Hedges By and Through Hedges v. Swan Lake and Salmon Prairie School Dist. No. 73

• Decision Date: 28 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 92-014,92-014
• Citation: 253 Mont. 188,832 P.2d 775
• Parties: , 75 Ed. Law Rep. 1206 Melissa HEDGES, A minor By and Through Patricia HEDGES, her Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SWAN LAKE AND SALMON PRAIRIE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 73, Carol Field, and Does 1 Through 10, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 775

832 P.2d 775

253 Mont. 188, 75 Ed. Law Rep. 1206

Melissa HEDGES, A minor By and Through Patricia HEDGES, her Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SWAN LAKE AND SALMON PRAIRIE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 73, Carol Field, and Does 1 Through 10, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 92-014.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs April 30, 1992.

Decided May 28, 1992.

H. James Oleson, Oleson Law Firm, Kalispell, for plaintiff and appellant.

Todd A. Hammer, Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg, Kalispell, for defendants and respondents.

WEBER, Justice.

Plaintiff, Melissa Hedges, appeals from the order of the District Court for the Twentieth Judicial District, Lake County, granting summary judgment to the defendants. We reverse and remand.

The issues for our review are:

1. Did the District Court err in holding that the defendants were immune from suit for negligence under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA (1991)?

2. Did the District Court err in denying Ms. Hedge's motion for reconsideration?

This case was previously before this Court on appeal from an order granting summary judgment on February 28, 1990. Hedges v. Swan Lake and Salmon Prairie School Dist. No. 73 (1991), 248 Mont. 365, 812 P.2d 334 (Hedges I ). As stated in Hedges I, plaintiff, Melissa Hedges (Ms. Hedges) was a student at the Swan Lake Elementary School in Lake County, Montana. Defendant, Carol Field (Ms. Field), a teacher, was supervising the playground and had instructed Ms. Hedges to mark where shot puts landed. Ms. Hedges was marking a previous shot put when she was struck by another shot put which had been thrown by Ms. Field. Ms. Hedges was injured and filed a complaint against Ms. Field and the Swan Lake and Salmon Prairie School District, No. 73 (School District).

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds of immunity under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA (1989). The parties also argued the issue of whether immunity had been waived by the defendants' purchase of liability insurance which the School District had purchased. The District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and held the defendants were immune under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA (1989), and that the purchase of liability insurance did not waive immunity. Ms. Hedges appealed. Hedges I.

This Court held that the case of Crowell v. School Dist. No. 7 (1991), 247 Mont. 38, 805 P.2d 522, was controlling, and thus, the School District was immune from suit for an act or omission of its "agent", Ms. Field. Quoting Crowell, we stated:

any negligence on the part of the teacher was associated with action by the School District in that it was the District which established programs and curriculum, including the specific course of instruction and which offered physical education classes as a part of such instruction. We agree with the conclusion of the District Court that the claim for damages arose from the lawful discharge by Mr. Allen of an official duty associated with actions of the School District and its legislative body. We hold that Mr. Allen, the physical education teacher, is immune from suit under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA.

Crowell, 805 P.2d at 524. We find no factual or legal distinction between Crowell and the present case. (Emphasis in original).

Hedges I, 812 P.2d at 335. Thus, in Hedges I, we held that the School District and teacher were immune from suit under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA (1989). However, based on our holding in Crowell, we also held that the purchase by the School District of liability insurance waived its immunity to the extent of the coverage granted by pertinent insurance policies. In Hedges I we reversed and remanded to the District Court.

On May 24, 1991, the day after the decision in Hedges I was issued, the Governor of Montana signed into law Senate Bill 154, significantly amending Sec. 2-9-111, MCA. The amended statute was given a retroactive applicability date to all cases not reduced to final judgment on or before May 24, 1991.

On remand, following the amendment of the statute, the defendants again moved for summary judgment. The District Court considered the amended statute, but again granted summary judgment for the defendants, this time stating:

In granting Defendants' summary judgment motion, this Court holds that the law of this case as established by [Hedges I ] has been modified by the legislative enactment signed into law May 24, 1991. The Defendants are immune from the claims stated in Plaintiff's suit because of Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, and that said immunity has not been waived by the liability insurance because of the retroactive amendment to said statute enacted by the legislature before this cause was reduced to final judgment.

In so holding, this Court rejects the argument of Plaintiff that the legislative amendments to Sec. 2-9-111, MCA changed the immunity provided to Defendants. This Court concludes that the rationale of the Supreme Court in applying the facts of this case to the controlling law as set forth in Crowell ... would result in the same holding of immunity for all of the Defendants herein regardless of whether Sec. 2-9-111, MCA is construed either before or after the May 24, 1991 amendments thereto. This court holds that the legislative changes to the first three sections of said statute did not remove or limit the immunity which resulted from the purchase of liability insurance. The Defendants are therefore now entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law on all claims in Plaintiff's Complaint. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis added).

Ms. Hedges appeals.

I

Did the District Court err in holding that the defendants were immune from suit for negligence under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA (1991)?

Ms. Hedges maintains that the District Court was wrong in holding that defendants were immune for negligence under the amended immunity statute, Sec. 2-9-111, MCA (1991). She contends that the immunity that existed under Hedges I no longer exists under the amended statute, and the defendants are liable for their negligent acts. She maintains that subsection (3) of Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, has been significantly revised and thus, a teacher is no longer immune for her negligent acts. She maintains that under the old Sec. 2-9-111(3), MCA, a "member, staff or agent " (emphasis added) of a legislative body was immune under certain conditions, and that the newly amended statute limited that immunity to only a "member or staff", and excluded agents. She points out that under Hedges I this Court held that Ms. Field was an agent of the School District and was thus, immune under the statute as it then existed, as well as under Crowell. Thus, she maintains that since Ms. Field is an agent she does not fall under the cloak of immunity granted under Sec. 2-9-111(3), MCA (1991).

The defendants maintain that the District Court correctly interpreted Sec. 2-9-111, MCA (1991). They maintain that a teacher performing official duties "associated with" the legislative acts of her school board is immune. Defendants point out that the old law, Sec. 2-9-111(3), MCA (1989), stated that the lawful discharge of one's duty had to be "associated with" the introduction or consideration of legislation or action by the legislative body. They further point out that the new law states that the lawful discharge of an official duty must be "associated with" legislative acts of the legislative body. Sec. 2-9-111(3), MCA (1991). Therefore, defendants contend that the legislature's retention of the words "associated with" indicates the intention to retain the immunity as it was granted and has been interpreted under Sec. 2-9-111(3), MCA (1989). Defendants contend that one's actions need only be associated with legislative acts.

Finally, defendants acknowledge that Ms. Field was considered an "agent" by the parties as well as the courts in Hedges I. However, they also contend in this appeal that Ms. Field was "staff" of the legislative body, and thus, she fits under the purview of Sec. 2-9-111(3), MCA (1991).

Section 2-9-111, MCA (1991) provides:

(1) As used in this section:

(a) the term "governmental entity" means only the state, counties, municipalities, school districts, and any other local government entity or local political subdivision vested with legislative power by statute;

(b) the term "legislative body" means only the legislature vested with legislative power by Article V of The Constitution of the State of Montana and that branch or portion of any other local governmental entity or local political subdivision empowered by law to consider and enact statutes, charters, ordinances, orders, rules, policies, resolutions, or resolves;

(c) (i) the term "legislative act" means:

(A) actions by a legislative body that result in creation of law or declaration of public policy;

(B) other actions of the legislature authorized by Article V of The Constitution of the State of Montana; or

(C) actions by a school board that result in adoption of school board policies pursuant to 20-3-323(1);

(ii) the term legislative act does not include administrative actions undertaken in the execution of a law or public policy.

(2) A governmental entity is immune from suit for a legislative act or omission by its legislative body, or any member or staff of the legislative body, engaged in legislative acts.

(3) Any member or staff of a legislative body is immune from suit for damages arising from the lawful discharge of an official duty associated with legislative acts of the legislative body.

(4) The acquisition of insurance coverage, including self-insurance or group self-insurance, by a governmental entity does not waive the immunity provided by this section.

... (Emphasis added).

Defendants are incorrect in their contention that the immunity granted in the old statute was retained by the amended statute. The legislature stated the purpose of the act as follows:

AN ACT CLARIFYING THAT STATUTORY LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY EXTENDS ONLY TO LEGISLATIVE BODIES OF GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES AND...