Hedlund v. State, 14–1969.

• Citation: 875 N.W.2d 720
• Decision Date: 26 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14–1969.,14–1969.
• Parties: Larry R. HEDLUND, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa; K. Brian London, Commissioner of the Iowa Department of Public Safety, Individually; Charis M. Paulson, Director, Division of Criminal Investigation, Individually; Gerard F. Meyers, Assistant Director, Division of Criminal Investigation, Individually; and Terry E. Branstad, Individually, Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

875 N.W.2d 720

Larry R. HEDLUND, Appellant,

v.STATE of Iowa; K. Brian London, Commissioner of the Iowa Department of Public Safety, Individually; Charis M. Paulson, Director, Division of Criminal Investigation, Individually; Gerard F. Meyers, Assistant Director, Division of Criminal Investigation, Individually; and Terry E. Branstad, Individually, Appellees.

No. 14–1969.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 26, 2016.

Thomas J. Duff of Duff Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, and Elizabeth Flansburg of Lawyer, Dougherty, Palmer & Flansburg, PLC, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jeffrey C. Peterzalek and Julie J. Bussanmas, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.

MANSFIELD, Justice.

In this interlocutory appeal, a former agent of the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) challenges the district court's dismissal of his claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The agent's application for leave to appeal was filed more than thirty days after the district court's order but within thirty days of the court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to amend findings and conclusions under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). The defendants urge that the appeal is untimely and should be dismissed.

Applying our settled precedent that rule 1.904(2) is not available to seek mere reconsideration of a legal ruling and our equally settled precedent that an improper rule 1.904(2) motion does not toll the time for appeal, we conclude the agent's appeal is untimely. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal. Because the dismissed appeal was interlocutory, the agent may appeal the ruling on his public-policy wrongful-discharge claim at the conclusion of this case.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Because we are reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true. Dier v. Peters, 815 N.W.2d 1, 3–4 (Iowa 2012).

Larry Hedlund was a long-time employee of the Department of Public Safety (DPS), and in April 2013, he was working for the DCI. On April 26, while driving on Highway 20, he noticed a black SUV traveling at what he believed to be a "hard ninety." Hedlund reported the speeding SUV to the local dispatch. The Governor and Lieutenant Governor were among the SUV's passengers. The vehicle was not pulled over or ticketed at that time.

On April 29 and 30, Hedlund sent several emails related to this incident. On May 1, the DCI placed Hedlund on paid administrative leave. The DPS Commissioner terminated Hedlund's employment on July 17.

On August 8, Hedlund filed a petition in the Polk County District Court alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and Iowa Code section 70A.28(2) (2013).¹ Hedlund named the State of Iowa, DPS Commissioner Brian London, DCI Director Charis Paulson, and DCI Assistant Director Gerard Meyers—in their individual capacities—as defendants.

Additionally, on August 12, Hedlund filed an appeal of his termination notice with the Employment Appeal Board (EAB) pursuant to Iowa Code section 80.15.² On August 15, Hedlund also filed an appeal of his termination with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) pursuant to Iowa Code section 70A.28(6).³

On September 25, the defendants moved for a stay of the court proceedings, arguing that Hedlund's suit was premature until his pending administrative appeals were adjudicated. Hedlund responded by asking both agencies for declaratory orders. See Iowa Code § 17A.9(1)(a ). Specifically, he asked both agencies to rule that he did not have to exhaust their remedies before bringing wrongful-discharge claims in district court and that their remedies were not exclusive. Hedlund also advised the district court that he would agree to a stay until the petitions for declaratory orders were resolved.

On November 1, the court granted the defendants a stay in the proceedings pending the outcome of Hedlund's administrative appeals. On December 10, the EAB issued a ruling on Hedlund's request for a declaratory order. The ruling stated the only remedy available in the Iowa Code section 80.15 hearing was reinstatement. It also said that if Hedlund wanted reinstatement, he had to pursue such relief under section 80.15. Hedlund retired from DPS and on January 21, 2014, dismissed his appeal before the EAB.

On April 7, Hedlund asked the district court to lift the stay. He described the EAB's ruling and added that PERB had not yet ruled on his petition for a declaratory order. (It turned out that PERB ruled that day.) The defendants responded to Hedlund's filing the next day and joined his request to lift the stay. The court entered an order lifting the stay on April 30.

Once district court proceedings resumed, Hedlund filed an amended petition on May 1 naming the Governor in his individual capacity as an additional defendant. The new petition also alleged that the defendants had committed defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On May 19, the defendants moved to dismiss Hedlund's petition pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.421(1)(f).⁴

The defendants filed briefs in support of dismissal on May 19 and July 7. Hedlund filed briefs in resistance of dismissal on June 16 and July 21. On July 23, the court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated,

[W]hat I'll do is, I'm going to leave the record open for the plaintiff to submit any additional briefing that he deems appropriate. And you must have that to me no later than August 1st. And then I will give the defendant a chance to file anything that they deem appropriate by August 12. And as of August 12th, the record will close and the matter will be submitted. Okay.

Both parties consented to this procedure on the record.

Hedlund filed his supplemental brief on August 1 and the defendants filed theirs on August 6.

On September 15, the district court issued its ruling on the motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion with regard to Hedlund's claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, finding that "no clearly defined and well-recognized [public policy] exception protected Plaintiff's actions." Additionally, the court concluded that Hedlund had statutory protection from wrongful discharge under Iowa Code section 80.15 and that this protection "diminishe[d] the idea that he had a compelling need for protection from wrongful discharge" at common law. The court declined to dismiss the remaining counts in Hedlund's petition.

On September 25, Hedlund filed a motion to amend the court's dismissal ruling, invoking Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2).⁵ This filing did not cite new facts or new Iowa law. Instead, Hedlund primarily argued that the dismissal of the common-law wrongful-discharge count was inconsistent with some out-of-state appellate decisions that had not previously been cited to the court. On October 6, the defendants filed a resistance to Hedlund's motion. On October 17, Hedlund filed a reply brief.

The reply brief had two exhibits attached. One was a copy of the December 10, 2013 ruling of the EAB. The other was a copy of the April 7, 2014 ruling of PERB.

The court denied the motion to amend on October 30 stating,

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented no new facts or authority that persuades the Court to amend its prior ruling. The prior ruling was issued based on the consideration of existing Iowa law. Plaintiff has not shown that the Court made a mistake of law or fact in its Ruling. The Plaintiff merely disagrees with the conclusion reached by the Court. Mere disagreement with the result is not a basis for this Court to amend or enlarge its previous ruling.

On November 26, Hedlund filed an application for interlocutory review with this court. We granted Hedlund's application on December 19, staying further district court proceedings.

II. Standard of Review.

Our standard of review for a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is for correction of errors at law. Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc., 818 N.W.2d 244, 253 (Iowa 2012). We will affirm a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss if the petition fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2012). "For purposes of reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the petition's well-pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions." Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 2014).

III. Analysis.

We must deal with a threshold matter. The State challenges Hedlund's interlocutory appeal as untimely. If the State is correct, we are without jurisdiction to hear Hedlund's appeal.⁶ We consider challenges to our jurisdiction before other issues in a case. See Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 511 (Iowa 1984).

According to the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure,

An application for interlocutory appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the challenged ruling or order. However, if a motion is timely filed under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2), the application must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the ruling on such motion.

Iowa R.App. P. 6.104(1)(b )(2).

Hedlund filed his application for interlocutory review seventy-one days after the district court ruled on the State's motion to dismiss. In the meantime, he had filed—and the court ruled on—a rule 1.904(2) motion to amend the court's ruling on the motion to dismiss.

We have repeatedly stated that only a "proper rule 1.904(2) motion" extends the time for appeal from the date of the original ruling. See Baur v. Baur Farms, Inc., 832 N.W.2d 663, 668 (Iowa 2013) ; In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 266–67 (Iowa 2005) ("[A]n untimely or improper rule 1.904(2) motion cannot extend the time for appeal." (Footnote omitted.)); Explore Info. Servs. v. Iowa Ct. Info. Sys., 636 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2001) (considering a motion to reconsider under 1.904(2) and noting "[i]f the motion was not appropriate, then [the plaintiff's] notice of...