Heiple v. C.R. Motors, Inc.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: FORD ELLIOTT; BROSKY
• Citation: 446 Pa.Super. 310,666 A.2d 1066
• Decision Date: 13 October 1995
• Parties: Dennis Bradley HEIPLE v. C.R. MOTORS, INC., and General Motors Corporation. Appeal of GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellant.

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666 A.2d 1066 446 Pa.Super. 310 Dennis Bradley HEIPLE
v.
C.R. MOTORS, INC., and General Motors Corporation.
Appeal of GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellant. Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Argued Dec. 13, 1994.
Filed Oct. 13, 1995.

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[446 Pa.Super. 313] Leslie G. Landau, San Francisco, CA, for appellant.

Michael N. Vaporis, Indiana, for Dennis B. Heiple, appellee.

Before DEL SOLE, FORD ELLIOTT and BROSKY, JJ.

FORD ELLIOTT, Judge:

In this appeal from the trial court's denial of its preliminary objections, ¹ appellant General

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Motors Corporation asks us to revisit our decision in Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 389 Pa.Super. 328, 567 A.2d 312 (1989), reargument denied, February 20, 1990. Appellant argues that Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3rd Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 111 S.Ct. 147, 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990), in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals declined to follow Gingold, compels us to overrule it. We disagree, finding instead that the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407[446 Pa.Super. 314] (1992), and Freightliner Corp., et al. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (Myrick II ), support our holding in Gingold. As a result, we affirm.

We note first that our review of the trial court's denial of appellant's preliminary objections is plenary, as appellant has raised a controlling question of law. See Mazaika v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 439 Pa.Super. 95, 98, 653 A.2d 640, 641-42 (1994) (scope of review of "an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is plenary, and, after accepting as true all material facts set forth in the complaint as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, we determine whether, on the facts averred, the law precludes with certainty a recovery by plaintiff."). A summary of the facts of this case, taken from the trial court opinion, therefore follows:

On October 10, 1991, Plaintiff, Dennis Bradley Heiple, was involved in a head-on collision with another motor vehicle. At the time of the collision, Plaintiff was operating a 1986 Chevrolet Celebrity automobile, which was manufactured by G[eneral] M[otors] and ultimately sold by CR Motors, Inc. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, seeking to recover damages for injuries he allegedly suffered in the collision. In this Complaint, Plaintiff's cause of action was based on the allegation that his seat belt malfunctioned as a result of a defect which existed at the time the automobile was manufactured and sold.

On June 28, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint, seeking to add a new paragraph alleging that the vehicle was defective because it did not contain an air bag. GM opposed the Motion for Leave to Amend, maintaining that claims based on the failure to install an air bag are preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (hereinafter the 'Safety Act'), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1381, et, [sic] seq., and the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards promulgated thereunder, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (hereinafter 'FMVSS 208'). By Opinion and Order dated August 20, 1993, this Court granted Plaintiff's [446 Pa.Super. 315] Motion for Leave to Amend, thus allowing Plaintiff to add the claim based on the absence of an air bag.

Shortly thereafter, on August 27, 1993, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, adding the absence of an air bag claim in paragraph 11. GM then filed the Preliminary Objections ... [that are the subject of this appeal], maintaining that the claim based on the failure to install an air bag is legally insufficient due to the preemptive effect of the Safety Act and FMVSS 208. Plaintiff responded to these Objections by claiming that the Court's Opinion and Order of August 20, 1993 is dispositive, in that GM supports its current Objections with the identical arguments put forth in opposition of [sic] Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend....

Trial court opinion, 12/6/93 at 1-2.

We will begin our analysis by recognizing that the circuit courts of appeals of the United States, as well as the various state appellate courts that have been confronted with the issue before us, have come to sharply varying conclusions. See Gingold, supra at 334 n. 6, 567 A.2d at 315 n. 6. We also recognize that, prior to Cipollone, supra, the position adopted by the Gingold court was a minority position. Gingold, supra at 334 n. 6, 567 A.2d at 315 n. 6. Nevertheless, we are persuaded by the careful analysis of the Gingold court as harmonized with the U.S. Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on the preemption issue. Before reaching that

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analysis, however, a brief summary of the relevant case law is appropriate.

Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G.

In 1989, this court decided Gingold, supra, a case in which appellant brought wrongful death and survival actions against a driver, McCloskey, and against the manufacturer of the car decedent was driving, Audi-NSU-Auto Union, Inc. (Audi), as a result of the death of her husband in a motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred when McCloskey rear-ended decedent, who was stopped at a red light, at approximately 50 miles per hour. The impact caused McCloskey's car and Gingold's car to travel together for 44 feet until Gingold's car separated and hit a tree at approximately 25 miles per hour. [446 Pa.Super. 316] The Audi was equipped with a manual three-point seat belt, which Gingold was wearing at the time of the accident, but was not equipped with any passive restraints, including air bags. ² The physician who performed the post mortem examination determined that Gingold died as a result of the frontal collision, which caused him to be thrown forward into the steering wheel. Gingold sustained fatal facial injuries, brain damage, and injury to the spinal cord from that impact. Id. at 329-32, 567 A.2d at 313-314.

Appellant alleged negligence, products liability and breach of warranty against Audi, and negligence against McCloskey. The basis for appellant's products liability claim was that Audi had defectively designed the car decedent was driving because it had failed to install passive restraints. Audi responded with a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that the passive restraint claims were preempted by the Safety Act and FMVSS 208, and that state law barred appellant's claims. Id. at 330-32, 567 A.2d at 314. At the time Gingold was decided, the Safety Act had an express preemption clause and a savings clause. The express preemption clause provided:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard....

15 U.S.C. § 1392(d). The savings clause stated:

Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.

[446 Pa.Super. 317] 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c). ³ In addition, when the Audi was manufactured in 1983, FMVSS 208

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provided that automobile manufacturers could opt for one of three systems: (1) a complete passive restraint system for front and lateral crashes; (2) passive restraints for frontal crashes plus lap belts, shoulder harnesses, and a warning system; or (3) a 3-point manual seat belt with a warning system. Id. at 336-38, 567 A.2d at 317, citing 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.208 S4.1.2.1, S4.1.2.2, and S4.1.2.3; Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir.1989), citing49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1977) & (1980). The third alternative was the choice of Audi and the overwhelming majority of other auto manufacturers. Id. See also Richard Goodman, Automobile Design Liability 2d, § 1:7, 16 (2d ed. 1983) (Goodman) ("[T]he only manufacturer offering air bags in 1983 [was] Mercedes-Benz. And that [was] a driver-side only system offered for sale in models sold in Europe. The only time that air bags were offered for sale in the United States was in 1974-75 under the leadership of Edward Cole, the last engineer to be the president of General Motors.").

[446 Pa.Super. 318] The trial court effectively granted Audi's motion, finding that common law "no air bag" claims were preempted by the federal regulation. Gingold, supra at 330-32, 567 A.2d at 314. On appeal, this court first noted the standard for preemption:

Congress is empowered to preempt state law by the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution.... Thus, preemption ' "is compelled [when] Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." ' ... When Congress does not expressly state its intent to preempt state law, its intent to supercede state law 'may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress "left no room" for supplementary regulation.'

Id. at 338-39, 567 A.2d at 318 (citations omitted). Applying this standard to the issue before us, we held that appellant's common law claims were expressly not preempted. ⁴ Then, in language presaging Cipollone, ⁵ we held that "an implied preemption analysis should not be entertained in the face of Congress's express pronouncement of its intent regarding preemption." Id. at 356, 567 A.2d at 327. Finding no express preemption of state common law liability, and no basis for engaging in implied preemption analysis, therefore, this court reversed that portion of the trial court's order finding that appellant's design defect claims were preempted. Id. at 363-65, 567 A.2d at 331.

Pokorny v. Ford Motor...