Hedrick v. Honeywell, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2:90-CV-763.
• Parties: Karen HEDRICK, Plaintiff, v. HONEYWELL, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

796 F. Supp. 293

Karen HEDRICK, Plaintiff, v. HONEYWELL, INC., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 2:90-CV-763.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio.

April 30, 1992.

Larry Robert Zingarelli, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Brian Keith Brittain and Evelyn P. Schonberg, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

GEORGE C. SMITH, District Judge.

Plaintiff originally brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, "Title VII", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging race and sex-based discrimination in her employment with defendant Honeywell. Plaintiff also asserts various state claims. The action was originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County, Ohio. Defendant subsequently removed the action to this Court on the bases of federal question and diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. This matter is now before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment and on plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint.

LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a second amended complaint to add a claim of fraud. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that leave to amend be "freely given when justice so requires." See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). For the following reasons, the Court concludes that justice does not require the grant of leave to further amend the complaint.

The facts supporting the alleged fraud have been patent on the face of the complaint from the outset of this action. Discovery is closed in this action; and plaintiff waited until after the filing of defendant's motion for summary judgment to file her motion.

While delay "that is neither intended to harass nor causes any ascertainable prejudice" does not alone justify denial of leave to amend, see Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637 n. 2 (6th Cir.1982); Janikowski v. Bendix Corp., 823 F.2d 945 (6th Cir.1987); Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 562 (6th Cir.1980), leave to amend a pleading need not be granted where the pleading, as amended, would nevertheless fail to state a claim. See Martin v. Associated Truck Lines, Inc., 801 F.2d 246, 248 (6th Cir. 1986); Neighborhood Development Corp. v. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 632 F.2d 21 (6th Cir.1980). While defendant has not asserted any identifiable prejudice, plaintiff has failed to plead any of the essential elements of a cause of action based on fraud, e.g., plaintiff has not identified any material misrepresentation made by the defendant to the plaintiff, any reliance based on any misrepresentation, or any damage as a result. Leave to amend plaintiff's complaint is therefore DENIED.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

"This standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original); Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984).

The standard to be applied by the Court on motion for summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

The primary difference between the two motions is procedural; summary judgment motions are usually made before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while directed verdict motions are made at trial and decided on the evidence that has been admitted. Bill Johnson's Restaurants Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 2171, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983). In essence, though, the inquiry under each is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.

Id. 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12. Accordingly, although summary judgment should be cautiously invoked, it is an integral part of the Federal Rules which are designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554 (quoting Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

In a motion for summary judgment the moving party bears the "burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and for these purposes, the evidence submitted must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (footnote omitted); accord, Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453, 1455-56 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 545, 83 L.Ed.2d 432 (1984). Inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in such materials must be considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor Pullers Assoc., 630 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6th Cir.1980). Additionally, "unexplained gaps" in materials submitted by the moving party, if pertinent to material issues of fact, justify denial of a motion for summary judgment. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157-60, 90 S.Ct. at 1608-09; Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 65 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 986, 100 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed.2d 415 (1979).

If the moving party meets its burden and if adequate time for discovery has been provided, summary judgment is appropriate if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the opposing party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As is provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e):

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.

Thus, "a party cannot rest on the allegations contained in his ... pleadings in opposition to a properly supported motion for summary judgment against him." First Nat. Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 259, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) (footnote omitted).

A. Title VII Claims

Plaintiff's first three years of employment with defendant were apparently uneventful, and plaintiff was promoted to Customer Service Representative in 1985. Thereafter, plaintiff alleges, she was offered a promotion to Sales Representative I in June of 1988, but at a lower starting salary than that given to male counterparts. Plaintiff declined the offer because of the pay differential. Plaintiff also alleges that, within one week of her lay-off, a black male was hired as a Sales Representative I. Finally, plaintiff asserts that she was not recalled from her lay-off and that lesser qualified males were hired, despite her expressed interest in rejoining Honeywell.¹

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to pursue independent Title VII claims based on the alleged discriminatory acts of offering her lower pay for the Sales Representative position, and failure to recall her after her lay-off, summary judgment is proper. Defendant asserts, and plaintiff has not responded to that assertion, that these two claims were not included in plaintiff's charge filed with the OCRC. Plaintiff cannot now interject new claims before this Court. To hold otherwise would undermine Title VII's policy of administrative negotiation and conciliation prior to litigation. See Vinson v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906, 107 S.Ct. 2482, 96 L.Ed.2d 375 (1987).

Plaintiff asserts in her remaining Title VII claim that her lay-off was on account of her race and sex. Title VII to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits discrimination "against any individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the basis of the individual's race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The allocation of the burdens of proof and production in proving employment discrimination under Title VII is well-established. The initial burden rests with the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts which, if not explained, give rise to an inference of discrimination by the employer. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Once a plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. Id.; Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978);...