Hei v. Holzer

Decision Date04 June 2003
Docket NumberNo. 26968.,26968.
Citation139 Idaho 81,73 P.3d 94
PartiesMelissa HEI, a single person; and Michael Hei and Colleen Hei, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mark HOLZER and Lisa Holzer, husband and wife; Joint School District No. 391, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho; Larry L. Curry, in his capacity as Superintendent of Joint School District No. 391; Larry Wier, in his capacity as Principal of Kellogg High School; and John Does 1-5, in their capacity as Board Members of Joint School District No. 391, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Rude, Jackson & Daugharty, Coeur d'Alene, for appellants. Paul W. Daugharty argued.

Anderson, Julian & Hull, Boise, for respondents Joint School District No. 391, Curry, Wier & Does 1-5. Brian K. Julian argued.

Michael F. Peacock, Kellogg, for respondents Holzer.

TROUT, Chief Justice.

This is a case about the civil liability arising out of a sexual relationship between a high school student and her teacher. The student and her parents appeal the district court's Order granting summary judgment to the teacher and school district. Because there are genuine issues of material fact with regard to some of the student's claims, we reverse in part and remand to the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Student Melissa Hei ("Hei") and her teacher Mark Holzer ("Holzer") began a sexual relationship in the winter of Hei's junior year at Kellogg High School in Joint School District No. 391 ("School District"). Holzer was Hei's physical education teacher and basketball coach; Hei also served as Holzer's teacher's aide. Holzer and his wife (also a teacher) were family friends of the Heis.

Early in Hei's junior year, the fall of 1995, mutual flirting started to develop. Holzer and Hei began confiding in one another and each expressed feelings for the other. Hei turned eighteen in December, and in January 1996, a romantic relationship developed. Several incidents of sexual contact occurred between January and October, with sexual intercourse first occurring in March. At first, Hei and Holzer kept their relationship quiet, but students and teachers began suspecting something was occurring. In late January, Hei told a teacher about the feelings she had for Holzer. The teacher told the activities director about the conversation, and the activities director told the principal and superintendent in February. The school employees began investigating in February, but both Hei and Holzer denied the rumors. Eventually, in early May, Hei told a teaching assistant about the sexual nature of the relationship. In mid-May, another teacher learned of the sexual nature of the relationship and she relayed this to the activities director. The activities director immediately informed the principal and superintendent that Holzer had sexual intercourse with Hei. In late June, the teaching assistant told the principal that sexual contact occurred. Holzer resigned the next day.

The Heis filed their Complaint March 17, 1997. The district court issued an Order granting summary judgment to Holzer and the School District on August 31, 2000. The Heis filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as that used by the trial court in ruling on the motion. Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000). We must liberally construe the facts in favor of the non-moving party and determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In making this determination, all allegations of fact in the record, and all reasonable inferences from the record are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002). The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. Id. Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element of the claim does exist. The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by affidavits or as otherwise provided in the rules to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). Failure to do so will result in an order granting summary judgment.

III. DISCUSSION

The issues raised on appeal fall into three general categories: (1) Melissa Hei's claims against Mark and Lisa Holzer; (2) Melissa Hei's claims against the School District; and (3) the Hei parents' claims against both Holzer and the School District. The district court's grant of summary judgment was proper with regard to the Hei parents' claims. The district court also correctly granted summary judgment against Hei on her claims against Mark and Lisa Holzer. However, there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment for two of Hei's claims against the School District.

A. Claims Against Holzer and his Wife

In its Conclusions of Law, the district court found that the sexual relationship between Hei and Holzer was consensual.1 No evidence in the record contradicts the finding of a consensual relationship. As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to Hei's sixth cause of action for battery, seventh cause of action for assault, and ninth cause of action based on seduction.2

In addition, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Holzer on Hei's second cause of action based on negligence. Hei can maintain her negligence action only if she establishes a duty of care owed to her by Holzer. While we have recognized a duty of care owed by teachers to students, see, e.g., Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 490, 903 P.2d 73, 79 (1995)

(noting duty owed by teacher to student), we have not recognized such a duty for students who have reached the age of majority and entered into a consensual relationship with a teacher that is otherwise legal.3 As discussed above, there is nothing in the record that contradicts the finding that the relationship between Hei and Holzer was consensual. Because Hei fails to establish the existence of a duty of care owed by Holzer, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the second cause of action based on negligence.4 Despite the fact that Hei fails to establish a duty of care owed by the teacher, we discuss below the School District's duty to protect students from sexual contact with teachers.

B. Claims Against the School District

We will not review issues neither presented in the statement of issues nor argued by either party in their briefs. Rhead v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 135 Idaho 446, 452, 19 P.3d 760, 766 (2001). Hei brought seventeen causes of action in the initial complaint. Eleven of the causes of action premise the School District's alleged liability on vicarious liability. The district court granted summary judgment against Hei on the issue of vicarious liability, and Hei failed to raise the issue of vicarious liability in her brief. Therefore, we will not consider that issue and will not disturb the district court's grant of summary judgment as to those causes of action. Two of the causes of action assess liability to the School District on breach of contract theories. Again, Hei fails to raise these issues on appeal and we will not consider them. The four remaining causes of action in the complaint were raised on appeal and are discussed below.

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Hei advances a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action against the School District for alleged violations of her constitutional rights. The district court found that Hei failed to demonstrate any factual support for the contention that the School District has a policy in place which amounted to deliberate indifference to her constitutional rights, or that the School District acted in a manner amounting to deliberate indifference with regard to Holzer's conduct. To state a § 1983 civil rights lawsuit against the School District, Hei must demonstrate she possessed a constitutional right that was violated by the School District through deliberate indifference of her rights. For the School District to be liable, a School District employee, Holzer, must have been acting under color of state law when committing the acts that Hei alleges violated her right to due process. Thus, two initial questions arise: (1) did Hei have a constitutional right that was violated; and (2) was Holzer acting under color of state law. Because there was no constitutional right violated, we need not address the second question.

Hei claims she had a right to be free from sexual abuse by a teacher, and some courts have indeed found this right— for minors. See, e.g., Plumeau v. School Dist. No. 40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.1997)

(finding the right for a nine-year-old student); Doe v. Taylor Indep. School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (finding the right for a fifteen-year-old student). No such constitutional right has been articulated for students who have reached the age of majority. While Holzer's behavior in having sexual relations with a student is offensive, that offensiveness alone does not create a constitutional right. Sexual intercourse is illegal when performed with a fourteen-year-old. While sexual intercourse with an eighteen-year-old may likewise constitute a criminal act, the illegality is not dependent purely upon the age of the participants. The cases finding a substantive due process right for school children to be free from sexual abuse by a teacher, have done so in large part because sexual intercourse with a minor is illegal and presumptively without their...

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