Heinz v. Chicago Road Inv. Co.

Decision Date12 April 1996
Docket NumberDocket Nos. 169059,169075
PartiesRobert F. HEINZ and Dawne M. Heinz, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO ROAD INVESTMENT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Robert F. HEINZ and Dawne M. Heinz, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CHICAGO ROAD INVESTMENT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Turner & Turner, P.C. by Matthew L. Turner, Southfield, for plaintiffs.

O'Leary, O'Leary, Jacobs, Mattson & Perry, P.C. by John P. Jacobs, Southfield, for defendant.

Before GRIBBS, P.J., and NEFF and McDONALD, * JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In Docket No. 169059, plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the circuit court awarding plaintiffs $70,034.77. The amount awarded represents the jury's verdict of $198,000, minus worker's compensation benefits received by Mr. Heinz, and then reduced by fifty percent as a result of plaintiff Robert Heinz' comparative negligence. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in reducing the jury's verdict by the amount of the worker's compensation benefits under M.C.L. § 600.6303(1); M.S.A. § 27A.6303(1). We disagree and thus affirm the trial court's decision to reduce the jury's verdict by the amount of the specific worker's compensation benefits.

In Docket No. 169075, defendant appeals as of right from the same order of the circuit court, claiming that the court erred in failing to reduce plaintiffs' jury award by an additional $80,227.25, the amount plaintiffs received as a redemption of other worker's compensation claims. We agree, reverse this part of the court's ruling, and remand.

I

Mr. Heinz was injured in 1988 in a slip and fall accident as he was leaving his employer's building. As a result of his injuries, he received worker's compensation benefits in the amount of $19,824.25 for medical expenses and $38,106.21 for lost wages. In addition, for the sum of $80,227.25, Mr. Heinz redeemed all other worker's compensation claims arising out of the 1988 slip and fall. As part of the redemption, Mr. Heinz' worker's compensation provider waived any lien on future judgments obtained by plaintiffs for the injuries sustained by Mr. Heinz.

After receiving the worker's compensation benefits, plaintiffs sued defendant, the owner of the building, for negligence. Following trial, the jury returned the verdict in favor of plaintiffs. The jury's award was itemized in the following manner: $128,000 in lost wages, $20,000 for medical expenses, $40,000 in general damages, and $10,000 for loss of consortium.

Before the judgment was entered on the jury's verdict, defendant, pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.6303; M.S.A. § 27A.6303, sought to have Mr. Heinz' award reduced by the amount of worker's compensation benefits he had received.

Ultimately, the trial court determined that the amount of worker's compensation benefits Mr. Heinz received for medical expenses and lost wages could be offset against the jury's award. 1 The court also held, however, that because it could not be determined how the $80,227.25 was apportioned, if at all, i.e., what portions compensated Mr. Heinz for future and past medical expenses, future and past wage loss, or other expenses or losses, that amount could not be offset against plaintiffs' recovery.

It is from this order that plaintiffs and defendant appeal as of right.

II

In Docket No. 169059, plaintiffs challenge the validity of M.C.L. § 600.6303; M.S.A. § 27A.6303, which abrogates the common-law collateral-source rule. Plaintiffs base their challenge on a number of grounds, none of which we find to be persuasive.

A

Before M.C.L. § 600.6303; M.S.A. § 27A.6303 was enacted in 1986, the common-law collateral-source rule provided that compensation from a source other than another tortfeasor, for example, worker's compensation benefits, did not operate to reduce the damages recoverable from the wrongdoer. See McMiddleton v. Otis Elevator Co., 139 Mich.App. 418, 429; 362 N.W.2d 812 (1984).

M.C.L. § 600.6303(1); M.S.A. § 27A.6303(1), however, provides:

In a personal injury action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for the expense of medical care, rehabilitation services, loss of earnings, loss of earning capacity, or other economic loss, evidence to establish that the expense or loss was paid or is payable, in whole or in part, by a collateral source shall be admissible to the court in which the action was brought after a verdict for the plaintiff and before a judgment is entered on the verdict.

B

Plaintiffs first argue that the statute is contradictory, ambiguous, and in derogation of common law and, thus, that the lower court erred in failing to construe strictly the statute to provide that worker's compensation benefits are not to be offset from a jury's verdict. We disagree.

Statutory interpretation is a legal issue, which this Court reviews de novo. See Smeets v. Genesee Co. Clerk, 193 Mich.App. 628, 633, 484 N.W.2d 770 (1992).

The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v. Stanaway, 446 Mich. 643, 658, 521 N.W.2d 557 (1994). If the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute's language is clear, judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted. Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 370, 376, 483 N.W.2d 844 (1992). If reasonable minds can differ concerning the meaning of a statute, however, judicial construction is appropriate. Folands Jewelry Brokers, Inc. v. City of Warren, 210 Mich.App. 304, 307, 532 N.W.2d 920 (1995).

One rule of statutory interpretation provides that well-settled common-law principles are not to be abolished by implication, and when an ambiguous statute contravenes the common law, it must be interpreted so that it makes the least change in the common law. Marquis v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich. 638, 652-653, 513 N.W.2d 799 (1994). At the same time, however, this Court is instructed to avoid any construction that would render a statute, or any part of it, surplusage or nugatory. Altman v. Meridian Twp., 439 Mich. 623, 635, 487 N.W.2d 155 (1992).

Plaintiffs argue that the definition of collateral source, found in M.C.L. § 600.6303(4); M.S.A. § 27A.6303(4), is contradictory and ambiguous. That subsection provides:

As used in this section, "collateral source" means benefits received or receivable from ... worker's compensation benefits.... Collateral source does not include ... benefits paid by a person, partnership, association, corporation, or other legal entity entitled by law to a lien against the proceeds of a recovery by a plaintiff in a civil action for damages.

Because the worker's compensation provider is entitled to such a lien, plaintiffs argue that this subsection is contradictory because the first sentence defines the term collateral source to include worker's compensation benefits, while the second sentence, by referencing a lien, excludes worker's compensation benefits from the definition of collateral source. Thus, plaintiffs would have us hold that worker's compensation is not included as a collateral source, because any other interpretation would abolish a common-law principle by implication.

We disagree because, as the trial court found, this statute can be construed so that none of it is rendered nugatory. We find that the second sentence of subsection 4 is an exception to the first: worker's compensation is a collateral source so that a plaintiff's recovery, and a defendant's responsibility to pay damages, are diminished unless there is a valid lien with respect to the plaintiff's recovery. In the latter case, the plaintiff is entitled to, and the defendant must pay, the full amount of the jury verdict because the plaintiff's recovery is subject to the valid lien. In either circumstance, the plaintiff's recovery would be identical, and double recovery would be avoided.

To construe the statute in the manner argued by plaintiffs would require reading out of the statute the requirement that worker's compensation benefits are considered a collateral source. In other words, plaintiffs' proposed construction is contrary to the express terms of the statute and would not be favored even if those statutory terms are in conflict with the common law. See Barker Bros. Construction v. Bureau of Safety & Regulation, 212 Mich.App. 132, 140, 536 N.W.2d 845 (1995).

C

Plaintiffs also challenge the statute on a number of constitutional grounds. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. In re Lafayette Towers, 200 Mich.App. 269, 273, 503 N.W.2d 740 (1993).

Plaintiffs first allege that the statute effects an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. U.S. Const., Ams. V, XIV; Const.1963, art. 10, § 2. We disagree.

In order to succeed in this argument, plaintiffs must establish that they enjoyed some cognizable interest in some affected item of private property. Michigan Soft Drink Ass'n v. Dep't of Treasury, 206 Mich.App. 392, 402, 522 N.W.2d 643 (1994). Such property is everything over which plaintiffs have exclusive control or dominion. Charles Murphy, M.D., P.C. v. Detroit, 201 Mich.App. 54, 56, 506 N.W.2d 5 (1993).

Plaintiffs have failed to prove a cognizable interest in this case. Initially, plaintiffs do not argue that their cause of action against defendant created a protectable property right; rather, they argue that once the jury rendered its verdict, a protectable property right arose. A jury verdict, however, does not become enforceable until the court enters a judgment on that verdict. Plaintiffs' argument fails to comprehend the distinction between a judgment, which finally disposes of the claim between parties, and the jury's verdict, which is merely the basis for the judgment. See 3 Martin, Dean & Webster, Michigan Court Rules Practice, p. 364. Thus, because plaintiffs do not...

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