Heine v. Vilsack
Decision Date | 31 December 2014 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:12-CV-01992-AWI-SMS |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Parties | DAVID SHAYNE HEINE; CALIFORNIA VEAL TECH, INC., Plaintiffs, v. TOM VILSACK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE; DR. YUDHBIR SHARMA; DR. AMY LIEDER; PENNY PATRALI; USDA EMPLOYEES KNOWN ONLY AS "DR. PANNU," "DR. REDDING," "KEN," AND "DR. HENLEY," AND DOES 1-100 INCLUSIVE, Defendants. |
(Docs. 47 & 55)
Before the Court in the above-styled and numbered cause of action are "Plaintiff David Shayne Heine's Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint," filed July 31, 2014 (Doc. 47), and "Plaintiff David Shayne Heine's Supplemental Brief in Support of His Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint," filed November 5, 2014 (Doc. 55). In these, Heine requests leave to amend his Third Amended Complaint. The matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-briefs, which were submitted without oral argument to the undersigned United States MagistrateJudge. The Court has jurisdiction over these actions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and the matter is ripe for review.
"Leave to amend should be granted unless the pleading 'could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts,' and should be granted more liberally to pro se plaintiffs." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1063 (2004). However, "[i]t is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend when any proposed amendment would be futile." Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990).
"Leave to amend may be denied if a court determines that 'allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency,'" Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008) ); see Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) ( )(citing Reddy, 912 F.2d at 296-297).
Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his complaint in order to assert three additional causes of action against "All Defendants" under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). These new claims are (1) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (2) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and (3) Conversion.
Defendants assert that amendment is futile because Plaintiff's proposed additional claims would be subject to immediate dismissal on the basis that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Court agrees.
A claim in a proposed amended complaint is futile if it would be immediately "subject to dismissal" pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998). A court also may deny leave to amend if it cannot acquire jurisdiction over the proposed new claims. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Coast Packing Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (); Garcia, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14154, 4-5 (). The Court finds at least two reasons why amendment would be futile here.
The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tortious conduct by the United States, and it only allows claims against the United States. FDIC v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). It is within the Court's discretion to deny leave to amend a complaint for the alleged torts because the United States and its agencies are immune under the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"). See Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013) ( ).
Heine's proposed additional claims would be subject to immediate dismissal because, under the FTCA,1 it is well settled that the United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA suit. See, e.g., Craft, 157 F.3d at 706 () (emphasis added); Kennedy v. United States Postal Service, 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Because the United States isthe only proper party defendant in an FTCA action, the district court correctly dismissed her complaint against the Postal Service and [the Postmaster General];" Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (); Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451, 1452 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983).
Heine seeks to impose liability in tort against "All Defendants" named in the pleading: the Secretary of Agriculture, the United States Department of Agriculture ("the USDA"), the FSIS, numerous USDA employees, and Does 1-100 (together, "the Defendants"). See PFAC at pp. 1, 10-11. These Defendants are not the United States. As such, the Court finds there are grounds for immediate dismissal as against these improper defendants. See, e.g., Lance, 70 F.3d at 1095 ( ); Gaede v. United States Forest Serv., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3561, * 19 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013) ( ); Crump v. SSA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73646, *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2008) ( ); Nero v. Ives, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92754, *19 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2014) ( ); Freeman v. United States, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37801, *14-15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014) ( ); Hennington v. FBI, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1189, * 5-6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2009) ) .
Likewise, this Court concludes that grounds exist for immediate dismissal of Heine's proposed new FTCA claims against the Defendants and will deny leave to amend.2 Therefore, allowing Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint as to Defendants - who are not the United States - would be futile because absence of subject matter jurisdiction is a legal defect. Although FTCA claims can arise from the acts or omissions of United States agencies (28 U.S.C. § 2671), an agency itself cannot be sued under the FTCA. See Shelton v. United States Customs Service, 565 F.2d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977) (); Craft, 157 F.3d at 706 (). The FTCA provides that the authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name "shall not be construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable" under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 28 U.S.C. § 2679. Accordingly, amendment here is futile.
Alternative reasons exist to deny Heine's request for leave to amend in order to add claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Under California law,3 to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 571 (9th Cir. 2009); Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991); KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1023, 1028, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (1995).
Conduct is outrageous if it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Corales, 567 F.3d at 571; Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City of New York, 175 Cal. App. 4th 1208, 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 744 (2009).
The conduct about which Plaintiff complains - contrived USDA inspection rates - falls short of satisfying the first required element, that a defendant's behavior exceeds the bounds of human decency. Specifically, the alleged behavior is that in a coordinated effort, inspectionofficials contrived to perform high inspection rates of Heine's veal...
To continue reading
Request your trial