Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ.
| Decision Date | 05 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-CV-05285-LHK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | JOHN M HEINEKE, Plaintiff, v. SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants. |
Before the Court are Defendants Santa Clara University and Jane Doe's motion to dismiss the complaint and special motion to strike the complaint under California's statute barring strategic lawsuits against public participation (the "anti-SLAPP statute"). ECF Nos. 27, 45. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' special motion to strike. The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. In this Order, the Court also details its reasoning for previously granting Defendants' motion to allow Jane Doe to proceed under pseudonym. See ECF No. 54.
Plaintiff John Heineke ("Plaintiff") is a 79-year-old tenured professor of economics at Santa Clara University ("SCU"). ECF No. 74 ("Compl.") ¶¶ 1, 9. In 2015, Jane Doe ("Doe"), then a student of his, accused Plaintiff of sexual harassment and filed a complaint with SCU's Office of EEO & Title IX. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 32. Doe chose not to pursue the complaint at that time. Compl. ¶ 33. Plaintiff denies the allegations and asserts that Doe made the allegations as a face-saving way to withdraw from her commitment to serve as Plaintiff's teaching assistant. Compl. ¶ 34.
At some unspecified time, another student ("Student A") of Plaintiff's filed a complaint accusing him of sexual harassment. Compl. ¶ 36. SCU hired a third-party investigator to investigate the charges. The investigator found that a preponderance of the evidence did not support Student A's allegations of sexual harassment. Compl. ¶ 37. In the course of the investigation into Student A's claims, however, the investigator learned of Doe's complaint and interviewed her. Compl. ¶¶ 37-38. The investigator then opened a formal investigation into Doe's complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 38-39. Plaintiff asserts that Student A made her allegations because she was upset about a low grade she received in Plaintiff's class. Plaintiff asserts that Doe agreed to resurrect her allegations to help Student A, with whom Plaintiff says Doe is friends. Compl. ¶ 36; Heineke Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.
Following an investigation that included interviewing Doe and a number of witnesses, the investigator issued a report finding that Plaintiff had violated SCU's Gender-Based Discriminationand Sexual Misconduct Policy as well as Policy 311 of the Staff Policy Manual. Compl. ¶ 40. Plaintiff contends that the investigation was biased against him. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 39-40.
On August 20, 2017, SCU threatened to terminate Plaintiff based on Provost Dennis Jacobs's acceptance of the investigation's findings. Compl. ¶ 45. Plaintiff contends that these decisions were influenced by SCU's general counsel's bias against Plaintiff, as well as SCU Business School's desire to save money. Heineke Decl. ¶¶ 30-31.
SCU suspended Plaintiff pending the resolution of Plaintiff's internal appeal of Jacobs's decision to SCU's president. Compl. ¶ 46. Plaintiff contends that news of his suspension quickly spread around campus. Compl. ¶ 46. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that SCU employees and students have publicly disclosed Doe's allegations of sexual harassment or the fact that Plaintiff was suspended for sexual harassment. Compl. ¶ 48.
Plaintiff contends that as a result of Defendants' actions, he has suffered mental anguish, loss of sleep, loss of appetite, headaches, loss of companionship, loss of reputation, and loss of career, as well as a range of monetary damages. Compl. ¶¶ 63-64.
On September 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants SCU and a named former student alleging age discrimination, due process violations, wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and defamation. Compl.
On September 13, 2017, while Plaintiff was suspended with pay pending resolution of his appeal to the SCU President of the Provost's decision to terminate Plaintiff, ECF No. 22 at 3, Plaintiff filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, ECF No. 97. Also on September 13, 2017, the Court ordered SCU to respond to the emergency motion. ECF No. 16. SCU responded on September 14, 2017. ECF No. 68. On September 15, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiff's emergency motion because the Court found that Plaintiff'salleged harms—reputational injury, loss of job, and emotional distress—were not irreparable under United States Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. Id.
On September 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. ECF No. 23. Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order from the Ninth Circuit, which the Ninth Circuit denied in a summary order. ECF No. 25. Briefing for the appeal concluded on December 4, 2017. See Docket No. 26 for Case No. 17-16876.
On October 3, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint in this Court. ECF No. 69 ("MTD"). On October 23, 2017, Defendants filed an administrative motion to allow the named defendant to proceed under pseudonym. ECF No. 71. On October 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the administrative motion to proceed under pseudonym. ECF No. 86. Also on October 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 34 ("MTD Opp."). On November 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed a reply in support of the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 70 ("MTD Reply").
On November 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 37. The Court struck Plaintiff's motion for failure to comply with the Civil Local Rules governing page limits. ECF No. 38. On November 13, 2017, Plaintiff refiled the emergency motion for preliminary injunction based on his alleged imminent firing. Plaintiff's motion included a request for an evidentiary hearing. ECF No. 39. The Court directed SCU to file a response by November 15, 2017. ECF No. 40. The Court also set a hearing for the preliminary injunction motion for November 17, 2017 and ordered the parties to file statements related to Plaintiff's request for an evidentiary hearing. ECF No. 46.
SCU filed an opposition to the emergency motion for a preliminary injunction on November 15, 2017, ECF No. 75, and both parties filed statements outlining their positions on Plaintiff's requested evidentiary hearing, ECF Nos. 76, 90. Notably, Plaintiff envisioned calling atleast 18 witnesses and taking at least 12 hours of testimony. ECF No. 90.
On November 16, 2017, the Court filed an order granting Plaintiff's request for an evidentiary hearing but limiting each side to two hours of witness testimony. ECF No. 50. The Court also granted Defendants' request for the named student-defendant to proceed under the pseudonym of "Jane Doe." ECF No. 54.
Also on November 16, 2017, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a declaration under penalty of perjury stating whether Plaintiff would file an appeal to the Faculty Judicial Board, as such an appeal would render Plaintiff's second request for a preliminary injunction premature. ECF No. 51. Plaintiff filed a declaration stating that he had decided to file an appeal to the Faculty Judicial Board. ECF No. 92. Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction because Plaintiff's status had not materially changed since his first motion for a restraining order or preliminary injunction. ECF No. 55. Specifically, Plaintiff remained on paid suspension pending exhaustion of his administrative remedies at SCU. Id. at 2. As such, the Court's reasoning in its Order denying the first motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction still applied. Id. The Court vacated the associated hearing. Id.
On November 13, 2017, Defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint. ECF Nos. 72 ("anti-SLAPP Mot."). The Court set a hearing for the special motion to strike on November 30, 2017. On November 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the special motion to strike. ECF No. 56 ("anti-SLAPP Opp."). On November 22, 2017, Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 62 ("anti-SLAPP Reply"). On November 28, 2017, the Clerk issued a notice taking the motions under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). ECF No. 63. Also on November 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed an administrative motion for permission to file a sur-reply on the anti-SLAPP special motion to strike. ECF No. 64. The Court denied the administrative motion on November 29, 2017. ECF No. 65. On November 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second notice of appeal, this time challenging the Court's second order denying apreliminary injunction, as well as the Court's order allowing Doe to proceed under pseudonym. ECF No. 67.
California's anti-SLAPP statute states:
A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §...
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