitution uses the same term to demarcate the end of our appellate jurisdiction and the beginning of our sister court's mandamus jurisdiction. When interpreting “criminal law matters” for purposes of our own jurisdiction, “we should be mindful of the potential effect of our construction” upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.²⁰ By declaring that our appellate jurisdiction reaches a certain matter, we thereby define, and potentially limit, the jurisdiction of our constitutional sibling.²¹

2.

In this case, we are asked to consider the issues first raised by defendants' plea to the jurisdiction:

• Did the named plaintiffs lack standing to sue?

• Were their claims not yet ripe?

• Did the mooting of their individual claims render this suit moot?

These are questions of justiciability—a doctrine rooted in the Separation of Powers provision ²² and the Open Courts provision ²³ of the Texas Constitution.²⁴ These constitutional provisions—or, more specifically, the justiciability doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness that derive from them—are the subject of this appeal, “not any provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure nor any other criminal statute.” ²⁵ Nor must we provide any “construction of a criminal statute” to answer the justiciability questions here.²⁶ In other words, no “criminal law is the subject of the litigation.” ²⁷ Arguably for this reason alone, this case does not present a “criminal law matter.”

But beyond this technical analysis, a more fundamental reason...