Hedgecock v. Orlosky, 27729.
| Decision Date | 13 October 1942 |
| Docket Number | No. 27729.,27729. |
| Parties | HEDGECOCK v. ORLOSKY. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
HEDGECOCK
v.
ORLOSKY.
No. 27729.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
Oct. 13, 1942.
Personal injury action by Edward Orlosky against Christine Hedgecock. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Appellate Court and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court under Burns' Ann.St. § 4-215.
Reversed with directions.
Superseding original opinion of Appellate Court in 39 N.E.2d 452, and rehearing opinion in 40 N.E.2d 659.
ROLL, C. J., dissenting.
[44 N.E.2d 94]
Appeal from Newton Circuit Court; Geo. F. Sammons, Judge.
Bomberger, Peters & Morthland, of Hammond, for appellant.
George E. London and Wildermuth & Force, all of Gary, and Hume L. Sammons, and Parker D. Hancock, all of Kentland, for appellee.
SHAKE, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment for the appellee in an action for personal injuries charged to have been caused by the appellant's negligent operation of an automobile. The sole error assigned is the overruling of the motion for a new trial, in which it is asserted that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence and that it is contrary to law.
The undisputed evidence and that most favorable to the appellee tend to establish the following facts: The accident occurred about 6:30 P. M., November 9, 1937, on Indianapolis Boulevard in the city of Hammond, which is a heavily traveled thoroughfare consisting of two ways of
[44 N.E.2d 95]
three traffic lanes each, separated by double streetcar tracks. The appellant was driving north on the west lane of the east way which was next to the tracks. The appellee was in an automobile behind, proceeding in the same direction. The appellant suddenly slowed down and brought her car to a stop without warning about midway between intersecting streets, intending to cross the tracks to an eating place. The appellee applied his brakes, but his car collided with the appellant's.
Immediately after this collision the appellee undertook to back his car under its own power preparatory to driving around the appellant but discovered that his front bumper was interlocked with that on the rear of the appellant's car. He thereupon got out of his car and went to the appellant, who was sitting in her car, and remonstrated with her for not having given a signal to indicate that she intended to make a left turn or stop. After a brief conversation between the parties the appellee went to the rear of the appellant's car on the west side for the purpose of disengaging the bumpers, where he learned that the point of contact was on the east side. The appellee then jumped between the cars to the east side. Meanwhile the appellant had alighted and gone to the rear west end of her car. The appellee lifted upon his bumper and both parties pushed, thereby separating the cars about two feet. While they were between the cars, another automobile approached from the south, ran into the appellee's car from the rear, and forced it against the rear of the appellant's car inflicting injuries upon each of the...
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