Hedlesky v. Hedlesky

• Decision Date: 03 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 15–117.,15–117.
• Citation: 166 So.3d 1221
• Parties: Marilyn Williams HEDLESKY v. Steven HEDLESKY.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

166 So.3d 1221

Marilyn Williams HEDLESKY

v.Steven HEDLESKY.

No. 15–117.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

June 3, 2015.

Oliver “Jackson” Schrumpf, Law Office of Oliver “Jackson” Schrumpf, and Charles Schrumpf, (A PLC), Sulphur, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Marilyn Williams Hedlesky.

B. Thomas Shea, Walter M. Sanchez, The Sanchez Law Firm, L.L.C., Lake Charles, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Steven Hedlesky.

Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, MARC T. AMY, and JAMES T. GENOVESE, Judges.

Opinion

GENOVESE, Judge.

In this domestic proceeding, Plaintiff, Marilyn Williams Hedlesky (Ms. Williams), appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing her Rule for Contempt against her former spouse, Defendant, Steven Hedlesky (Dr. Hedlesky) for non-payment of child support. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Williams and Dr. Hedlesky were married on January 15, 1998. Subsequent to their marriage, Dr. Hedlesky adopted two of Ms. Williams's children from a prior marriage, neither of which are the subject of this contempt proceeding. Thereafter, only one child was born of their marriage, Emily Hedlesky, who is presently sixteen years of age. Ms. Williams and Dr. Hedlesky divorced, and Dr. Hedlesky's child support obligation for Emily was fixed at $3,761.00 per month, beginning September 25, 2010. This child support obligation was the subject of an Income Assignment Order of February 13, 2014.

After litigation over the division of their community property, a partition judgment was rendered on December 3, 2013. A by-product of that community property judgment was judgment in favor of Dr. Hedlesky against Ms. Williams for $263,485.10.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. Beginning March 27, 2014, Dr. Hedlesky began reducing his child support payments on the grounds that he was entitled to offset his child support obligation to Emily with the amount owed to him by Ms. Williams pursuant to the partition judgment. Dr. Hedlesky paid $1,000.00 in child support for March and April 2014. For May 2014, Dr. Hedlesky paid the full child support obligation of $3,761.00, due to Ms. Williams's then pending bankruptcy proceedings. Dr. Hedlesky made no further child support payments thereafter. On July 15, 2014, Ms. Williams filed a Rule for Contempt due to Dr. Hedlesky's failure to pay child support for Emily.

Ms. Williams's Rule for Contempt was considered by the hearing officer on September 16, 2014. For reasons provided on September 29, 2014, the hearing officer denied Ms. Williams's Rule for Contempt. Ms. Williams's appealed the hearing officer's decision. Following a hearing on October 30, 2014, the trial court made the recommendation of the hearing officer the judgment of the court on November 5, 2014. From said judgment, Ms. Williams appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Ms. Williams presents the following assignments of error for our review:

1. The trial court erred in failing to hold Dr. Hedlesky in contempt, thereby condoning “self-help” to terminate or offset child support obligations.

2. The trial court over[-]extended and misinterpreted the 1950 case of [Saunier v. Saunier, 217 La. 607, 47 So.2d 19 (1950) ], because [Saunier ] allowed only a partial offset of the portion of the support (combined spousal and child support ) to be taken or offset by the obligor spouse; [Saunier ] did not authorize the taking of 100% of the child support to offset a community property claim.

3. The trial court erred in failing to apply affirmative, remedial legislation that strictly prohibits “self-help” and strongly opposes taking child support to pay debts of one spouse to another, without holding a hearing to determine whether or how much of an offset can be applied.

4. The result is inequitable, taking the child support from a [fifteen-year-old] (now [sixteen-year-old] ) child to pay a claim allegedly owed to a spouse earning $600,000[.00] per year in order to partially offset a community property claim.

5. The trial court failed to consider and apply recent legislation that would change the result in [Saunier ].

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Although broken down into five individual assignments of error, Ms. Williams summarizes her argument to this court as follows:

Self-help is not authorized in stopping child support payments. Even the cases cited by defendant, though ancient and preceding modern child support statutes, did not authorize a 100% offset of child support to enforce a community property claim the obligor spouse has against his former spouse for a community property equalization payment. Modern statutes put a priority on protecting child support. The lower court has abused its discretion in permitting the self-help of Dr. Hedlesky stopping 100% of the child support and in failing to punish his contemptuous act of stopping child support without first involving a judicial proceeding.

We agree with Ms. Williams.

The hearing officer reached what he termed “[t]his unsavory result” by concluding that the decision of our supreme court in Saunier v. Saunier, 217 La. 607, 47 So.2d 19 (1950), was controlling and in Dr. Hedlesky's favor. We have considered Saunier and find it to be distinguishable from the instant case. Further, there have been subsequent statutory and jurisprudential developments since 1950 that lead us to a different conclusion.

In Saunier, a husband was ordered to pay a total of $200.00 per month in alimony and child support. He later reduced his payment to $150.00 contending that the debt of his wife, arising from their community property agreement, allowed compensation to occur such that the amounts could be offset. The wife filed a rule for contempt. The supreme court considered whether the wife's debt could “be pleaded in compensation of the judgment which condemned him to pay alimony.” Id. at 22. The court noted that the underlying judgment failed to allocate “how much of the amount of $200[.00] a month is allotted to the support of the two minor children, and how much to the wife [,]” but did not find that to “make any difference for the judgment is one in her favor [,] and the money is to be spent in [sic] her for the support of both herself and the children.” Id. After finding the debts to be “liquidated and demandable[,]”¹ the supreme court next considered whether the minor children were “third persons” in order to preclude compensation by the husband due to resultant prejudice to the children.² On this issue, the court stated:

[I]t is contended that compensation cannot take place because it would lead to the prejudice of the two minor children in whose favor, as well as plaintiff's, the judgment of alimony was rendered, and article 2215 of the Civil Code specifically provides that compensation cannot take place to the prejudice of the rights acquired by a third person. Whilst it is true that the amount awarded by the judgment of alimony in the sum of $200[.00] payable each month is for the maintenance and support of both the plaintiff and the two minor children[,] it is nevertheless a judgment in plaintiff's favor, the amount awarded to be used by her for the joint support of them all. With relation to her and to the judgment awarded in her favor in such manner, the two children are not third persons within the meaning and contemplation of the article of the Code relied on.

Id. at 23. Thus, it was the holding of the supreme court in Saunier that the husband was not in contempt of court for pleading compensation and reducing, in part, the amount of his joint alimony and child support obligation to offset a debt owed to him by the wife.

We find Saunier to be factually distinguishable. The judgment underlying the offset in Saunier was a judgment in favor of the wife. In this case, the underlying judgment is in favor of the minor child, Emily. Additionally, the judgment in Saunier was an in globo award comprising both alimony and child support. In this case, the judgment is solely for child support. Lastly, the offset taken in Saunier was only partial and resulted in a reduction of child support payments.³ In this case, the offset taken was for the total amount of the child support obligation, thereby eliminating it entirely. For these reasons, we do not find Saunier to be controlling herein.

Additionally, we do not find such an expansive application of Saunier to be proper. Certainly, Saunier has been subsequently cited in the jurisprudence and relied upon in support of the right of compensation; ⁴ however, in none of those cases was a parent allowed to offset a child support obligation. In our opinion, the distinction between the utilization of the right of compensation to offset a judgment of alimony and/or a community property partition and its use for the purpose of eliminating a child support obligation is critical. In the first instance, where compensation has been held to be permissible, it involved rights of the former spouse. In the latter instance, where we find compensation to be impermissible, it involves the rights of the minor child. This is a critical distinction mandating a different result.

The supreme court decision of Saunier relied upon by the hearing officer and the trial court was also decided sixty-five years ago. Although we agree that it has not been legislatively or jurisprudentially overruled expressly, it has also not been cited since 1983.⁵ Moreover, extensive legislative developments have occurred in the interim,⁶ and the jurisprudence interpreting same clearly protects the rights of the minor child. These pertinent statutes, some mandatory in nature, require judicial intervention before a reduction in child support is taken.

Specifically, La.R.S. 9:311 is germane to our consideration herein. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:311(A)(1) expressly provides: “An award for support shall not be modified unless the party seeking the modification shows a material change in circumstances of one of the parties between the time of the previous award and the time...