Heffner v. Murphy
| Decision Date | 22 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-cv-990.,08-cv-990. |
| Citation | 590 F.Supp.2d 710 |
| Parties | Ernest F. HEFFNER, et. al, Plaintiffs v. Donald J. MURPHY, et. al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Barbara A. Zemlock, James J. Kutz, Post & Schell P.C., Harrisburg, PA, Gary L. James, James Smith Dietterick & Connelly LLP, Hummelstown, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Christopher K. McNally, Maryanne M. Lewis, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of State, BPOA, Kenneth L. Joel, Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
Pending before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (the "Motion"). (Rec.Doc.11). For the following reasons, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Plaintiffs1 initiated the instant action by lodging a massive Complaint against the Defendants2 on May 20, 2008 alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19833 and 28 U.S.C. § 22014 for deprivations of rights secured by the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution.5 (Rec.Doc.1). On July 25, 2008, the Defendants filed the instant Motion and a brief in support of that Motion. (Rec. Docs.11, 12). The Plaintiffs responded by filing their brief in opposition on September 3, 2008, (Rec.Doc.22), which led to the filing of Defendants' reply brief on September 16, 2008, (Rec.Doc.26). Oral argument was conducted on December 15, 2008. Having been fully briefed and argued, the instant Motion is presently ripe for disposition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir.2002)).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, "in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 1965. A plaintiff must make "a `showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief", and "without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only `fair notice,' but also the `grounds' on which the claim rests." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 3). "[A] complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct, and the [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1969 n. 8. Therefore, "stating a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest the required element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 3).
On the other hand, "a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits." Id. at 231 (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65, 1969 n. 8). Rule 8 "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Id. at 234.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS:6
A. PARTIES
Plaintiffs Ernest F. Heffner ("Heffner") and Nathan Ray are licensed funeral directors in York, PA. Plaintiff Betty Frey ("Frey") is an associate of Heffner and is not a licensed funeral director. Plaintiff Harry C. Neel ("Neel") is the President of Plaintiff Jefferson Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. and Plaintiff Jefferson Memorial Park, Inc., and has a principle place of business in Pittsburgh, PA. Plaintiff Bart H. Cavanagh, Sr. ("Cavanagh") is a licensed funeral director in Norwood, PA. Plaintiff John Katora ("Katora") is a licensed funeral director in Lewisberry, PA. Plaintiff Brian Leffler ("Leffler") is a licensed funeral director in Avoca, PA. Plaintiffs Rebecca Ann Wessel ("Wessel"), Mark Patrick Dougherty ("Dougherty"), Amber M. Scott ("Scott"), and Cynthia Lee Finney ("Finney") are licensed funeral directors in Pittsburgh, PA.
Plaintiffs Todd Eckert ("Eckert") and Matthew Morris ("Morris") are licensed funeral directors in Red Lion, PA. Plaintiff Ben Blascovich ("Blascovich") is a licensed funeral director in Mill Hall, PA. Plaintiffs Greg Achenbach ("Achenbach") and William Pugh ("Pugh") are licensed funeral directors in Pottsville, PA. Plaintiff Karen Eroh ("Eroh") is a licensed funeral director in Wilkes-Barre, PA. Plaintiff William Sucharski ("Sucharski") is a licensed funeral director and owner of a duly approved crematory in Philadelphia, PA. Plaintiff John McGee ("McGee") is a licensed funeral director in Philadelphia, PA. Plaintiffs Erika Haas ("Haas") and Nicolas Wachter ("Wachter") are licensed funeral directors in Milton, PA. Plaintiff David Halpate ("Halpate") is a licensed funeral director in Renovo, PA. Plaintiffs Patrick Connell ("P.Connell"), Eugene Connell ("E.Connell"), Matthew Connell ("M.Connell"), and James J. Connell, Jr. ("J.Connell") are licensed funeral directors in Bethlehem, PA.
Plaintiff Jefferson Memorial Park, Inc. ("Jefferson MP") is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principle place of business in Pittsburgh, PA. Jefferson MP is a licensed cemetery and is the sole shareholder of Plaintiff Jefferson Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. ("Jefferson MFH"),7 which is also a Pennsylvania corporation with a principle place of business in Pittsburgh PA. Plaintiff Wellman Funeral Associates, Inc., d/b/a Forest Park Funeral Home ("Wellman"), is a Louisiana corporation with a principle place of business in Shreveport, LA.8 Plaintiff East Harrisburg Cemetery Company, d/b/a East Harrisburg Cemetery & Crematory ("East HBG Cem.") is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principle place of business in Harrisburg, PA.9 Plaintiff Robert Lomison ("Lomison") owns and operates the William Howard Day Cemetery ("WHD Cem."), East HBG Cem., and Wellman. Plaintiff Craig Schwalm operates a crematory and cemetery and is the Vice President and General Manager of East HBG Cem. Plaintiff Gregory J. Havrilla is not a licensed funeral director, but is the General Manager of Jefferson MFH.
Defendant Donald J. Murphy ("Murphy") is an appointed consumer member of the Pennsylvania State Board of Funeral Directors (the "Board"). Defendants Mike Gerdes ("Gerdes"), Joseph A. Fluehr III ("Fluehr"), Michael J. Yeosock ("Yeosock"), Bennett Goldstein ("Goldstein"), James O. Pinkerton ("Pinkerton"), and Anthony Scarantino ("Scarantino") are members of the Board. Defendant Basil Merenda ("Merenda") is the Commissioner of the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, and is a member of the Board.10
Defendant Peter Marks ("Marks") is the Executive Deputy Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs. Defendant Marks oversees a unit that makes prosecutorial decisions, and oversees investigations and prosecutions of individuals subject to various licensing laws, including the Funeral Director Law. Defendant C.A.L. Shields ("Shields"), as Director of the Bureau of Enforcement and Investigation ("BEI"), oversees all investigations conducted by the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs. Defendants Marks and Shields are sued solely in their official capacities.
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Funeral Director Law (the "Funeral Law") was enacted in 1952 to, purportedly, "provide for the better protection of life and health of the citizens of this Commonwealth by requiring and regulating the examination, licensure and registration of persons and registration of corporations engaging in the care, preparation and disposition of the bodies of deceased persons...."11 63 P.S. § 479.1 (1952). The Board is the administrative entity charged with the enforcement of the Funeral Law.12 Id. § 479.16(a). In particular, the Board is "empowered to formulate necessary rules and regulations not inconsistent with this act for the proper conduct of the business or profession of funeral directing and as may be deemed necessary or proper to safeguard the interests of the public and the standards of the profession." Id. To this end, the Board has promulgated regulations (the "Funeral Regulations") to implement the dictates of the Funeral Law.13 49 Pa.Code § 12.1 et seq.
Plaintiffs aver that, although the Funeral Laws and Regulations have not undergone significant change since their initial implementation, the funeral directing industry has experienced massive changes since that time, a result of which has been increased competition in the industry. (Compl. ¶¶ 65-73). Plaintiffs assert that the rise in competition has not been warmly received by established funeral directors. (Id. ¶ 73). Thus, the Plaintiffs contend that the Board's current interpretation of the Funeral Laws and Regulations, which in some instances completely contradicts its past interpretations, is driven by an anticompetitive attitude that is aimed towards appropriating an...
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