Hedlund v. Ryan
Decision Date | 04 March 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 09–99019.,09–99019. |
Citation | 815 F.3d 1233 |
Parties | Charles Michael HEDLUND, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Charles L. RYAN, Respondent–Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Paula Kay Harms, Federal Public Defender's Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner–Appellant.
Jon Anderson, Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Respondent–Appellee.
Before: KIM McLANE WARDLAW, CARLOS T. BEA, and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge N.R. SMITH; Concurrence by Judge BEA; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge WARDLAW.
ORDER
The opinion filed April 24, 2014, and reported at 750 F.3d 793, is withdrawn. Because the court's opinion is withdrawn, Appellant's petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc is moot. A superseding opinion will be filed concurrently with this order. Further petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc may be filed.
OPINIONPetitioner Charles Michael Hedlund, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254habeas corpus petition. A jury convicted Hedlund of one count of first degree murder for the 1991 killing of Jim McClain. The trial court sentenced Hedlund to death for the murder. The jury also convicted Hedlund of the second degree murder of Christene Mertens.
The relevant state court decision, relating to Hedlund's claims regarding (1) the use of a leg brace as a security measure during trial; (2) the use of dual juries; (3) juror bias; (4) counsel's performance during the plea process; and counsel's performance during the penalty phase, was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts before that court.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
However, the Arizona Supreme Court applied a "causal nexus" test, whereby not all mitigating evidence was considered under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), and their progeny. See McKinney v. Ryan, No. 09–99018, 813 F.3d 798, 2015 WL 9466506 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2015)(en banc). Therefore, such decision was contrary to clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We must reverse the district court and remand with instructions to grant the petition with respect to Hedlund's sentence.2
Findings of fact in the last reasoned state court decision are entitled to a presumption of correctness, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. See Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763 n. 1 (9th Cir.2012); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir.2008). Therefore, we adopt the statement of facts as presented by the Arizona Supreme Court in its 1996 opinion on consolidated direct appeal.
Defendants committed the fifth burglary on March 22, 1991. The target was Jim McClain, a sixty-five-year-old retiree who restored cars for a hobby. McClain was targeted because Hedlund had bought a car from him some months earlier and thought McClain had money at his house. Entry was gained through an open window late at night while McClain was sleeping. Hedlund brought along his .22 rifle, which he had sawed-off to facilitate concealment. Defendants ransacked the front part of the house then moved to the bedroom. While he was sleeping, McClain was shot in the back of the head with Hedlund's rifle. Defendants then ransacked the bedroom, taking a pocket watch and three hand guns; they also stole McClain's car.
State v. McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 917 P.2d 1214, 1218–19 (1996)(en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Martinez, 196 Ariz. 451, 999 P.2d 795, 806 (2000)(en banc).
Hedlund and McKinney were each indicted on two counts of first degree murder and four other counts relating to the robberies. Both Defendants were tried in the same courtroom before dual juries. Before returning its verdict, Hedlund's jury asked whether he could "be convicted as an accomplice to the burglary and not be convicted in the murder charge." On November 12, 1992, the jury found Hedlund guilty of the second-degree murder of Mertens, the first-degree murder of McClain, and lesser charges. In a special verdict, the jury unanimously found that Hedlund was guilty of the premeditated murder of McClain, rejecting a felony murder theory. The trial court sentenced Hedlund to death for the first degree murder of McClain and to terms of imprisonment on the lesser charges.
Upon direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1214. In its opinion, the Arizona Supreme Court considered five claims relevant to this appeal: (1) whether the use of dual juries deprived Hedlund of his right to a fair trial, (2) whether ordering Hedlund to wear a visible leg restraint during trial deprived Hedlund of his right to a fair trial, (3) whether Hedlund was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury when the trial court refused to dismiss a juror distantly related to one of the victims, (4) claims surrounding the negotiation of a second plea deal, and (5) the consideration and weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors.
The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief on all claims and noted "ample evidence" that Hedlund killed McClain, including: Hedlund's finger and palm prints were on McClain's briefcase, which had been rifled during the burglary; Hedlund's fingerprints were on the magazine of his sawed-off rifle; the bullet that killed McClain was consistent with having come from Hedlund's rifle; Hedlund had modified his rifle by sawing it off in order to conceal it; Hedlund hid the rifle after the murder; Hedlund asked Morris to get rid of the rifle before police found it; and Hedlund expressed remorse after he was arrested.
After the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Hedlund's claims, Hedlund filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) and then an amended PCR petition in the state trial court. On PCR review, the trial court denied the amended petition without an evidentiary hearing. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Hedlund's petition for review.
On August 5, 2003, Hedlund filed the operative amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Hedlund later filed a motion to expand the record and for evidentiary development as to certain claims. On March 31, 2005, the district court denied the motion to expand the record and denied six of Hedlund's claims. On August 10, 2009, the district court denied Hedlund's remaining claims, found Hedlund not entitled to habeas relief, and entered judgment.
The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on three claims. We expand the COA to include three additional claims, as explained below. We otherwise deny Hedlund's request to expand the COA.
"We review de novo the district court's decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus." Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir.2010). Because Hedlund initiated district court proceedings in 2002, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) applies. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336–37, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). A petitioner must overcome a high threshold to obtain relief under AEDPA:
Federal habeas relief may not be granted for claims subject to [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)unless it is shown that the earlier state court's decision was contrary to federal law then clearly established in the holdings of Court, § 2254(d)(1); or that it involved an unreasonable application of such law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the state court, § 2254(d)(2).
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA...
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