Heick v. Bacon
Decision Date | 26 March 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 95-2215,95-2215 |
Citation | 561 N.W.2d 45 |
Parties | Scott HEICK and Vicki Kelley-Heick, Appellants, v. Christina BACON, Appellee, and Stewart Richardson, Kathy Van Blaricome, other unknown/unnamed group activity participants, Herky's Tap, Inc., Corner Tap, Betty Weineke d/b/a Wink's Tap, and Burt's Tavern, Inc., Defendants. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Wythe Willey of Wythe Willey Law Office, Cedar Rapids, for appellants.
Robert R. Rush and Jana L. Happel of Lynch, Dallas, Smith & Harman, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
This case arises out of a near-head-on collision between an automobile, in which one of the plaintiffs was traveling, and a truck. The plaintiffs sued the driver of the truck, two passengers who were in the truck at the time of the collision, and four taverns. By the time of trial, all the defendants had settled except one of the passengers in the truck. A jury had been picked but before the parties presented evidence, they persuaded the district court to hear the defendant-passenger's motion for directed verdict based on some stipulated facts, interrogatories, depositions and exhibits.
The plaintiffs alleged the defendant was liable under theories of joint enterprise, joint concerted tortious activity, and aiding and abetting in the violation of a criminal statute. The district court sustained the motion for directed verdict, finding there was insufficient evidence to submit any of these theories of liability to the jury. The plaintiffs appealed, contending there was sufficient evidence to submit all three theories. We affirm.
We review rulings granting motions for directed verdict for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4. When reviewing the ruling, we view the evidence in the same light as the district court to determine whether the evidence generated a jury question. Toney v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa 1990). In ruling on such motions, the district court must first decide whether the party against whom the motion was made has presented substantial evidence on each element of the claim. Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1986). Evidence is substantial if a jury could reasonably infer a fact from the evidence. Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 317-18 (Iowa 1992). If the evidence is not substantial, a directed verdict is appropriate. Id. at 318.
Under this substantial evidence standard, if reasonable minds could disagree on an issue in light of the evidence presented, the district court must submit the issue to the jury. Id. Sometimes facts are not in dispute. Even so, if reasonable minds might draw different inferences from such facts, a jury question is engendered. Iowa R.App. P. 14(f)(17).
In addition, when ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. Iowa R.App. P. 14(f)(2). Finally, a party moving for directed verdict is considered to have admitted the truth of all evidence offered by the other party and every favorable inference that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from it. Brown v. Ellison, 304 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Iowa 1981).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we think the evidence establishes the following facts. On Saturday, February 12, 1994, at about 4:05 p.m., Stewart Richardson lost control of his pickup while traveling west on Highway 22 near Lone Tree. The pickup crossed the center line and collided, almost head-on, with a west-bound vehicle driven by Scott Heick. Randy Dudgeon was a passenger in Scott's vehicle.
At the time of the collision, there were two passengers in the pickup: Christina Bacon (now Kristy Richardson) and Kathy Van Blaricome, Kristy's friend. At times before the collision Stewart held Kristy out as his wife. The two, however, were not officially married until December 3, 1994.
Following the collision, Stewart was charged with OWI and arrested at the scene. See generally Iowa Code ch. 321J (1993) ( ). His blood-alcohol concentration was .129, beyond the legal limit for operating a motor vehicle. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(b) ( ). The parties stipulated that Stewart was negligent in the operation of his pickup.
At the time of the collision, Stewart was a manual laborer and a part-time body builder. Kristy was a student at a community college. She was also a body builder. In 1982, Kristy graduated from the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy and was a police officer in Muscatine for six years.
On the afternoon of the collision, Stewart, Kristy, and Kathy were participating in an event organized by a local motorcycle club, "The Circle of Pride." Several of the club's members were friends of Stewart and lifted weights with him and Kristy. The event was called the "Not-So-Special Olympics Game Run." Each participant--there were from ten to twenty--paid a $6 fee to participate in the event. Each was issued a score card with which to keep track of their score in six events, and the winner was to receive a prize.
The participants traveled from bar to bar, in a several county radius around the city of Muscatine, drinking alcoholic beverages at each bar and playing the prearranged games. The game run was scheduled to meet at a total of six different bars. At the end of the game run, the participant with the highest total score would receive the prize. The game run began at about 11:30 a.m. and was to end at 6 p.m.
Stewart, Kristy, and Kathy had been participating between four and five hours at the time of the collision and were traveling in a caravan of other participants to the fifth of the six scheduled bars.
Several weeks before the game run, Kathy told Stewart and Kristy about the planned event. Thereafter, Kristy and Kathy planned and prepared for the event. On the morning of the event, Stewart told Kristy he did not want to go. Kristy persisted and told Stewart she would go with Kathy anyway. Finally, Stewart relented and decided to go. One reason Stewart decided to go was that he did not want Kristy socializing with the other male members of the motorcycle club unless he was present.
Although Stewart agreed to go, he told Kristy he did not want Kathy riding with them in his pickup. Kristy insisted that Kathy ride along with them and, without another word from Stewart, she did.
The trio arrived at the first bar at 11:30 a.m., paid their entry fees, and received their sign-up sheet upon which they were to keep track of their scores. The sign-up sheet specified the six bars to which the participants were to go. It was snowing at the time, making driving conditions hazardous. All of the participants agreed to travel in a caravan from bar to bar. Some of the fifteen or more vehicles involved, including Stewart's, had four-wheel drive.
As planned, Stewart, Kristy, and Kathy went from bar to bar drinking and playing the prearranged games. Between bars, Stewart left the designated route to go back to Kristy's home where he had been staying so that she could change into warmer clothes. They then rejoined the game run.
By the time they reached the fourth bar, most of the participants were intoxicated, including Stewart, Kristy, and Kathy. The participants continued to drink and play games.
After leaving the fourth bar, all of the participants headed to the fifth bar on the scheduled itinerary. On the way, the road appeared to be clear. This prompted Stewart to pull off to the side of the road where Kristy got out and disengaged the pickup's four-wheel drive.
Later, while traveling to the fifth bar, Stewart noticed the road was covered with about six to eight inches of snow. Stewart thought about stopping and re-engaging his four-wheel drive, but there was no place to pull over and the next town was only one mile away. The occupants in the car ahead of Stewart's were waving him to go on. Apparently, at this point, Kristy and Kathy told Stewart to "keep going." Stewart did so and shortly thereafter he hit an icy spot in the road, lost control, and collided with the Heick's vehicle.
On March 8, 1994, Scott Heick sued Stewart, Kristy, Kathy, and the four bars that had served them alcohol on the game run. Scott's wife, Vicki Kelley-Heick also sued seeking damages for loss of spousal consortium. By the time of trial, all defendants except Kristy had settled. The Heicks claimed that Kristy was liable to them under three legal theories: (1) joint enterprise, (2) joint concerted tortious activity, and (3) aiding and abetting Stewart in the violation of a criminal statute.
The parties proceeded to trial and picked a jury. Before the parties presented any evidence, they agreed to submit the case to the court on Kristy's motion for directed verdict. The parties agreed that the court could consider some stipulated facts, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and certain exhibits. The court sustained the motion, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to submit any of the three theories to the jury.
The Heicks appealed, contending there was sufficient evidence to submit all three theories.
A. The law generally. According to one treatise, "[t]he doctrine of vicarious responsibility in connection with joint enterprises rests upon an analogy to the law of partnership." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 72, at 516 (5th ed.1984) [hereinafter Prosser]. A partnership is based upon a permanent business arrangement that in turn creates a mutual agency between partners to carry on some general business. Id. Because of this mutual agency, each partner is responsible for the acts of the other. Id.
A joint enterprise resembles a partnership, but it differs from a partnership in that the joint enterprise is for a more limited time and...
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