Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet
| Decision Date | 29 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 97-12134-WGY.,Civ.A. 97-12134-WGY. |
| Citation | 118 F.Supp.2d 73 |
| Parties | Evelyn HEINRICH on Behalf of her husband George HEINRICH, Henry M. Sienkewicz, Jr. on behalf of his mother Eileen Rose Sienkewicz,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Plaintiffs, v. William H. SWEET, M.D., Trustee of the Lee Edward Farr Trust dated 1/11/71, as amended,<SMALL><SUP>2</SUP></SMALL> The Estate of Lee Edward Farr,<SMALL><SUP>2</SUP></SMALL> M.D., Associated Universities, Inc.,<SMALL><SUP>2</SUP></SMALL> Massachusetts General Hospital, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,<SMALL><SUP>3</SUP></SMALL> and the United States of America,<SMALL><SUP>4</SUP></SMALL> Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
John M. Clifford, Bill P. Garde, Clifford, Lyons & Garde, Washington, DC, Mark A. Freeman, Martin H. Freeman, Freeman & Freeman, Rockville, MD, Raymond J. Heslin, Rubin, Baum, Levin, Constant & Friedman, New York, NY, John K. McGuire, Jr., McGuire & McGuire, Worcester, MA, Anthony Z. Roisman, Lyme, NH, for Plaintiffs.
Gail A. Anderson, Joseph L. Dougherty, Jr., Raymond J. Kenney, Christopher J. Maley, Martin, Magnuson & Kenney, Boston, MA, Constantine Athanas, Francis C. Lynch, Lori B. Silver, Palmer & Dodge, Thomas P. Billings, Karen White Salon, Sally & Fitch, Boston, MA, Garrett Harris, Sally VanderWeele, Gallagher & Gallagher, Charlestown, MA, Jerome A. Karnick, Jonathan Silverman, Kevin T. Van Wart, Mark J. Zwillinger, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, William Shields, Day, Berry & Howard, Boston, MA, Burke M. Wong, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Torts Branch, Civ. Div., Washington, DC, for defendants.
The principal events in this case took place during the 1950s and 1960s. Against all odds, the plaintiffs Evelyn Heinrich ("Heinrich") and Henry M. Sienkewicz ("Sienkewicz") (collectively "the Plaintiffs"), after protracted pre-trial proceedings,5 eventually brought the defendants William Sweet, M.D. ("Sweet") and Massachusetts General Hospital ("Mass General") (collectively "the Defendants") to bay before a jury of the people. After twenty days of trial, the jury awarded Heinrich $250,000 in compensatory damages on her negligence claim and $250,000 on her wrongful death claim against both Defendants and awarded punitive damages of $750,000 against Sweet and $1,250,000 against Mass General. The jury awarded Sienkewicz $500,000 in compensatory damages on his negligence claim and $2,000,000 on his wrongful death claim against both Defendants and awarded punitive damages of $1,000,000 against Sweet and $2,000,000 against Mass General. Now the question is whether the Plaintiffs can hang onto these verdicts.
This opinion addresses three post-trial issues — the "Motion for Reduction of Jury Verdict in Accordance with Mass.Gen. Laws c. 229, § 2 (1958 ed.)," Mass General's contention that it is not vicariously liable for the actions of Sweet, and Mass General's "Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law upon the Issue of Charitable Immunity." Each of these issues is addressed in turn.
Sweet and Mass General make two distinct arguments that are closely intertwined. Both contentions require this Court to determine whether the wrongful death statute applicable to this case is the one that was in existence at the time of the deaths of Heinrich's husband and Sienkewicz' mother (the 1961 statute), or the one that was in place at the time the tortious conduct was discovered (the current statute). First, the Defendants argue that Heinrich's and Sienkewicz' damages should be limited to those contained in the 1961 statute and not the more sweeping damages available in the current statute. Second, they contend that the 1961 statute had a one-year statute of limitations that bars the present action.
Because all the parties either rely on or take issue with this Court's previous conclusions regarding the applicable statute and statute of limitations issues, a brief review is necessary.
In Heinrich I, the Court addressed the Federal Tort Claims Act claims, specifically the jurisdictional bar contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Section 2401(b) provides that a tort action against the United States is forever barred unless "it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues...." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The issue before the Court was when the claim accrued.
The Court noted that the time of accrual was a question of federal law under the Act. See Heinrich I, 44 F.Supp.2d at 415 n. 8. Although the general rule is that a claim accrues at the time of injury, the Court relied on a Supreme Court decision and applied the discovery rule under federal law. Pursuant to the discovery rule analysis, the claims against the United States were tolled until the plaintiffs discovered or reasonably should have discovered the tortious conduct. See id. at 415. Thus, the procedural bar created by the tort claims act statute of limitations was hurdled.
In the next opinion, the Court addressed the statute of limitations for the other federal claims. Because the other federal causes of action did not have an express statute of limitations period, the Court "borrowed" from state law. Accordingly, the Court turned to Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 260, § 2A which provides that actions of tort "shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues." Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 260, § 2A. Because the claims were under federal law, the Court again relied on federal law to determine when the cause of action accrued and held, as it did in Heinrich I, that the claims were timely pled. See Heinrich II, 49 F.Supp.2d at 36-37.
Significant to the discussion here, the Court dismissed Mass General's assertion that the Court ought look to the statute of limitations statute in effect between 1951 and 1961 because that was when the injuries occurred. See id. at 36 n. 9. The Court concluded that it would apply the statute of limitations in effect when the cause of action arose. Because "the federal causes of action in these cases did not `arise' or `accrue' until 1995, when the Plaintiffs became aware of the alleged true nature of the experiments," the Court relied on the most recent statute. Id. Important to the discussion ahead is that the Court treated the words "arise" and "accrue" as synonymous.
In the third opinion, the Court addressed the statute of limitations defense as it related to the various state law claims. See Heinrich III, 62 F.Supp.2d at 304-05. Under Massachusetts law, the Court concluded that the statute of limitations had been tolled by both the doctrine of fraudulent concealment contained in Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 260, § 12 and the discovery rule, which was added to the wrongful death statute by amendment in 1989. See Heinrich III, 62 F.Supp.2d. at 305.
As to fraudulent concealment, the Court relied on the fiduciary duty imposed on doctors to disclose known possible causes of actions to patients fully. See id. Because the Massachusetts' plaintiffs alleged that "they did not gain actual knowledge of the `true nature' of the [boron neutron capture therapy] experiments until 1995, ... their claims [were] not time-barred under Massachusetts law." Id.
Additionally, the Court addressed the retroactive application of the discovery rule to the claims asserted under the Wrongful Death Statute. See id. at 305. Mass General pointed out that the statute in effect at the time of the death did not contain a discovery tolling provision. The Court concluded, however, that the 1989 amendment to the Wrongful Death Statute applied retroactively to deaths that occurred prior to the amendment but were discovered after the amendment was in effect. See id. Thus, the Plaintiffs' Massachusetts claims were also saved by the discovery rule.
Equally important, during the conference concerning the preliminary charge to the jury, the Court explicitly stated that the 1995 version of the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Statute applied:
The death statute is procedural. The version of the wrongful death statute that governs is the version at the time the cause of action accrued, not at the time the injections took place. That is, it's the more recent version of the wrongful death statute we're going to use, the one without the limitation and the limitation on punitive damages.
Sweet's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Reduction of Jury Verdict at 4 (quoting Tr. of Proceedings, Sept. 10, 1999 at 3-4).
In accordance with the construction thus adopted, the factual aspects of the statute of limitations question were presented to the jury. The jury determined that the statute of limitations had been tolled and that the action was timely brought. The Defendants failed to object to the instructions provided to the jury and a review of the jury instructions indicates that they were consistent with Massachusetts law.
The question remains: did the Court apply the right statute? Answering this question drastically affects the liability of the Defendants. The Court, discussing the federal claims in Heinrich II, stated that it would apply the statute of limitations in effect when the action "arises" or "accrues." See Heinrich II, 49 F.Supp.2d at 37 n. 9. Relying on the discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the Court determined that the action accrued in 1995, when the plaintiffs discovered the tortious conduct. Based on this conclusion, the Court later applied the damage provisions available in the current wrongful death statute. In this case, the Court's determination of whether the discovery rule should be retroactively applied has a substantial impact on the extent of the liability of these Defendants. The Court's analysis needs to be revisited in light of the current motion. Cf. Carter v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 684 F.2d 187, 191 n. 9 (1st Cir.1982) (), disagreed with on other grounds by Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 46 n. 9...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Laurenzano v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mass.
...for that purpose, even though the word "arose" could be used to refer to when the wrong occurred. Cf. Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 118 F.Supp.2d 73, 79-81 (D.Mass.2000) (distinguishing "arose" from "accrued"). In this case, the wrong occurred in 1976 when the Plan adopted the illegal......
-
Limone v. U.S.
...of the tort were met, which amounted to years after the original misconduct. In contrast, the government relies on Heinrich v. Sweet, 118 F.Supp.2d 73, 79 (D.Mass.2000) rev'd on sep. grounds 308 F.3d 48 (1st Cir.2002). Heinrich is distinguishable because like Liuzzo it involved claims that ......
-
In re Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc.
...defense in many respects and it is, therefore, appropriate to employ a burden-shifting paradigm. Cf. Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 118 F.Supp.2d 73, 86 (D.Mass.2000) (explaining burden shifting paradigm in context of the damages cap of M.G.L. ch. 231, § 85K), vacated in part on other ......
-
Doe v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield
...were somehow related to his duties as a priest or that they in any way furthered the interests of [his church]"); Heinrich v. Sweet, 118 F. Supp. 2d 73, 92 (D. Mass. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 308 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 914, 123 S.Ct. 2273, 156 L.Ed.2d 129 (20......