Heinemann v. Satterberg
| Decision Date | 24 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-35404,D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00125-RSL,12-35404 |
| Parties | THEODORE H. HEINEMANN, I, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL SATTERBERG, King County Prosecutor, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
FOR PUBLICATION
OPINIONAppeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Circuit Judges, and Jed S. Rakoff, District Judge.*
Opinion by Judge Clifton
SUMMARY**
Civil Rights/Civil Procedure
The panel affirmed the district court's summary judgment in a civil action brought by an airline passenger against the Prosecuting Attorney for King County who had filed a criminal complaint against the passenger for an altercation that occurred on a United Airlines flight between the passenger and two flight attendants.
The panel first held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, in its current form, prohibits a district court from granting a motion for summary judgment by default based upon a local court rule when an opposing party fails to respond. The panel held that because the local rule at issue in this case, Western District of Washington Rule 7(b)(2), conflicted with Rule 56, it could not provide a valid basis for granting a motion for summary judgment. The panel nevertheless affirmed the district's grant of summary judgment on the merits, holding that the King County Prosecuting Attorney was entitled to prosecutorial immunity for his decision to initiate the prosecution against plaintiff.
Justin Price Wade (argued), Michael Barr King, Carney Badley Spellman, P.S., Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
David Eldred, King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Seattle, Washington, for Defendant-Appellee.
This appeal presents the question of whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, in its current form, prohibits a district court from granting a motion for summary judgment by default based upon a local court rule when an opposing party fails to respond. We conclude that it does.
In this case, in addition to citing such a local rule, the district court considered the motion on the merits and concluded that it should be granted. We agree and affirm the judgment.
Theodore Heinemann was a passenger aboard a United Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Seattle via Chicago. Near the end of the flight, Heinemann was involved in an altercation with two flight attendants. Heinemann and the flight attendants told very different stories about the episode.
Heinemann alleged that he suffered a mild epileptic seizure just minutes prior to landing in Seattle, and that a flight attendant denied him access to the bathroom in this "emergency medical situation." He further contended that as he was disembarking after his seizure, another flight attendant followed him out of the airplane "brandishing" an ice mallet. The flight attendants denied that Heinemann said anything about a seizure and instead stated that his strongly worded complaints about the airline's customer service escalated into profanity and a physical threat.
Heinemann was arrested by the Port of Seattle Police Department when he got off the plane. A criminal complaint was later filed in state court charging Heinemann with harassment. The complaint was filed officially by the Prosecuting Attorney of King County, defendant Daniel Satterberg, and was actually signed by one of his deputy prosecuting attorneys.
A few months after he was criminally charged, Heinemann, proceeding pro se, initiated a civil action against United Airlines in state court, alleging that its personnel falsified police reports, falsely diagnosed an epileptic seizure, and threatened him with an ice mallet, among other things. United removed the case to district court on the basis of diversity, and moved for summary judgment. Reasoning that the Montreal Convention of 1999 precluded Heinemann from pursuing state law claims against United because the incident occurred on an "international carriage," and that Heinemann had no claims under the Convention itself, the district court granted United's summary judgment motion.
Heinemann then filed the current action against Satterberg in district court, again proceeding pro se. He contended thatthe King County prosecutor had no jurisdiction to file a criminal complaint against him. In his complaint, Heinemann argued that because he could not "claim damages from United Airlines because of the [M]ontreal [C]onvention in a state court[,] . . . . a state court may not prosecute Heinemann for a[n] incident that occurred on that inter[national] flight . . . ."
Satterberg moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the Montreal Convention did not preclude criminal actions based on state law; (2) Satterberg did not personally participate in any deprivation of Heinemann's constitutional rights, as would be required to establish his liability for any claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) Satterberg's decision to file a criminal complaint against Heinemann in state court was protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Heinemann did not file any response to the motion, which the district court subsequently granted. In its short order, the district court explained:
Heinemann did not file anything further in the district court. Instead, he appealed to this court.
District courts may promulgate their own local rules so long as those rules comport with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1). This court determines de novo whether there is a conflict between a local rule and aFederal Rule. See, e.g., Marshall v. Dates, 44 F.3d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 1995). We also review de novo the merits of a grant of summary judgment. Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1997).
Satterberg argues that the district court properly relied on the local rule sanctioning summary judgment by default. Heinemann argues that under the Federal Rules, a motion for summary judgment may not be granted based on a failure to file an opposition to the motion, regardless of any local rule that suggests the contrary. We agree with Heinemann.
In its order, the district court cites Western District of Washington Local Rule 7(b)(2), which states that "[i]f a party fails to file papers in opposition to a motion, such failure may be considered by the court as an admission that the motion has merit." The local rule does not exclude a motion for summary judgment, so by its terms it appears to permit the court to grant a motion for summary judgment by default whenever the opposing party fails to respond.
Summary judgment is governed by Rule 56. Before it was amended in 2010, Rule 56 provided that summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (2009). It specified that "an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading" when a motion for summary judgment is "properly made and supported," but Id. 56(e)(2) (2009).
In 2010, amendments to the Rule were adopted. Under a new section entitled "Failing to Properly Support or Address a Fact," the Rule now provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact . . . , the court may: (1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue any other appropriate order." Id. 56(e) (2010). As amended, Rule 56 requires district courts to assess whether "the motion and supporting materials" entitle the movant to summary judgment. Id. 56(e)(3).
Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes regarding the 2010 revision explain that these amendments prohibit the grant of summary judgment "by default even if there is a complete failure to respond to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes (2010). If there is a failure to respond, the Rule "authorizes the court to consider a fact as undisputed." Id. Lest this instruction be misconstrued as condoning summary judgment by default, the Advisory Committee Notes continue:
Considering some facts undisputed does not of itself allow summary judgment. If there is a proper response or reply as to some facts, the court cannot grant summary judgment without determining whether those facts canbe genuinely disputed. Once the court has determined the set of facts - both those it has chosen to consider undisputed for want of a proper response or reply and any that cannot be genuinely disputed despite a procedurally proper response or reply - it must determine the legal consequences of these facts and permissible inferences from...
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Johnson v. Kelly, 2:11-cv-01858-JAD-VCF
...P. 56 . . . , constitutes a consent to the granting of the motion."2 The local rule was amended to reflect the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Heinemann v. Satterberg3 that the failure to oppose a motion for summary judgment does not permit the court to enter summary judgment by default by applyi......