Hedgepeth v. Clinic

Decision Date30 June 2011
Docket NumberNo. 07–CV–158.,07–CV–158.
Citation22 A.3d 789
PartiesTerry HEDGEPETH, Appellant,v.WHITMAN WALKER CLINIC and Mary Fanning, M.D., Appellees.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

22 A.3d 789

Terry HEDGEPETH, Appellant,
v.
WHITMAN WALKER CLINIC and Mary Fanning, M.D., Appellees.

No. 07–CV–158.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued En Banc June 10, 2010.Decided June 30, 2011.


[22 A.3d 791]

Jonathan C. Dailey, with whom Robert C. Kostecka and David P. Korteling, Bethesda, MD, were on the brief, for appellant.Marc Fiedler, with whom Laurie A. Amell, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for the Trial Lawyers Association of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., as amicus curiae in support of appellant.Alfred F. Belcuore, Washington, DC, for appellees.Kenneth H. Rosenau filed a brief on behalf of the Children's National Medical Center as amicus curiae in support of appellees.

[22 A.3d 792]

Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, RUIZ, GLICKMAN, FISHER, BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, THOMPSON, and OBERLY, Associate Judges, REID * and KRAMER,** Associate Judges, Retired, and FARRELL, Senior Judge.RUIZ, Associate Judge:

Appellant Terry Hedgepeth alleges that he suffered serious emotional distress after the doctor he saw at the Whitman Walker Clinic negligently informed him that he was HIV positive when, in fact, he was not. Appellant presented evidence that, as a result of the mistaken diagnosis, he was severely clinically depressed and suffered repercussions in his employment and personal life until another clinic correctly informed him that he was not afflicted with HIV, five years later. The Superior Court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that appellant had failed to establish the requisite facts for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, where there is no other harm. A division of this court affirmed, agreeing with the Superior Court that appellees' alleged negligence did not place appellant within a “zone of physical danger,” as required for recovery of emotional distress damages by Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062 (D.C.1990) (en banc). Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 980 A.2d 1229 (D.C.2009).

We granted the petition for rehearing en banc to decide whether the “zone of physical danger test” should be applied to preclude appellant's claim that his doctor's negligent misdiagnosis caused him serious emotional injury. Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 990 A.2d 455 (D.C.2010). After reviewing the development of the law on this issue and the reason for the Williams zone of physical danger test, we conclude that appellant's claim should not be barred simply because he was not put at risk of physical injury. Although the rule in Williams continues to be generally applicable to claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the zone of physical danger requirement imposes an unnecessary limitation upon, and is not to be applied indiscriminately in all cases to, claims of emotional distress brought against a defendant who has a relationship with the plaintiff, or has undertaken an obligation to the plaintiff, and whose negligence causes serious emotional distress to the plaintiff. We, therefore, adopt a rule—itself a limited one—that supplements the zone of physical danger test. We hold that a duty to avoid negligent infliction of serious emotional distress will be recognized only where the defendant has an obligation to care for the plaintiff's emotional well-being or the plaintiff's emotional well-being is necessarily implicated by the nature of the defendant's undertaking to or relationship with the plaintiff, and serious emotional distress is especially likely to be caused by the defendant's negligence. We conclude this is such a case: the appellees, in the context of a doctor-patient relationship, undertook to test and treat appellant for HIV, an undertaking that would necessarily implicate the patient's emotional well-being and entailed a specially likely risk of serious emotional distress. Appellant has presented evidence supporting his allegations that appellees negligently misdiagnosed him as being HIV positive and that this misdiagnosis caused him to suffer serious emotional distress. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment for appellees and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the principles we set out in this opinion.

[22 A.3d 793]

I. General Principles of Negligence

It is well-established that a claim alleging the tort of negligence must show: (1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) injury to the plaintiff that was proximately caused by the breach. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 321 (D.C.1984) (citing Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 30 (4th ed.1971) (hereinafter “Handbook of the Law of Torts”)). The court's threshold determination—namely, the existence of a duty—is “essentially a question of whether the policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have in fact occurred.” Id. at 321 (quoting Handbook of the Law of Torts, supra, § 42). Stated another way: “The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question—whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct.” Id. (quoting Handbook of the Law of Torts, supra, § 53). In this case, we are tasked with determining the scope of the duty to avoid causing emotional distress that results from negligence.

A. Duty and Foreseeability

In general, courts rely on the concept of “foreseeability” to determine whether the defendant owed a duty to the claimant in a negligence action and examine whether the risk to the claimant was “reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant.1 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Shannon, 696 A.2d 1359, 1366 (D.C.1997); Haynesworth v. D.H. Stevens Co., 645 A.2d 1095, 1098 (D.C.1994). If the injury that befell the plaintiff was “reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant, then courts will usually conclude that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to avoid causing that injury; if the injury was not “reasonably foreseeable,” then there was no duty. Compare Shannon, 696 A.2d at 1366 (holding that because playground accident due to poor maintenance could have been reasonably foreseeable to the District, trial court properly denied District's motion for judgment on the ground it owed no duty to child using playground), with Galloway v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 632 A.2d 736, 739–40 (D.C.1993) (holding that grocery store did not have “duty to foresee and protect” customer from rowdy children).2 See also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the District of Columbia v. DiSalvo, 974 A.2d 868, 870–71 (D.C.2009) (discussing the required showing of “heightened foreseeability” where the plaintiff claims that the defendant should be held liable for intervening criminal acts).

[22 A.3d 794]

B. Duty and the Relationship Between the Parties

The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is closely related to a court's determination of the foreseeability of the plaintiff's injury and, ultimately, the scope of the defendant's duty. See, e.g., Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. O'Neill, 633 A.2d 834, 840 (D.C.1993) (“[W]here a special relationship exists, such as between a common carrier and its passengers, the carrier undeniably has a duty to protect its passengers from foreseeable harm arising from criminal conduct of others.”); Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 105 (D.C.1980) (“It is established in the District of Columbia that a landlord has a duty to use reasonable care to keep safe those common areas of the building retained under his control.”). We have described a court's examination of whether a duty exists as a “foreseeability of harm test” that is determined, in large part, by the nature of the relationship between the parties:

In determining the existence of a duty owed to a plaintiff, [courts] have applied a “foreseeability of harm” test, which is based on the recognition that duty must be limited to avoid liability for unreasonably remote consequences.... Inherent also in the concept of duty is the relationship between the parties out of which the duty arises .... [U]ltimately, the determination of whether a duty should be imposed is made by weighing the various policy considerations and reaching a conclusion that the plaintiff's interest[s] are, or are not, entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant.

Odemns v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 137, 143 (D.C.2007) (alteration in original) (quoting W.C. & A.N. Miller Co. v. United States, 963 F.Supp. 1231, 1243 (D.D.C.1997)). Thus, “the scope of the defendant's undertaking determines the scope of its duty,” Haynesworth, 645 A.2d at 1098, by which we mean that the foreseeable risks associated with the defendant's failure to complete an undertaking provide the basis for the court's assessment of duty. Recently, we have even suggested that “the relationship between the parties is the key to determining whether the defendant had a legally enforceable duty to the plaintiff,” Bd. of Trs., 974 A.2d at 871 n. 1 (quoting Workman v. United Methodist Comm., 355 U.S.App.D.C. 131, 137, 320 F.3d 259, 265 (2003)) (emphasis added), and that issues related to foreseeability might better be “confine[d] ... to the proximate cause analysis.” Id. (citing Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra, § 53, at 356).

In general, therefore, there is only a minimal duty—if any—owed to a party who is at arms' length.3 Once the defendant enters into a relationship with the plaintiff, however, a corresponding duty of care arises. See, e.g., Tolu v. Ayodeji, 945 A.2d 596, 603 (D.C.2008) (“In negligence actions the standard of care by which the defendant's conduct is measured is often stated as ‘that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.’ ” (quoting Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 560 (D.C.1979))); Giordano v. Sherwood, 968 A.2d 494, 498 (D.C.2009) (discussing the national standard

[22 A.3d 795]

of care applicable in medical malpractice claim against a...

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