Hedrick v. Steele, 14185.

• Decision Date: 02 March 1951
• Docket Number: No. 14185.,14185.
• Citation: 187 F.2d 261
• Parties: HEDRICK v. STEELE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

187 F.2d 261 (1951)

HEDRICK v. STEELE.

No. 14185.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 2, 1951.

Rexford P. Hedrick, per se.

Sam M. Wear, U. S. Atty., and Sam O. Hargus, Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.

Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and WOODROUGH and COLLET, Circuit Judges.

COLLET, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The facts were correctly stated in the trial judge's memorandum opinion as follows: "Petitioner was tried and convicted on November 28, 1945, by Military Court-Martial, 8th Army, 97th Division, and sentenced to six years' imprisonment for the offense of manslaughter. Under said sentence, petitioner was duly confined in the Federal Reformatory at El Reno, Oklahoma. After serving 960 days of said sentence petitioner was paroled to go to his home at Springfield, Missouri. Before being granted such parole petitioner had `earned 256 days of Statutory Good Time by his `good conduct'. After eleven and one-half (11½) months on parole, under Federal supervision, petitioner's parole was duly revoked, and he was committed as of June 30, 1949, to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, at Springfield, Missouri, and ordered to serve a total of 1230 days' confinement under his original sentence. As a parole violator the full term of petitioner's sentence, according to the records of said institution, will not expire until November 20, 1952; and his `good conduct' term will continue such sentence until December 24, 1951."

Appellant makes the same argument here and his position is the same as both were in the trial court. The trial court's statement thereof is clear, accurate and concise: "It is petitioner's contention that under the above state of facts his original sentence of six years has been increased and extended to `six years, eleven and one-half months'; and as a consequence he is being placed in `double jeopardy' or twice punished for a single offense, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Petitioner further contends that if his original sentence was not so extended, he would, by allowance of good time now earned, `be eligible for immediate conditional release.' To sustain this latter proposition, petitioner makes claim to the 256 days of statutory good time he claims to have earned before being granted a parole, as well as `good time' earned while out on parole,¹ and such as he has earned since his retaking for violation of the terms of his parole."

Appellant is not entitled to have the time he was at liberty on conditional release or parole treated as time served on his sentence when there has been a violation of the terms of the conditional release or parole. Nor is he entitled to have the "good time" earned while he was serving his sentence prior to parole treated as time served on his sentence, when he subsequently violated that parole. The trial judge properly applied the law and correctly disposed of these contentions in the following language:

"The contentions above made by petitioner are not novel. Identical contentions have previously been made by other federal prisoners and adversely ruled to the same...