Heglin v. United States

• Decision Date: 31 May 1928
• Docket Number: No. 7961.,7961.
• Citation: 27 F.2d 310
• Parties: HEGLIN v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

27 F.2d 310 (1928)

HEGLIN v. UNITED STATES.^*

No. 7961.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

May 31, 1928.

D. W. Buckner, of Gate, Okl. (J. T. Rogers, of Wichita, Kan., on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

Roy St. Lewis, U. S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Okl. (Leslie E. Salter, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before KENYON, Circuit Judge, and SYMES and MARTINEAU, District Judges.

KENYON, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff in error was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on four counts of an indictment charging a violation of what is known as the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act. Section 408, title 18, USCA. The particular provision of said statute claimed to be violated is the following:

"Whoever shall transport or cause to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both. Whoever shall receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both. Any person violating this section may be punished in any district in or through which such motor vehicle has been transported or removed by such offender."

The first, second, and third counts of the indictment charge that plaintiff in error knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously received, concealed, stored, bartered, sold, and disposed of a certain motor vehicle, to wit, etc., which had theretofore been stolen in the state of Kansas and transported into the western district of Oklahoma, and that the same was then moving in and was a part of interstate commerce, and that plaintiff in error knew said motor vehicle was stolen. Each one of the counts is practically the same, except as to the ownership of the specified car stolen. The fourth count charged the unlawful and felonious transportation from Gate, Okl., to Dodge City, Kan., of the car named in the third count.

The court imposed a sentence of five years and a fine of $250 on each count, sentences to run concurrently.

The first assignment of error relates to the overruling by the court of the demurrer to the indictment, it being claimed that the indictment is insufficient to charge any offense against the laws of the United States, the particular reasons advanced being that the respective counts contain no allegation of the time when the automobile therein described was stolen; that the statement that the same was in interstate commerce is a mere conclusion, and that there is no statement in the indictment that the transportation was without the knowledge or consent of the owner. It would seem these objections to the indictment are rather trivial. As the indictment charges the various automobiles had been stolen from the owners and transported in interstate commerce, there was no necessity for any statement as to the knowledge or consent of the owner as to such transportation, nor is it necessary to state any particular time in the counts of the indictment as to when the particular automobile therein referred to was stolen. This indictment fully meets the test laid down by this court in Goldberg v. United States, 277 F. 211, 215, as follows: "The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is that it sets forth the facts which the pleader claims constitute the alleged transgression so distinctly as to advise the accused of the charge which he has to meet and give him a fair opportunity to prepare his defense, so particularly as to enable him to avail himself of a conviction or acquittal in defense of another prosecution for the same offense, and so clearly that the court may be able to determine whether the facts there stated are sufficient to support a conviction."

Assignments of error 3 and 4 raise the question of error in the court's failing to instruct the jury as to the testimony of an accomplice, Carl Fred Wood. It is to be observed that no requests for instructions were made by plaintiff in error, and the only exceptions to the instructions were as follows: "Mr. Buckner: We except on behalf of the defendant." Of course, this exception is totally insufficient to raise the question here suggested. We may say, however, that the rule as to accomplices as laid down by the Supreme Court in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 495, 37 S. Ct. 192, 198 (61 L. Ed. 442, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168), that there may be convictions on the testimony of accomplices if the jurors believe them, but it is "the better practice for courts to caution juries against too much reliance upon the testimony of accomplices and to require corroborating testimony before giving credence to such evidence," was carefully followed by the learned trial court, as is apparent from the following excerpt from the instructions:

"The rule on that subject is, and I instruct you that is the law for your guidance, that you should consider the testimony of that witness cautiously, and consider whether he is corroborated by the facts and circumstances...