Hector Donald v. Oregon Railroad Navigation Company

• Decision Date: 25 May 1914
• Docket Number: No. 463,463
• Citation: 233 U.S. 665,34 S.Ct. 772,58 L.Ed. 1145
• Parties: HECTOR McDONALD and Margaret McDonald, Plffs. in Err., v. OREGON RAILROAD & NAVIGATION COMPANY, Incorporated
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

233 U.S. 665

34 S.Ct. 772

58 L.Ed. 1145

HECTOR McDONALD and Margaret McDonald, Plffs. in Err.,

v OREGON RAILROAD & NAVIGATION COMPANY, Incorporated.

No. 463.

Submitted May 4, 1914.

Decided May 25, 1914.

Messrs. George E. Chamberlain, Will R. King, and Turner Oliver for plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. W. W. Cotton, Henry W. Clark, and Arthur C. Spencer for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant in error, hereafter referred to as the railroad company, was plaintiff below, and sued the plaintiffs in error, who were defendants, to enjoin them from interfering with its right of possession of a strip of land constituting a railroad right of way. It was alleged that this strip, which traversed property belonging to the defendants, had been bought from them by the railroad company for a cash price of $600, which was paid, but nevertheless the defendants, asserting some title to the land, were threatening to disturb the railroad in its possession, to tear up a track where laid, and otherwise to prevent the use of the land for the purpose for which it had been bought. The defendants answered, and although admitting that they had sold the land to the railway for a right of way, and had received the stipulated price, nevertheless asserted that they were yet the owners of the property for the following reasons: (a) Because in the deed by which the property was conveyed there was an express condition 'that the Oregon Railraod & Navigation Company will construct the line of road over the above-described premises within two years from the date hereof.' (b) Because while after the deed the railroad had commenced to construct its road, and had graded along the right of way, after doing so it suspended all work so that the two years provided in the deed elapsed without the railroad being built, and therefore all right to the land had been lost, and the defendants had reentered and notified the railroad of the fact.

Averring that the land was 'reasonably worth the sum of $1,000 and the plaintiff has not paid the same nor any part thereof, and has not offered to pay defendant anything for said land since its failure to comply with the condition of the deed,' the answer prayed not merely the rejection of the plaintiffs' demand and the dissolution of the injunction which had been allowed, but asked substantive relief; that is, that the defendants be decreed to be the owners, and that the complainant be enjoined from in any way interfering with them, and for the awarding of 'such other and further relief as shall seem to the court equitable in the premises.' After trial at which considerable testimony was taken, among other things, as to the value of the property, the court, holding in favor of the defendants, decided that the railroad, by virtue of its failure to build within the period specified, and the re-entry of the defendants, had lost all right to the land, and therefore that the subsequent action of the railroad in entering upon the land to complete its railroad was a trespass. The injunction which was issued at the inception of the cause was dissolved. On appeal the court below expressly adopted the legal principles which the trial court had applied; that is, the court likewise declared the cause in the deed to be a condition, and decided that the failure of the railroad to comply with its terms had forfeited all its right and title in and to the land. But nevertheless the...