Heffelfinger v. Town of Morristown
| Decision Date | 24 May 1985 |
| Citation | 507 A.2d 761,209 N.J.Super. 380 |
| Parties | Patricia D. HEFFELFINGER and Eugene M. Heffelfinger, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF MORRISTOWN, A Municipal Corporation of the State of New Jersey; Southeast Morris County Municipal Utilities Authority, A Body Corporate of the State of New Jersey, Edward L. Vogt, Alfred J. Mackin, Ralph B. Welsh, Dudley F. Parker, Willis H. Dutton, Jr., A. Nesbitt Phillips, Henry M. Hoyt, William D. Bruen, Donald A. Delpho, Robert S. Rochelle, Glenn K. Coutts and James C. Pitney, Being The Surviving Trustees of Morristown Green; Raymond B. DeChiara, Seymour Epstein, John Stevens, Pasquale (Pat) DeChiara, Theodore (Ted) Denman, J. Albert Wunder, William Pierson, Ann Mackinnis, B. Sandelli (First Name Unknown, Individually and t/a B. Sandelli Contracting), Being the 1981 Christmas On The Green Committee; Chamber of Commerce of Morris County; and John Doe, Ruth Roe, ABC Corporation and XYZ Committee (Fictitious names representing one or more persons or legal entities having an ownership interest in the Morristown Green and/or being responsible for the maintenance and/or decoration thereof), Defendants. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
George J. Benson, Budd Lake, for plaintiffs.
Tari R. Van Winkle (O'Donnell, McCord, Leslie & O'Toole, Morristown, attorneys), for defendants The Trustees of the Morristown Green.
This is a negligence action arising out of an incident which occurred on November 25, 1981. Plaintiff Patricia Heffelfinger (hereafter "Mrs. Heffelfinger") allegedly fell and sustained bodily injury on the Morristown Green 1 while visiting the 1981 "Christmas on the Green" display with her daughter. Her husband sues per quod. Among those from whom they seek money damages are: Edward L. Vogt, Alfred J. Mackin, Ralph B. Welsh, Dudley F. Parker, Willis H. Dutton, Jr., A. Nesbitt Phillips, Henry M. Hoyt, William D. Bruen, Donald A. Delpho, Robert S. Rochelle, Glenn K. Coutts, and James C. Pitney. These individual defendants collectively constitute the successor trustees of the Morristown Green (hereafter "trustees"). The trustees now move for summary judgment on the authority of the charitable immunity statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7, et seq. ("act"). All parties agree that there are no issues of material fact. Hence, the matter is ripe for determination as a matter of law. R. 4:46-1; Judson v. People's Bank & Trust of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
The trustees assert that Mrs. Heffelfinger's claims against them are barred by N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7, which provides that:
[n]o nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be liable to respond in damages to any persons who shall suffer damage from the negligence from any agent or servant of the corporation, society or association, where such person is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the work of such nonprofit corporation, society or association, provided, however, that such immunity from liability shall not extend to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of such corporation, society, or association or of its agents or servants where such persons are unconcerned in and unrelated to and outside of the benefactions of such corporation, society or association; but nothing herein shall be deemed to exempt the said agent or servant individually from their liability for any such negligence. [Emphasis supplied]
Before the court may conclude that the trustees are entitled to the protection of the act, they must demonstrate that they were a "nonprofit corporation, society or association, organized exclusively for ... charitable ... purposes," which promoted such purposes at the time of the incident. In addition, the trustees must establish that Mrs. Heffelfinger was a beneficiary of their charitable works.
Mrs. Heffelfinger first contends that the trustees are not a "nonprofit corporation, society or association," and thus are not entitled to the benefit of the act. The trustees argue that their group is tantamount in a legal sense, to such a "society or association." 2 This court agrees that the principles which confer legal immunity upon those entities specifically defined by the Legislature apply equally to these trustees.
The terms "society" and "association" are not clearly defined by New Jersey statutory or decisional law. However, a "society" is generally recognized as "[a]n association or company of persons (generally unincorporated) united together by mutual consent, in order to deliberate, determine and act jointly for some common purpose." Black's Law Dictionary (5 ed. 1979) at 1245. N.J.S.A. 2A:64-1, which allows associations to sue or be sued, uses language similar to the general definition of a society and provides that:
[a]ny unincorporated organization or association, consisting of 7 or more persons and having a recognized name ... may sue and be sued in any court of this state by such name in any civil action affecting its common property, rights and liabilities, with the same force and effect as regards such common property, rights and liabilities as if the action were prosecuted by or against all members thereof.
Thus, a "society" and an "association" may be construed to be functional and legal equivalents.
There presently are 12 trustees. Their organization has been known as the Trustees of the Morristown Green since it was constituted in 1816. 3 Ever since then, the trustees' relationships to each other, to the group, and to the green have been governed by the deed of trust, their by-laws, and the common law. Cf. Marchitto v. Central R.R. Co. of N.J., 9 N.J. 456, 466-67, 88 A.2d 851 (1952), overruled on other grounds Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 70, 190 A.2d 825 (1963). They were formed and continue to exist consensually for a single common purpose--that of maintaining the green for the use and enjoyment of the public. They meet as a group to debate and to deliberate about contemporary means by which to accomplish this common goal. This court cannot discern a difference between a "society" or an "association" and these trustees, and is satisfied that the trustees meet the statutory tests for a "society" and for an "association" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7.
The word "exclusively" in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 means "single" or "sole." Kirby v. Columbian Institute, 101 N.J.Super. 205, 243 A.2d 853 (Cty.Ct.1968). The term "charitable purposes" generally has been defined in connection with suits by entities seeking tax-exempt status. E.g., The Presbyterian Homes v. Division of Tax Appeals, 55 N.J. 275, 284, 261 A.2d 143 (1970) ( N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6); Trustees of Y.M.C.A. v. City of Paterson, 61 N.J.L. 420, 39 A. 655 (Sup.Ct.1898). The Y.M.C.A. court noted that the term "charitable" includes religious, educational and various other useful objects, although not all which are benevolent. Id. at 421, 39 A. 655. The Presbyterian Homes Court approved an Illinois court's definition of "charitable purposes" as
an application of property for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering and constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens on government. Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen, 12 Ill.2d 387, 398, 146 N.E.2d 73, 79 (Sup.Ct.1957) [55 N.J. at 284, 261 A.2d 143]
Other courts also have considered what "purposes" are "charitable." For example, in More Game Birds In America, Inc. v. Boettger, 125 N.J.L. 97, 14 A.2d 778 (Sup.Ct.1940), Justice Perskie found that conserving game birds, establishing hatcheries and refuges, and providing education about vermin control constituted "charitable purposes." Although neither the Game Birds case nor the Presbyterian Homes Court addressed the same type of organization and factual scenario, the principles on which they relied and the conclusions which they reached provide a useful analytical backdrop for the instant action.
The first paragraph of count one of the complaint alleges that the trustees are representatives of a "perpetual trust created for the purpose of maintaining a public common in the Town of Morristown for the use and enjoyment of plaintiff and other members of the public." The trustees agree with the description. The present trustees, as an entity, trace their origin to April 1816, when the property now known as the Morristown Green was conveyed to them in perpetual trust by a deed from the First Presbyterian Church at Morristown, New Jersey. The deed specifies that the property is to remain "a Green or common forever." The document also contains a covenant between the trustees and the First Presbyterian Church that:
... it shall not be lawful to erect or build on the said pieces or parcels of land or any part thereof any dwelling house, store, shop, barn or other building of any kind excepting a house for public worship, a Court House, a market house, and a house for a fire engine.
This restriction has remained unchanged since 1816. Consequently, the only lawful uses of the green were and are public and non-commercial. The original deed demonstrates unequivocally that the green was placed in a supervised, perpetual trust in order to maintain a common in Morristown for the benefit, use and enjoyment of the public. 4
The trustees' sole responsibility under the deed of trust is to preserve the green as a public park or common for the benefit of the local citizenry. 5 In order to fulfill their covenant with the church, the trustees periodically have authorized its renovation. The most recent physical...
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