Hedberg v. Cooley

• Decision Date: 19 July 1932
• Citation: 161 A. 665,115 Conn. 352
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HEDBERG v. COOLEY et al.

161 A. 665

HEDBERG v. COOLEY et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 19, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Carl Foster, Judge.

Action by Carla E. J. Hedberg, executrix of the estate of John Hedberg, against Walter Cooley and others, to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's decedent. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Rution appeals.

No error.

Thomas R. Robinson and Alfred C. Baldwin, win, Jr., both of New Haven (D. L. O'Neill, of New Haven, on the brief), for appellant.

James E. Murphy and Isadore L. Kotler, both of Bridgeport, for appellee.

MALTBIE, C.J.

Plaintiff's decedent was driving his automobile northerly on a state highway in Meriden. An automobile driven by the defendant Cooley, which was proceeding in the opposite direction, crashed, into the side of the decedent's car and almost immediately thereafter an automobile driven by the defendant Rution collided with the rear of the decedent's car. The decedent was so injured in the accident that he died very shortly thereafter. The plaintiff brought her action against both defendants, and the verdict finally returned and accepted by the court found the issues in her favor against both, fixing the damages at $10,000. The defendant Rution has appealed.

There was evidence from which the jury might reasonably have found the following facts: About a quarter of a mile south of the place of the accident the decedent's automobile had passed Rution's car, which was stopped at the side of the road, with Rution standing near it. He entered his car started it, and followed the decedent's. At a point about six hundred feet south of the place of the accident he was some one hundred and seventy-five feet behind it, then going at a speed of thirty to thirty-five miles, about the same speed as the decedent. The collision between Coley's car and that of the decedent brought the latter's almost to an immediate stop. Rution's car then struck the decedent's with great force, a fact which, aside from descriptive words used by the witnesses, is shown by other circumstances appearing from the evidence: Thus, by the first collision, the decedent's son, who was sitting beside him on the front seat, was thrown against the side of the car, but by the second he was thrown forward against the front of it; the decedent's wife, who was sitting on the back seat, kept her place during the first collision, but was thrown to the floor by the second; his daughter was thrown from the car and was found in a position such that the jury might fairly infer she was thrown out as a result of that collision; and the decedent's car was itself driven several feet forward as a result of it. From these facts the jury might reasonably have concluded that Rution was driving at an unreasonable speed at the time of the accident, was not keeping a proper outlook ahead, and did not control his car as he ought, to have done in the exercise of reasonable care, to avoid running into the decedent's automobile, and that, even in view of the emergency confronting him, he was negligent. King v. Haynes, 114 Conn. 396, 399, 158 A. 915. As the trial court instructed the jury, the negligence of Cooley in causing the first collision might be found to have brought about the second and so to have been a proximate cause of the decedent's death, if that was due to the second collision. Roden v Connecticut Co., 113 Conn. 408, 413, 155 A. 721; Burbee v. McFarland, 114 Conn. 56, 61, 157 A. 538; White v. Herler, 114 Conn. 734, 735, 159 A. 654. In this way the jury might have found concurring negligence on the part of both defendants. But Rution's negligence would not...