Heffner v. Murphy

Decision Date22 August 2012
Docket NumberNo. 08–cv–990.,08–cv–990.
Citation866 F.Supp.2d 358
PartiesErnest F. HEFFNER, et al., Plaintiffs v. Donald J. MURPHY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Held Unconstitutional

63 P.S. §§ 479.7, 479.8(a, b, d, e), 479.9(a), 479.13(c), 479.16(b); 49 Pa.Code §§ 13.158a, 13.202(5)Barbara A. Zemlock, Post & Schell P.C., Harrisburg, PA, Gary L. James, James Smith Dietterick & Connelly LLP, Hummelstown, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher K. McNally, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of State, BPOA, Maryanne M. Lewis, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Loudon L. Campbell, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.

James J. Kutz, Post & Schell, P.C., Harrisburg, PA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN E. JONES III, District Judge.

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

Pending before this Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (doc. 117), Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment, (doc. 137), and Defendants' Motion to Strike. (Doc. 163). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment shall be granted in part and denied in part, Defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants' motion to strike shall be denied.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiffs 1 initiated the instant action by lodging a massive Complaint against the Defendants 2 on May 20, 2008 alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19833 and 28 U.S.C. § 22014 for deprivations of rights secured by the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution.5 (Doc. 1). On July 25, 2008, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. (Doc. 11). Following full briefing of the motion, and oral argument on December 15, 2008, we issued a memorandum and order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion. ( See Doc. 32 at 30–32). After numerous motions to extend the trial term were granted, the Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Association filed a Motion to Intervene on March 9, 2010, (doc. 50), which we subsequently denied on June 25, 2010, 2010 WL 2606520. (Doc. 80).

On August 25, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 91). We granted the motion on November 5, 2010, (doc. 100), and Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on November 9, 2010. (Doc. 101). 6 The Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Association (“PFDA”) filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Brief on June 20, 2011, (doc. 111), which we granted on June 22, 2011. (Doc. 112). On July 19, 2011, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal of Count X of the Amended Complaint, agreeing to dismiss the same with prejudice. (Doc. 113). Thereafter, on August 10, 2011, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment and brief in support thereof. (Docs. 117, 126). On August 15, 2011, Plaintiffs filed the instant cross Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting brief. (Docs. 137, 140).

In addition, on August 23, 2011, we granted the International Cemetery, Cremation and Funeral Association leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 142). On October 12, 2011, the National Funeral Directors Association (“NFDA”) filed a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief regarding the cross motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 152). We granted the motion in part on October 17, 2011 to the extent we limited petitioners to twenty (20) pages and directed them not to expand the factual record given the potentially duplicative nature of petitioner's filing with that of the PFDA. (Doc. 155).

Defendants filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on October 21, 2011. (Doc. 158). They also filed the instant Motion to Strike, (doc. 163), and brief in support thereof, (doc. 164), on the same day. Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on October 21, 2011. (Doc. 168). Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' motion to strike on November 4, 2011, (doc. 173), and on November 10, 2011, Defendants filed a reply brief in further support of their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 176). Plaintiffs filed a reply brief in further support of their motion for summary judgment on November 11, 2011. (Doc. 177). Defendants also filed a reply brief in further support of their motion to strike on November 17, 2011. (Doc. 179).

Therefore, the pending motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant meets this burden by pointing to an absence of evidence supporting an essential element as to which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). An issue is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the action under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In opposing summary judgment, the non-moving party “may not rely merely on allegations of denials in its own pleadings; rather, its response must ... set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). The non-moving party “cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir.2000). Arguments made in briefs “are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109–10 (3d Cir.1985). However, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir.2006).

Summary judgment should not be granted when there is a disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences that a factfinder could draw from them. Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir.1982). Still, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; there must be a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. Factual BackgroundA. Parties

Plaintiffs Ernest F. Heffner (Heffner) and Nathan Ray are licensed funeral directors in York, PA. Plaintiff Betty Frey (“Frey”) is an associate of Heffner and is not a licensed funeral director. Plaintiff Harry C. Neel (“Neel”) is the President of Plaintiff Jefferson Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. and Plaintiff Jefferson Memorial Park, Inc., and has a principal place of business in Pittsburgh, PA. Plaintiff Bart H. Cavanagh, Sr. (“Cavanagh”) is a licensed funeral director in Norwood, PA. Plaintiff John Katora (“Katora”) is a licensed funeral director in Lewisberry, PA. Plaintiff Brian Leffler (“Leffler”) is a licensed funeral director in Avoca, PA. Plaintiffs Rebecca Ann Wessel (“Wessel”), Mark Patrick Dougherty (“Dougherty”), Amber M. Scott (“Scott”), and Cynthia Lee Finney (“Finney”) are licensed funeral directors in Pittsburgh, PA.

Plaintiffs Todd Eckert (“Eckert”) and Matthew Morris (“Morris”) are licensed funeral directors in Red Lion, PA. Plaintiff Ben Blascovich (“Blascovich”) is a licensed funeral director in Mill Hall, PA.7 Plaintiff William Sucharski (“Sucharski”) is a licensed funeral director and owner of a duly approved crematory in Philadelphia, PA. Plaintiff John McGee (“McGee”) is a licensed funeral director in Philadelphia, PA. Plaintiffs Erika Haas (“Haas”) and Nicolas Wachter (“Wachter”) are licensed funeral directors in Milton, PA. Plaintiff David Halpate (“Halpate”) is a licensed funeral director in Renovo, PA. Plaintiffs Patrick Connell (P. Connell), Eugene Connell (E. Connell), Matthew Connell (M. Connell), and James J. Connell, Jr. (J. Connell) are licensed funeral directors in Bethlehem, PA.

Plaintiff Jefferson Memorial Park, Inc. (“Jefferson MP”) is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principal place of business in Pittsburgh, PA. Jefferson MP is a licensed cemetery and is the sole shareholder of Plaintiff Jefferson Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. (“Jefferson MFH”),8 which is also a Pennsylvania corporation with a principal place of business in Pittsburgh, PA. Plaintiff Wellman Funeral Associates, Inc., d/b/a Forest Park Funeral Home (“Wellman”), is a Louisiana corporation with a principal place of business in Shreveport, LA.9 Plaintiff East Harrisburg Cemetery Company, d/b/a East HarrisburgCemetery & Crematory (“East HBG Cem.”) is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principal place of business in Harrisburg, PA.10 Plaintiff Robert Lomison (“Lomison”) owns and operates the William Howard Day Cemetery (“WHD Cem.”), East HBG Cem., and Wellman. Plaintiff Craig Schwalm operates a crematory and cemetery and is the Vice President and General Manager of East HBG Cem. Plaintiff Gregory J. Havrilla is not a licensed funeral director, but is the General Manager of Jefferson MFH.

Defendant Donald J. Murphy (Murphy) is an appointed consumer member of the Pennsylvania State Board of Funeral Directors (the “Board...

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2 cases
  • Heffner v. Murphy
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 19 Febrero 2014
    ...agreed with the Plaintiffs that the challenged FDL provisions violated various constitutional provisions. See Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F.Supp.2d 358 (M.D.Pa.2012). The Court struck down FDL provisions that: (1) permit warrantless inspections of funeral establishments by the Board; (2) limit t......
  • Montanez v. York City
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • 17 Diciembre 2012
    ...that plaintiffs may not maintain claims for damages for alleged violations of the Pennsylvania constitution. See Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 374 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Alvarez v. City of Phila., No. Civ. A. 07-0493, 2008 WL 4347529, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2008); R.H.S. v. Alleghen......

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