Heflin v. State

• Decision Date: 05 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 1079S269,1079S269
• Citation: 275 Ind. 197,416 N.E.2d 121
• Parties: Frederick HEFLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 121

416 N.E.2d 121

275 Ind. 197

Frederick HEFLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 1079S269.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 5, 1981.

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Paul Jeffery F. Roberts, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief. The appellant was convicted in January, 1976, of three counts of committing a felony while armed, Ind.Code § 35-12-1-1 (repealed effective October 1, 1977).

On direct appeal, Heflin v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 427, 370 N.E.2d 895, appellant raised, among other issues, a claim that he was denied a speedy trial under the provisions of Ind.R.Crim.P. 4(B). This Court, assuming arguendo that Criminal Rule 4(B) was applicable, deemed the right to a speedy trial to have been waived by appellant's failure to object to a trial date scheduled beyond the seventy-day limit set by the rule. The issue, the Court held, was therefore forfeited on appeal.

In his petition for post-conviction relief, appellant raised the sole claim that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. He alleged in his petition that his attorney failed to object properly to the trial date; that his attorney failed to object to the denial of his motion for a lineup; that on appeal his attorney misstated the law and the facts on the speedy trial issue, and failed to preserve the lineup issue in the motion to correct errors; and that on the petition for rehearing his attorney did not address "misstatements of facts in the record" upon which the court based its waiver holding.

Following denial of the petition and denial of the motion to correct errors, appellant brought this appeal, raising five issues. The first four are as follows:

(1) Whether the court erred in law in finding that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the speedy trial provisions of Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B).

(2) Whether the court erred in finding that the Interstate Compact on Detainers takes precedence over the application of Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B).

(3) Whether the court erred in finding that appellant's constitutional rights were adequately safeguarded by the application of the principles enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.

(4) Whether the court erred in finding that the appellant was not in custody of the State of Indiana after return on October 20, 1975, until trial on January 5, 1976.

These four issues underlie a fifth claim that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the petitioner was not denied adequate legal representation.

In order to review these claims we must first briefly examine the relevant facts.

Appellant was charged by information with the underlying felony, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest on January 13, 1975. The warrant was not served until October 20, 1975. Meanwhile, appellant was arrested on May 2, 1975, on federal charges and held in St. Joseph County jail from May 5, 1975, until July 18, 1975, when he was transferred to federal prison in Michigan.

On July 27, 1975, Indiana authorities placed a detainer on appellant while he was still in federal prison in Michigan. On September 9 or 11 appellant pro se filed what was styled a motion for speedy trial in the St. Joseph Superior Court. The court ordered the prosecutor's office to procure appellant's attendance in court for disposition of the pending charge, and on October 20, 1975, he arrived at the St. Joseph County jail from federal prison in Oklahoma. He was served with the Indiana warrant on that day. On October 23, 1975, appellant appeared in court and counsel was appointed for him; arraignment was continued to October 27, 1975, and then to October 31, 1975, at his request. On October 31, 1975, appellant appeared in court with counsel and orally moved for a speedy trial and for dismissal of the charges based on alleged defects in the information. The court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the time for a speedy trial should run from October 31, 1975.

On December 2, 1975, the court set the case for trial on January 5, 1976. On December 29, 1975, appellant was brought before the court in connection with a pro se letter motion for discharge. His counsel on that day filed a motion to dismiss the information based not on a Criminal Rule 4(B) claim, but rather on constitutional claims of denial of due process and denial of the right to a speedy trial. Counsel argued that the State's failure to serve the January 13, 1975, bench warrant while appellant was in St. Joseph County jail in federal custody from May 5 to July 18 worked a prejudice against his client in securing witnesses and preparing the case. Counsel further argued that his client was available to Indiana authorities during the whole time, even though he was in federal custody, through the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (the Agreement), Ind.Code § 35-2.1-2-4, to which the United States is also a signatory, 18 U.S.C.App., 84 Stat. 1397-1403.

Counsel's motion was denied. Appellant's pro se motion for discharge, referred to in the court docket in the record of the original proceedings only as "his letter on legal sized paper styled 'Motion for Discharge' ", was not ruled upon. There is no reference to it in appellant's brief on direct appeal, but appellant testified that this letter motion was based on a Criminal Rule 4(B) claim that the January 5, 1976, trial setting was beyond the seventy-day limit established by the rule (calculated, presumably, from the September 9 or 11 date of his request for a speedy trial sent from federal prison).

In resolving the question of whether appellant's counsel was ineffective, the post- -conviction trial court adopted three alternative views on the allegations of ineffectiveness as to the Criminal Rule 4(B) speedy trial claims. First, the post-conviction trial court held that a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel could not be based on failure to raise, preserve for appeal, or argue properly, the issue of Criminal Rule 4(B) time limits. This is because Criminal Rule 4(B) is not applicable in this case. Rather, the court held, since appellant was imprisoned in another jurisdiction, his September 9 or 11, 1975, request triggered the application on the Agreement on Detainers. The time limits there are either one hundred eighty days from the date of receipt of the request or one hundred twenty days from his arrival in Indiana on October 20, 1975. The January 5, 1976 trial setting was within either of these limits.

Second, the post-conviction court held that even if Criminal Rule 4(B) were applicable, its seventy-day time limit must be calculated from October 31, 1975, since a Criminal Rule 4(B) motion could not have been made until the prisoner was in Indiana and his first request under Criminal Rule 4(B) in Indiana was made on ...