Hedding Camp Meeting Ass'n v. Epping

• Citation: 189 A. 347
• Parties: HEDDING CAMP MEETING Ass'n v. EPPING.
• Decision Date: 05 January 1937
• Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire

189 A. 347

HEDDING CAMP MEETING Ass'n
v.
EPPING.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Rockingham.

Jan. 5, 1937.

189 A. 348

Transferred from Superior Court, Rockingham County; Johnston, Judge.

Petition by the Hedding Camp Meeting Association against one Epping for abatement of taxes for 1932. The master's report was accepted except as to questions of law which it raised, which were transferred without ruling.

Case discharged.

Petition, for abatement of taxes for 1932. Referred to a master whose report was accepted, except the questions of law which it raised and which the court (Johnston, J.) has transferred without ruling. The opinion states the facts material thereto.

Arthur E. Sewall, of Portsmouth, for plaintiff.

Batchelder & Wheeler, of Exeter (Frank A. Batchelder, of Exeter, orally), for defendant.

ALLEN, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff was chartered by special act (Laws 1863, c. 2827) for such "religious, moral, charitable and benevolent purposes" as it might from time to time designate. The charter as modified by amendment (Laws 1891, c. 250) exempted from taxation its property except its cottages and rented buildings.

By general law (Laws 1913, c. 115, as amended; P.L. c. 60, § 22), charitable and religious societies, among other institutions, were exempted from taxation of their personal property and also of real estate "owned and occupied by them * * * for the purposes for which they are established, * * * provided none

189 A. 349

of the income or profits of the business of such corporations or institutions * * * is used * * * for other than * * * charitable or religious purposes."

The 1913 act contained a section (2) which reads: "All special acts exempting property of any such corporation or institution from taxation, unless such property is used as specified in section 1 of this act, and all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed." This section is not embodied in Public Laws, the 1926 revision of the general statute law, and the omission accomplished a repeal of the section. How far the repeal operated to revive the exemptions of the plaintiff's charter and amendment thereto becomes an inquiry. It did not revive them (P.L. c. 2, § 37) unless "such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature" (Id. § 1). The general statute was designed to establish a uniform scheme for tax exemptions of charitable institutions (St. Mary's School v. Concord, 80 N.H. 436, 118 A. 608), and no intent appears in the 1926 revision that it should not supersede the grant of exemptions in special instances. If there may be exceptions in particular cases, the reasons therefor are not here applicable. The master's ruling that the amendment of the plaintiff's charter has not been repealed, so far as it subjected certain of the plaintiff's property to taxation, was therefore erroneous. The general act is the sole law by which the plaintiff's exemption privileges are to be ascertained.

In St. Mary's School v. Concord, supra, 80 N.H. 436, 438, 118 A. 608, 609 the legislative intent was found to be "clear that property in the actual possession of others, occupied by tenants who are not students or officers of the corporation, should be taxed, and all other real estate occupied by such institution for its purposes should not be taxed."

Applying this general test, three items of property taxed are designated as a store building, dining hall, and cookhouse. Parts were rented and parts reserved for use incidental to the plaintiff's camp meetings. Only the rented portion of the buildings was assessed for taxation. The plaintiff is entitled to no abatement of the tax thereon. It did not occupy the property taxed. Another item is a tool house. Being rented, it also was unoccupied by the plaintiff, and hence taxable.

Two other items are a water system and an electric system. The contention that they are personal property cannot be accepted. If they are not to be...