Hedrick v. Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment

• Decision Date: 30 June 1982
• Citation: 7 OBR 272,7 Ohio App.3d 211,454 N.E.2d 1343
• Parties: , 99 Lab.Cas. P 55,425, 7 O.B.R. 272 HEDRICK, Appellant, v. CENTER FOR COMPREHENSIVE ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT et al., Appellees. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 211

7 Ohio App.3d 211

454 N.E.2d 1343, 99 Lab.Cas. P 55,425, 7 O.B.R. 272

HEDRICK, Appellant, v. CENTER FOR COMPREHENSIVE ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT et al., Appellees. ^*

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County.

June 30, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

A trial court may not dismiss a cause of action for "wrongful discharge," where the plaintiff-employee's complaint alleges sufficient facts to rebut, for the purposes of overcoming the defendant-employer's motion to dismiss, the general rule that contracts of indefinite duration are terminable at will.

Tobias & Kraus and Paul H. Tobias, Cincinnati, for appellant.

Dinsmore, Shohl, Coates & Deupree and John M. Kunst, Jr., Cincinnati, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This cause came on to be heard upon an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County.

On January 5, 1981, appellant, Sharon Hedrick, filed a complaint in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas naming as defendants the appellees in this cause: the Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment ("Center"), the Center's Board of Trustees, its President, and its Executive Director. Appellant alleged in her original complaint that she had been wrongfully discharged from her employment at the Center, that her discharge was effected with specific intent to harm her, that her discharge contravened the public policy of the state of Ohio, and that her discharge constituted a denial of a property right without due process of law. Thereafter, appellant amended her complaint to include claims seeking recovery on the basis of promissory estoppel and defamation of character. She also included in this amendment copies of several documents which allegedly contained various forms and conditions of her employment at the Center.

On May 19, 1981, appellant amended her complaint a second time adding allegations that her discharge violated certain implied-in-fact conditions of her employment and an implied agreement not to discharge her as long as her employment performance was satisfactory. Appellant again included copies of several documents, different from those appended to her first amendment, which allegedly contained terms and conditions of her employment at the Center. As finally amended, appellant's complaint contained seven claims against the appellees; each claim related to appellant's termination as an employee at the Center.

On May 28, 1981, the appellees moved the lower court to dismiss appellant's complaint, as finally amended, on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The appellees posited several arguments in support of their motion to dismiss. Prominent among these was the argument that since appellant's employment contract was indefinite in duration it was terminable at either the Center's or the appellant's will. The lower court accepted this argument and, on August 25, 1981, entered judgment dismissing all seven counts of appellant's complaint. The instant appeal derives from that judgment; however, the errors assigned by appellant relate only to the dismissal of the wrongful discharge, promissory estoppel and defamation counts.

Appellant assigns three errors. The first is that the lower court erred in dismissing her claim " * * * for breach of her employment contract"; the second is that the lower court erred in dismissing her claim based upon promissory estoppel; and the third is that the lower court erred in dismissing her claim based upon defamation. In support of each assignment, appellant argues that she alleged sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We will dispose of these assignments seriatim.

In her claim for breach of contract appellant alleges that she was employed at the Center pursuant to a contract which provided that she would only be terminated for just cause, for maintenance of unsatisfactory work standards, or for serious infractions of the Center's rules. She also alleges that her employment contract entitled her to certain procedural protections including knowledge of the reason for her discharge, a hearing on her discharge before the Center's Executive Director, and the opportunity to present a defense prior to being terminated. Appellant contends further that she was discharged from the Center for reasons unrelated to her work performance and that she was denied the procedural protections listed above.

Appellant appended to her complaint and its amendments numerous documents which she argues support the allegations summarized above. These documents included the Center's Employee Handbook, various of its policy statements regarding employee disciplinary, discharge and grievance procedures, a Staff Distribution Form, and an Employment Confirmation Form. Appellant argues that these documents support her breach of contract claim because they establish the terms and conditions which the appellees allegedly breached by discharging her.

The constraints within which this court must function upon review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted are well-established. The judgment of a lower court dismissing a complaint will not be upheld unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See O'Brien v. University Community Tenants Union (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 . We are also required, in construing a complaint upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, to take the material allegations of the complaint as being admitted. State ex rel. Alford v. Willoughby Civil Service Comm. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 221, 223, 390 N.E.2d 782 .

Given these mandates and the state of the record relating to appellant's breach of contract claim, we hold that appellant has stated a viable cause of action for breach of contract against the appellees. If the appellant can prove that the terms and conditions described, supra, were part of her employment contract at the Center ¹ and that the appellees failed to comply with them when they discharged her, she will have demonstrated a breach of her employment contract entitling her to recovery.

This result pertains despite the concededly indefinite duration of appellant's employment contract. An employment contract of indefinite duration is terminable at will unless the parties to the contract provide otherwise. See Henkel v. Educational Research Council (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 118 . This rule is based upon the principle that the intent of the parties to a contract governs its construction by a court of law despite the existence of a general rule such as the one employed by the lower court in dismissing appellant's complaint. In the instant cause, we hold that appellant has alleged sufficient facts to rebut, for the purposes of overcoming the appellees' motion to dismiss, the general rule that contracts of indefinite duration are terminable at will. For the above reasons, appellant's first assignment of error is well-taken.

Application of the constraints set out in O'Brien, supra, and State ex rel. Alford, supra, to the appellant's second assignment of error yields the same result as did their application to her first assignment of error. In her second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the lower court erred in dismissing her claim based upon promissory estoppel. She argues here, as she did in support of her first assignment, that the facts alleged under this count of her complaint are sufficient to state a claim entitling her to recovery. The material allegations stated in appellant's claim based upon promissory estoppel are that the terms and conditions contained in the documents,...