Hector C. v. Immigration & Customs Enf't
| Decision Date | 16 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-1914 (SRN/LIB) |
| Parties | Hector C., Petitioner, v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a general referral in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1, as well as, upon Petitioner Hector C.'s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Docket No. 1].
Petitioner, who at the time he filed the present Petition was in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter "ICE"), filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter the "Petition") challenging the legality of his detention by ICE pending his removal from the United States. (See, Petition [Docket No. 1]). Petitioner seeks "immediate release" from custody pending his removal from the United States. (Id. at 3).
Since the filing of his Petition, however, Petitioner has been removed to Argentina. (Response [Docket No. 5]; Warrant of Removal/Deportation [Docket No. 6-1]). Because Petitioner has been removed from the United States to Argentina, this matter has become moot.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that this matter be dismissed without prejudice as moot.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Argentina. (See, Petition, [Docket No. 1], at 2). Petitioner entered the United States on February 16, 2018, using an Argentinian passport and a "B-1 visa." (Id.). Petitioner alleges his "B-1 visa" expired approximately six months after his entry into the United States. (Id.).
On February 11, 2020, ICE issued to Petitioner a Notice to Appear "charging [Petitioner with] removability pursuant to Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a nonimmigrant alien who remained in the country longer than the time allotted." (Campbell Decl., [Docket No. 6], ¶ 4). Petitioner subsequently appeared for proceedings in front of an Immigration Judge.
On April 1, 2020, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United States to Argentina. (Exhibit A [Docket No. 1-1]). Petitioner waived his right to appeal that Order of Removal. (Id.). The Immigration Judge approved Petitioner's application for voluntary departure, and Petitioner was permitted until June 1, 2020, to voluntarily depart the United States. (Id.).
Petitioner did not depart the United States prior to June 1, 2020. (See, Petition [Docket No. 1]). Because Petitioner failed to voluntarily depart the United States or purchase an airline ticket for departure from the United States in the time permitted, the Order permitting him to voluntarily depart the United States was converted to a Final Order of Removal on June 1, 2020. (Campbell Decl., [Docket No. 6], ¶ 6).
At some unspecified time prior to June 16, 2020, Petitioner was detained by ICE. (See, Notice to Alien of File Custody Review [Docket No. 1-1]). On June 16, 2020, a "Warrant ofRemoval/Deportation" was issued in Petitioner's name. (Warrant of Removal/Deportation [Docket No. 6-1]).
On October 13, 2020, Petitioner was removed from the United States to Argentina. (Warrant of Removal/Deportation [Docket No. 6-1]; Campbell Decl., [Docket No. 6], ¶ 7).
Article III of the United States Constitution allows Federal Courts to adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies. See, Am. United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509 F.3d 406, 420-21 (8th Cir. 2007); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 497 (1969); Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081, 1086 (2011). "This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate" and "[w]hen an action no longer satisfies the case or controversy requirement, the action is moot and a federal court must dismiss the action." Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 329 F.3d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted); see, Roberts v. Norris, 415 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2005); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 45 (1997).
The ongoing case or controversy requirement is no longer met if an event occurs, during the course of the proceedings, which precludes the court from granting any meaningful relief to the party who initiated the action. See, In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 869-70 (8th Cir. 2000) ( ) . If it becomes impossible for the court to provide any further redress for the claims that have been raised, the case must be dismissed asmoot. See, Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) ().
In the present case, Respondents assert and provide documentation demonstrating that Petitioner has been removed from the United States to Argentina. Petitioner has not submitted any evidence or argument to dispute Respondents' assertion that he has been removed from the United States to Argentina. Therefore, Respondents contend that any challenges to the legality of Petitioner's detention are now moot. (See, Response [Docket No. 5]).
Petitioner's removal from the United States to Argentina leaves nothing for the Court to grant as relief in the present habeas Petition. See, e.g., Sirlef v. Secretary, 17-cv-4126 (DSD/HB), 2018 WL 3407697, at *1 (D. Minn. June 19, 2018) (collecting cases) report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3404154 (D. Minn. July 12, 2018).
Nothing about Petitioner's current situation would change with a finding that he had previously been detained unlawfully. "This is the very definition of mootness." Kargbo v. Brott, No. 15-cv-2713 (PJS/LIB), 2016 WL 3676162, at *2 (D. Minn. July 6, 2016) (citing Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90-91 (2013)). Without an active, ongoing case or controversy in the present case, this Court lacks the requisite subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding. See, e.g., Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 329 F.3d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 2003).
However, a petitioner's removal alone does not always automatically render moot a petition challenging the legality of detention and removal. See, Mohamed v. Lynch, No. 15-cv-2726 (JRT/LIB), 2016 WL 563164, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 593512 (D. Minn. Feb. 12, 2016); Sayonkon v. Beniecke, No. 12-cv-27 (MJD/JJK), 2012 WL 1621149, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1622545 (D. Minn. May 9, 2012). Rather, whether the petition becomes moot upon the petitioner's removal depends on whether any of the potential exceptions to the mootness doctrine may apply. Mohamed, 2016 WL 563164, at *3.
Under these exceptions, the Petition should not be dismissed as moot if: "(1) secondary or 'collateral' injuries survive after resolution of the primary injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a properly certified class action suit.
Id. (quoting Sayonkon, 2012 WL 1621149, at *2.
For the secondary or collateral injury exception to the mootness doctrine to apply, there must be "some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended" detention or "collateral consequence" still at issue. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). As this Court has previously and consistently held, this exception does not apply to when said injuries are a result of the final order of removal. See, Ahmed v. Sessions, No. 16-cv-02124 (DSD/HB), 2017 WL 3267738, at *2 (D. Minn. July 11, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3268176 (D. Minn. July 31, 2017).
In the present case, any possible continued injury would flow from Petitioner's removal to Argentina—an injury which Petitioner is unable to challenge under this Court's jurisdiction. Consequently, the secondary or collateral injury exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply in the case presently before the Court.
With regards to the exception to the mootness doctrine for actions which are capable of repetition yet evade review, the Eighth Circuit has stated:
This exception will "rescue an otherwise moot claim if (1) the challenged conduct is of too short a duration to be litigated fully prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again." [Nat'l Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Connor, 323 F.3d 684, 691 (8th Cir. 2003)]. The question is "whether the controversy was capable of repetition and not . . . whether the claimant had demonstrated that a recurrence of the dispute was more probable than not." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 n.6 (1988) (emphasis in original).
Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr, 830 F.3d 789, 795 (2016).
Although Petitioner's detention in the case presently before the Court ended before the full litigation of its legality, Petitioner cannot be subjected to the same alleged, unlawful conduct as is at issue in his current Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus....
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