Hefner v. County of Sacramento

• Decision Date: 20 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. C000305,C000305
• Citation: 197 Cal.App.3d 1007,243 Cal.Rptr. 291
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Kimberly HEFNER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 291

243 Cal.Rptr. 291

197 Cal.App.3d 1007

Kimberly HEFNER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, Defendant and Respondent.

No. C000305.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Jan. 20, 1988.

Review Denied March 30, 1988.

Thompson & Dreyer, Robert A. Buccola, and Wade R. Thompson, Sacramento, for plaintiff and appellant

Bolling, Walter & Gawthrop, George E. Murphy, and Marjorie E. Manning, Sacramento, for defendant and respondent.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff Kimberly Hefner was seriously injured in an automobile accident. She sued (in addition to the driver of the car that collided with hers) Sacramento County ("defendant") alleging the defective design of the intersection at which the accident occurred constituted a dangerous condition of property that caused the collision. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground it was immune from liability arising out of the defective design of improvements to public property. (Gov.Code, § 830.6; all further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.) ¹ Plaintiff appeals. We shall conclude that the expert opinions of two civil engineers constitute "any substantial evidence upon the basis of which ... a reasonable public employee could have adopted the ... design...." (Ibid.) We shall therefore affirm the judgment on the ground defendant is entitled to immunity under section 830.6.

FACTS

U Street (later renamed Antelope Road) is a through street running east-west. Don Julio Boulevard runs north-south; its northern terminus is at U Street, where a T-intersection is formed. At the time of the accident, a stop sign was placed on the eastern side of Don Julio some 38 feet south of the edge of the pavement of U Street's eastbound lane. A limit line ² was painted across the northbound lane of Don Julio 13 feet south of the edge of the pavement of U Street's eastbound lane. ³

On November 7, 1980, plaintiff's automobile was hit broadside by a vehicle driven by Matthew DeWein that had been traveling east on U Street. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that she had stopped her vehicle at the limit line on Don Julio Boulevard but her view of eastbound traffic was obscured by a mound of dirt and vegetation on the corner across Don Julio (the southwest corner of the intersection). As she pulled beyond the limit line, her car was hit by the vehicle of DeWein, who apparently believed plaintiff was pulling onto U Street in front of him and thus swerved his car to avoid what he thought would be a collision. In fact, plaintiff's car was stopped and DeWein's intended evasive maneuver actually directed his car straight into plaintiff's.

Evidence on the motion showed without dispute that DeWein had been drinking alcoholic beverages. Officers investigating the accident found a strong odor of alcohol about DeWein and his vehicle. DeWein's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. A half-empty bottle of beer was found on the floorboard of the driver's side of the vehicle.

With respect to defendant, the foundation of plaintiff's complaint was that placement of the limit line in a spot where a driver's visibility was obscured created a dangerous condition at the intersection. Defendant moved for summary judgment on grounds that the facts failed to establish a material controversy with respect to the existence of a dangerous condition and, in any event, defendant was immune from liability by virtue of section 830.6.

In support of its design immunity defense, defendant presented declaration evidence outlining the history of construction and approval of the intersection. The evidence showed the intersection was designed by a civil engineer with defendant's Department of Public Works. Because U Street was designated a through street, the plan called for a stop sign to be placed on Don Julio Boulevard at the southeast corner of its intersection with U Street. The plan did not designate placement of the limit line.

After the location of the stop sign was determined, the limit line was painted onto Don Julio Boulevard under the supervision of Jess Lowery, the department's senior traffic supervisor. In his position, Lowery had been delegated discretionary authority to supervise the placement of limit lines within the department's standards. Those standards had been promulgated by James Ray, a civil and traffic engineer with defendant, and were identical to those listed in the U.S. Department of Commerce Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices as well as in the California Department of Transportation Traffic Manual. Copies of these written standards were incorporated in Ray's declaration.

The standards provided that limit lines should be placed no less than four and no more than thirty feet from the nearest edge of the intersecting street. In accordance with the requirements, the limit line was painted across the northbound half of Don Julio Boulevard 13 feet south of the southern edge of U Street.

Ray declared his opinion as a professional registered civil and traffic engineer that placement of the stop sign and limit line was in accord with county, state and national standards as well as consistent with then-prevailing and current standards of design and safety. He stated the limit line was placed and approved "according to reasonably accepted standards and by employees of [defendant] Department of Public Works with authority to make those approvals." In addition, Terry Little, a civil engineer with the Highways and Bridges Division of the Department of Public Works, stated in his declaration that the placement of the stop sign and limit line met reasonable and safe engineering practices and was in accord with all applicable standards. He also stated that sight distances from the intersection met and exceeded all federal, state and local recommendations for intersection sight distances.

Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment and presented the declaration of William Neuman, a civil engineer and professor of engineering at California State University, Sacramento. Neuman stated that the location of the limit line was a dangerous condition because drivers stopped at that spot could not see oncoming traffic, nor could oncoming drivers see them.

The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on July 3, 1985. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. In connection with the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff submitted the further declaration of William Neuman. Neuman propounded a two-prong approach to determining the proper placement of the limit line. He declared "The limit line is to be placed where it is safe with adequate visibility within 4 to 30 feet of the fog line [i.e., the edge of the intersecting roadway]." He opined that the limit line at the intersection After reconsideration, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. This appeal followed.

of U Street and Don Julio Boulevard failed to meet this guideline. He also asserted an engineering evaluation was required to determine whether placement of the limit line was proper and that no such evaluation had taken place. He stated no reasonable employee or public entity could have approved the location of the limit line. He also [197 Cal.App.3d 1013] insisted the failure to place the limit line at a location with adequate visibility of oncoming traffic created a trap wherein a car slowly pulling past the limit line to ascertain whether it was safe to enter U Street would be perceived by drivers of oncoming cars as actually attempting to enter U Street, thereby forcing those oncoming drivers to take evasive action.

DISCUSSION

I. Design Immunity

At the risk of jumping over the duty horse into the immunity cart (see Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 22, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137), we shall assume for purposes of argument there exists a triable issue of fact whether defendant's duty to prevent accidents caused by dangerous conditions on public property was breached by the design of the subject intersection. Because the trial court ruled that defendant was immune pursuant to section 830.6, and because we find that issue dispositive, we need consider only that ruling.

"The rationale behind design immunity 'is to prevent a jury from simply reweighing the same factors considered by the governmental entity which approved the design.' (Baldwin v. State of California [1972] 6 Cal.3d 424, 432, fn. 7 [99 Cal.Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121].) ' "[T]o permit reexamination in tort litigation of particular discretionary decisions where reasonable men may differ as to how the discretion should be exercised would create too great a danger of impolitic interference with the freedom of decision-making by those public officials in whom the function of making such decisions has been vested." ' (4 Cal.Law Revision Com.Rep. (1963) p. 823, quoted at [Cabell v. State of California (1967) ] 67 Cal.2d [150,] at p. 153 [60 Cal.Rptr. 476, 430 P.2d 34].)" (Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318, 326, 102 Cal.Rptr. 305, 497 P.2d 777.)

"The 'Design Immunity' defense (Gov.Code, § 830.6) is raised on a motion for summary judgment, nonsuit, and directed verdict. On submitting such matter, the trial court is invited to rule whether the evidence is sufficient to support the design immunity defense, and if the trial court determines that the defense has been established, the jury is instructed that the public entity is immune as a matter of law for design related damages. (Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 565 .).... [p] In order for the state to establish design immunity as a defense, the state must show (1) A causal relationship between the plan and the accident; (2) discretionary approval of the plan prior to construction; (3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the design. (Anderson v. City of Thousand Oaks (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 82, 88 .) The state is...