Hegg v. Mont. State Fund
| Decision Date | 10 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | WCC No. 2016-3730 |
| Citation | 2016 MTWCC 14 |
| Parties | JULIA DARLENE HEGG Petitioner v. MONTANA STATE FUND Respondent/Insurer. |
| Court | Montana Workers Compensation Court |
Summary: Petitioner became a beneficiary when her husband died from an occupational disease. Her husband worked sporadically and, during the year prior to his death, his average weekly wage was $79.71. Thus, Respondent moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it correctly calculated Petitioner's benefit rate to be $79.71 under § 39-71-721(2), MCA, which states, in relevant part, "The minimum weekly compensation benefit is 50% of the state's average weekly wage, but in no event may it exceed the decedent's actual wages at the time of death." Petitioner argues that this statute is ambiguous and that her benefit rate is $354, which was 50% of the state's average weekly wage for her husband's date of death. Alternatively, Petitioner argues that if her rate is $79.71, then § 39-71-721(2), MCA, violates her right to substantive due process under Article II, § 17 of the Montana Constitution, and is therefore insufficient to uphold the quid pro quo on which the Workers' Compensation Act is based. She argues that the remedy for this alleged constitutional violation is for this Court to increase her benefit rate to $354, an amount she argues is sufficient to uphold the quid pro quo.
Held: This Court granted Respondent's motion, and denied in part Petitioner's cross-motion for summary judgment because Respondent correctly calculated Petitioner's rate under the plain language of § 39-71-721(2), MCA. This Court declined to rule on Petitioner's constitutional challenge, and denied that part of Petitioner's cross-motion for summary judgment, because this Court cannot grant her the relief she seeks.
¶ 1 Respondent Montana State Fund (State Fund) moves for summary judgment, arguing it correctly calculated Petitioner Julia Hegg's (Julia) death benefit rate to be $79.71 under §§ 39-71-123(3) and -721(2), MCA. Julia agrees that State Fund correctly determined that the decedent's wages were $79.71 under § 39-71-123(3), MCA, but argues she is entitled to benefits at the rate of $354 under § 39-71-721(2), MCA. Alternatively, Julia argues that if her rate is $79.71, her rate is so minimal that it violates her right to substantive due process under Article II, § 17 of the Montana Constitution, and argues that the remedy is for this Court to increase her rate to $354 — the amount she claims is sufficient.
¶ 2 This Court held a hearing on May 18, 2016. Lucas J. Foust represented Julia. Thomas E. Martello represented State Fund. The parties agreed at the hearing that this Court should consider Julia's response brief as a brief in support of a cross-motion for summary judgment.
¶ 3 There are two issues before this Court:
¶ 4 Thomas Hegg, an employee of Oak Creations, Inc. (Oak Creations), died from an occupational disease on January 13, 2015. Mr. Hegg was a part-time employee of Oak Creations at the time of his death; however, he had worked full-time 13 out of the 15 years he was employed with Oak Creations.
¶ 5 Julia was married to Mr. Hegg at the time of his death and presented a Beneficiaries Claim for Compensation to State Fund.
¶ 6 State Fund accepted liability for Julia's claim.
¶ 7 In accordance with § 39-71-123(3)(a), MCA, Amanda Krissovich, a claims examiner for State Fund, initially calculated the death benefit rate using the average actual earnings for the four pay periods immediately preceding Mr. Hegg's death, which resulted in an average weekly wage of $53.52. However, given the sporadic nature of Mr. Hegg's work in 2014, Krissovich determined that the four pay periods immediately preceding his death did not accurately reflect his wages. Thus, under § 39-71-123(3)(b),MCA, Krissovich calculated his earnings over the entire year preceding his death, which resulted in an average weekly wage of $79.71.
¶ 8 At the time of Mr. Hegg's death, 50% of the State's average weekly wage was $354.
¶ 9 State Fund determined that Julia's rate for death benefits is $79.71 under § 39-71-721(2), MCA, which states, in relevant part, "The minimum weekly compensation benefit is 50% of the state's average weekly wage, but in no event may it exceed the decedent's actual wages at the time of death."
¶ 10 State Fund is paying death benefits to Julia at the rate of $79.71.
¶ 11 The Estate of Thomas Hegg has filed a tort claim against Oak Creations in the Stillwater County District Court.1 The Estate of Thomas Hegg alleges, inter alia, that Oak Creations may not rely on the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) as an affirmative defense because the workers' compensation benefits payable as a result of Mr. Hegg's death are insufficient to uphold the quid pro quo underlying the WCA.2
¶ 12 This case is governed by the 2013 version of the WCA because that was the law in effect at the time of Mr. Hegg's last injurious exposure.3
¶ 13 This Court renders summary judgment when the moving party demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.4
Issue One: Did State Fund correctly calculate Julia's benefit rate to be $79.71?
¶ 14 Under the WCA, two factors are used to calculate a claimant's benefit rate. The first factor is the employee's wages. Section 39-71-123, MCA — the statute that defines "wages" — states in relevant part:
¶ 15 The second factor is the state's average weekly wage for the fiscal year in which the injury occurred.5
¶ 16 These factors are then used to calculate the claimant's rate for the particular benefit at issue. For death benefits, § 39-71-721(2), MCA, states:
(2) To beneficiaries as defined in 39-71-116(4)(a) through (4)(d), weekly compensation benefits for an injury causing death are 66 2/3% of the decedent's wages. The maximum weekly compensation benefit may not exceed the state's average weekly wage at the time of injury. The minimum weekly compensation benefit is 50% of the state's average weekly wage, but in no event may it exceed the decedent's actual wages at the time of death.6
¶ 17 Julia argues that the last sentence of this subsection is ambiguous; while the first clause provides a "minimum" for benefits of 50% of the state's average weekly wage, the second clause allows for a rate that can be less than the "minimum." She maintains that these clauses are irreconcilable and that it is therefore unclear whether she is entitled to the "minimum," which is $354 for Mr. Hegg's date of death, or to Mr. Hegg's actual wages, which she concedes are $79.71. Relying upon legislative history from the 1973 Legislature, Julia argues that the Legislature's intent was to provide the "minimum" to the beneficiaries of all workers who die in the course of their employment. Thus, she argues that her rate under § 39-71-721(2), MCA, is $354.
¶ 18 State Fund argues that this statute is unambiguous. State Fund maintains that the first clause of the last sentence of § 39-71-721(2), MCA, sets forth a rule of law, while the second clause sets forth an exception. State Fund argues that the only way to interpretthe statute as Julia does is to strike the phrase "but in no event may it exceed the decedent's actual wages at the time of death." Because State Fund maintains that the statute is unambiguous, it argues that it is unnecessary to resort to legislative history. However, State Fund points out that the 1973 Legislature enacted the phrase stating that the rate cannot be higher than the decedent's actual wages and that it has been a part of the WCA since then.7 Thus, State Fund maintains that the 1973 Legislature did not intend for death benefits to be greater than the decedent's actual wages. State Fund maintains that it correctly calculated Julia's rate to be $79.71.
¶ 19 The "primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent."8 If the legislative intent can be determined from the plain language of the statute, no further means of interpretation may be applied.9 To that end, § 1-2-101, MCA, states:
In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.
This Court will not resort to legislative history unless the legislative intent cannot be determined from the plain language of the statute.10
¶ 20 Under these rules of statutory construction, it is unnecessary to resort to legislative history because the Legislature's intent is clear from the plain language of § 39-71-721(2), MCA. The plain language of this statute states that the "minimum" rate applies when 66 2/3% of the decedent's...
To continue reading
Request your trial