Hedges By and Through Hedges v. Swan Lake and Salmon Prairie School Dist. No. 73, 90-182

Citation248 Mont. 365,812 P.2d 334
Decision Date23 May 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-182,90-182
Parties, 68 Ed. Law Rep. 526 Melissa HEDGES, a minor By and Through Patricia HEDGES, her Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SWAN LAKE AND SALMON PRAIRIE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 73; Carol Field, and Does 1 and 10, Defendants and Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Montana

H. James Oleson, argued, Oleson Law Firm, Kalispell, for plaintiff and appellant.

Todd A. Hammer, argued, Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg, Kalispell, for defendants and respondents.

WEBER, Justice.

Plaintiff, Melissa Hedges, was injured on school grounds during school hours. She brought suit against the School District and the teacher who was in charge at the time of the accident. The District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment based on immunity under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, and held that such immunity could not be waived by the purchase of liability insurance. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

There are two issues raised on appeal:

1. Whether the School District and the teacher are immune under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA.

2. Whether the purchase of liability insurance by the School District waives immunity under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA.

In 1987 twelve year-old Melissa Hedges (Ms. Hedges) was a student at the Swan Lake Elementary School in Lake County, Montana. Respondent, Carol Field (Ms. Field), a teacher, was supervising the playground and had instructed Ms. Hedges to mark where shot puts landed. Ms. Hedges was marking a previous shot put when she was struck by another shot put which had been thrown by Ms. Field. Ms. Hedges was in clear view of Ms. Field at the time in question. Ms. Hedges was injured and this lawsuit resulted.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds of immunity under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA. The matter was presented on oral argument to the District Court. The parties also argued the issue of whether immunity had been waived by the defendants' purchase of liability insurance. The School District had purchased comprehensive liability insurance coverage. The District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and held the defendants were immune under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, and that the purchase of liability insurance did not waive immunity. Ms. Hedges appeals that decision.

I

Whether the School District and the teacher are immune under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA.

Section 2-9-111, MCA, provides (in part):

(1) As used in this section:

(a) the term "governmental entity" includes ... school districts;

(b) the term "legislative body" includes ... any local governmental entity given legislative powers by statute, including school boards.

(2) A governmental entity is immune from suit for an act or omission of its legislative body or a member, officer, or agent thereof.

(3) A member, officer, or agent of a legislative body is immune from suit for damages arising from the lawful discharge of an official duty associated with the introduction or consideration of legislation or action by the legislative body.

. . . . .

Ms. Hedges concedes that the School District is a governmental entity as defined in the statute, and that the School Board is the legislative body, of the School District. However, she contends that despite its immunity from suit, the School District remains liable for the torts of Ms. Field, who is not immunized from suit, pursuant to Sec. 2-9-201, et seq., MCA, the Comprehensive State Insurance Plan, which requires joinder of the School District and renders it liable to defend and indemnify Ms. Field for any damages awarded. Ms. Hedges maintains that Ms. Field's discharge of duties was not "associated with" action of a legislative body as required by the language of Sec. 2-9-111(3), MCA, and thus she is not immune. Ms. Hedges contends there is no connection between Ms. Field's conduct and any action by the School Board.

Defendants maintain that under this Court's holdings in State ex rel. Eccleston v. Montana Third Judicial Dist. Ct. (1989), 240 Mont. 44, 783 P.2d 363, and cases therein cited, the School District and the teacher are immune from liability.

Our decision in Crowell v. School Dist. No. 7 (Mont.1991), 805 P.2d 522, 48 St.Rep. 81, is controlling. Crowell, also involved a school teacher. Crowell held that the governmental entity, the school district, was immune from suit for an act or omission of its agent, and that the physical education teacher was its agent. As a result Crowell concluded that the school district was immune from suit for the actual omissions of its teacher agent. Crowell further held that the teacher was immune under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, stating:

We conclude that any negligence on the part of [the teacher] was associated with action by the School District in that it was the District which established programs and curriculum, including the specific course of instruction and which offered physical education classes as a part of such instruction. We agree with the conclusion of the District Court that the claim for damages arose from the lawful discharge by Mr. Allen of an official duty associated with actions of the School District and its legislative body. We hold that Mr. Allen, the physical education teacher, is immune from suit under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA. (Emphasis added).

Crowell, 805 P.2d at 524. We find no factual or legal distinction between Crowell and the present case.

We hold that both the School District and the teacher are immune from suit under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA.

II

Whether the purchase of liability insurance by the School District waives immunity under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA.

In Crowell we held that the purchase by the school district of liability insurance waives its immunity to the extent of the coverage granted by the pertinent insurance policies. After an extensive review of Montana legislative history and case law, Crowell concluded:

We emphasize that Montana's statutory provisions are unique. We conclude that the Montana Legislature has reached the following conclusion: while a school district is granted immunity of various types, a school district still is granted authority to purchase insurance which may have the effect of waiver of immunity to the extent of the insurance proceeds. We do not find it necessary to imply a waiver, as the intention of the Legislature is clear. That intention is reemphasized by its authorization of tax levies sufficient to pay for insurance premiums. That intention is consistent with the legislative theory that a claim against a school district should be paid in a manner similar to payment required of a private party. We conclude that the Legislature has declared its intent to allow a school district to waive immunity to the extent of the insurance proceeds.

Crowell, 805 P.2d at 533.

We conclude that the Crowell holding cannot be distinguished factually or legally from the present case. We therefore hold that the purchase by the School District of liability insurance waived its immunity to the extent of the coverage granted by pertinent insurance policies.

We remand this case to the District Court for a determination of the applicable insurance coverage and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

TURNAGE, C.J., and HARRISON and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur.

TRIEWEILER, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

This case is an example of how far this Court has come by blindly following precedent--no matter how tortured and defective the reasoning on which that precedent is based. The statute intended to protect public employees during activities associated with the introduction of legislation or action of the legislative body, now protects teachers who hit students in the head with 12 pound steel balls while supervising track practice. The legislature's effort to enable local governments to protect themselves against the liability provided for in Art. II, Sec. 18, of the Montana Constitution, is now construed to be a waiver of immunity that the legislature never created in the first place.

This incredible decision is just the most recent example of this Court's disregard for the Constitution, traditional rules of statutory construction, and the plain language of the statutes which are being construed.

And toward what end is such blatant judicial activism directed?

The result of today's case, and the precedent, which according to the majority, compels today's conclusion, is to protect wrongdoers and ignore innocent victims, even when they are 12-year-old children who sustain brain damage by the gross negligence of the adults under whose supervision they have been placed. (Unless, of course, the employer of the wrongdoer chooses to waive this generous protection.)

More significant than the poor legal reasoning which has brought us to this point is the fact that it has been carved into Montana's common law for a bad social purpose. Hopefully this dark age for Montana jurisprudence which began with Peterson v. Great Falls School Dist. No. 1, 237 Mont. 376, 773 P.2d 316 (1989), will soon be brought to a merciful end by the intervention of the Montana Legislature.

I concur with the result of the majority opinion. Based upon this Court's decision in Crowell v. School Dist. No. 7 of Gallatin County, 805 P.2d 522, 48 St.Rep. 81 (1991), I agree that this case should be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with that opinion. However, I disagree with the reasoning of the Crowell decision. It is clear to me that the legislature did not authorize the waiver of immunity when it authorized local governments to purchase insurance. It authorized local governments to purchase insurance because it never did create the kind of local governmental immunity that has been found to exist by this Court.

I dissent from that part of the majority's opinion which holds that Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, clearly and unambiguously provides immunity to Carol Field for the acts...

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2 cases
  • Koch v. Billings School Dist. No. 2, 91-380
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Montana
    • June 11, 1992
    ...§ 2-9-111, MCA, including Crowell v. School Dist. No. 7 (1991), 247 Mont. 38, 805 P.2d 522; and Hedges v. Swan Lake and Salmon Prairie School District (1991), 248 Mont. 365, 812 P.2d 334. On March 15, 1991, Koch filed a motion for relief from judgment, which was deemed denied since the Dist......
  • Hedges By and Through Hedges v. Swan Lake and Salmon Prairie School Dist. No. 73, 92-014
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Montana
    • May 28, 1992
    ...before this Court on appeal from an order granting summary judgment on February 28, 1990. Hedges v. Swan Lake and Salmon Prairie School Dist. No. 73 (1991), 248 Mont. 365, 812 P.2d 334 (Hedges I ). As stated in Hedges I, plaintiff, Melissa Hedges (Ms. Hedges) was a student at the Swan Lake ......

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