Heirs of John Beckwith LLC v. Sims

• Decision Date: 10 March 2021
• Docket Number: nks.NO. 2020-CA-0476
• Citation: 315 So.3d 306
• Parties: HEIRS OF JOHN BECKWITH LLC, Price Heirs LLC, James M. Foster Trust, Linda Price Ellzey, John V. Price, Richard F. Price, Jr., Susan Hurth Price, Beckwith Lands, LLC v. Nathan SIMS and Braille Institute of America, Inc.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

315 So.3d 306

HEIRS OF JOHN BECKWITH LLC, Price Heirs LLC, James M. Foster Trust, Linda Price Ellzey, John V. Price, Richard F. Price, Jr., Susan Hurth Price, Beckwith Lands, LLC v. Nathan SIMS and Braille Institute of America, Inc.

nks.NO. 2020-CA-0476

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

MARCH 10, 2021

Steven M. Spiegel, STEVEN M. SPIEGEL, APLC, 381 Highway 21, Suite 205, Madisonville, LA 70447, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

Amos J. Cormier, III, LAW OFFICES OF AMOS CORMIER, LLC, P. O. Box 7280, Belle Chasse, LA 70037, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

(Court composed of Chief Judge James F. McKay, III, Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Dale N. Atkins )

Judge Daniel L. Dysart

This is an action seeking to establish the ownership of immovable property located in Plaquemines Parish. From a judgment finding that the property at issue is owned by the plaintiffs, the Heirs of John Beckwith, L.L.C.; the Price Heirs, L.L.C.; James M. Foster Trust; Linda Price Ellzey; John V. Price; Richard F. Price, Jr.; Susan Hurth Price; Beckwith Lands, L.L.C.; and the Braille Institute of America, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"), the defendant, Nathan Sims has taken this appeal. ¹

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 15, 2018, Plaintiffs filed this action against Nathan Sims by way of a Petition to be Recognized as Owners of Immovable Property ("Petition"), originally alleging that they are owners in indivision of a 95% interest in property located in Plaquemines Parish. ² The Petition was amended by a supplemental and amending petition, filed on January 2, 2019, before any defendant filed an answer. The amending petition alleges that the Plaintiffs are the owners in indivision of "[a]n undivided one-hundred percent (100%) interest in 10 acres, being the North 10 acres of the Southwest Quarter of Section 19, Township 19 South, Range 18 East, in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana."

Named as defendants in this action are Nathan Sims and Ethel Jones. The Petition, as amended, alleges that Plaintiffs and the BIA are in possession of the property. However, Mr. Sims and Ms. Jones asserted a claim of ownership in the property adverse to the Plaintiffs, as evidenced by filings of documents into the conveyance records. Mr. Sims filed documentation purporting to reflect his acquisition of the 95% interest in the property at a tax sale in 1993. A Tax Deed reflecting that sale was filed into the conveyance records on June 25, 1993. Ms. Jones filed documentation purporting to reflect her acquisition of a 5% interest in the property through a tax sale in 1992. A Tax Deed reflecting that sale was filed in the conveyance records on June 30, 1992.

According to the Petition, John Beckwith purchased the property from the State of Louisiana on November 4, 1874. Plaintiffs allege to be the successors-in-interest to the property and attached to their Petition various documents, including the following; (1) a Sale of Land of numerous properties at an October 29, 1910 public auction to Millard C. Baker, recorded on April 20, 1911; (2) a handwritten document described in the Petition as a February 6, 1905 conveyance of land from the State of Louisiana to the Board of Commissioners of the Grand Prairie Levee District ("GPLD"); ³ (3) a May 12, 1911 Sale of Land by Millard C. Baker to the Plaquemines Land Company; ⁴ (4) a November 4, 1874 Patent reflecting that the State of Louisiana transferred property to John Beckwith, described as the whole of Section 19, Township 19 South, Range 18 East; (5) a February 1, 1938 Cash Deed transferring an ownership interest in the property from the Plaquemines Land Company to Susan Brister; and (6) a December 27, 1973 Cash Sale of the property from Ms. Brister to William A. Hardin.

After the trial court denied several exceptions filed by Mr. Sims, the Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, seeking a judgment recognizing their 100% ownership of the property and an order recording the judgment so as to remove any cloud on the title of the property. By judgment dated January 29, 2020, the trial court granted the summary judgment, recognizing the Plaintiffs as the owners of the property in their respective percentages of ownership. The trial court issued Reasons for Judgment on the same date. Mr. Sims timely filed a motion for a suspensive appeal of this judgment. ⁵

DISCUSSION

The ultimate issue in this appeal is a determination of the ownership of the property and whether issues of material fact remain for which the summary judgment determination of ownership was improper. The trial court found no such factual issues in dispute, granting summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor, which is the primary focus of this appeal.

In addition to the propriety of the grant of summary judgment, Mr. Sims raises numerous issues and correlating assignments of error relating to the trial court's denial of several exceptions. ⁶ We first consider the trial court's denial of Mr. Sims’ various exceptions. ⁷

Dilatory exception of vagueness or ambiguity of the petition

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 891 A requires that a petition "contain a short, clear, and concise statement of all causes of action arising out of, and of the material facts of, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation." The sufficiency of the petition to clearly articulate the facts underlying the claims asserted therein is tested by a dilatory exception of vagueness or ambiguity, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 926 A(5).

Our jurisprudence is clear that the purpose of the exception of vagueness "is to compel the plaintiff to amplify and make more definite his claim in order that defendant may properly prepare his defense." Williams v. State , 34,691, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/9/01), 786 So.2d 927, 930 (quoting City of Gretna v. Gulf Distilling Corporation , 207 La. 719, 21 So.2d 884, 889 (1945) ). It is equally clear that "the exception does not permit the defendant to demand exactitude and detail beyond what is necessary for the above purposes;" thus, "[a]n exception of vagueness will be denied if the petition fairly informs the defendant of the nature of the cause of action and includes sufficient particulars for the defendant to prepare a defense." Joseph v. Wasserman , 16-0528, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/7/16), 206 So.3d 970, 973 (citation omitted).

We review a trial court's denial of an exception of vagueness under a manifest error standard as this judgment is based on factual determinations. An Erny Girl, L.L.C. v. BCNO 4 L.L.C ., 18-0360, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/26/18), 257 So.3d 212, 218.

Mr. Sims maintains that the Petition is impermissibly vague for a number of reasons including the following: it failed to specify that the Plaintiffs’ claim arose out of either an alleged mistake or by fraud with respect to the transfer of title culminating in Mr. Sims’ alleged ownership of the property; it failed to allege the invalidity of the 1993 tax sale by which Mr. Sims purportedly obtained ownership of the property; it failed to assert a claim for the nullification of the 1993 tax sale; and it failed to inform him of the type of action being pursued (petitory pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3651 vs. possessory pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3655 ). ⁸

The trial court denied the exception of vagueness and ambiguity of the Petition, assigning the reason that the Petition "clearly assert[ed] a declaratory judgment action under [ La. C.C.P. art.] 3654." In support of this finding, the trial court cited Decatur-St. Louis Combined Equity Properties, Inc. Venture v. Abercrombie , 421 So.2d 253, 253-54 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1982), wherein this Court rejected the contention that a plaintiff cannot maintain both a petitory and a possessory action, finding that the plaintiff was asserting "a declaratory judgment action allowed under [La.] C.C.P. 3654."

Article 3654, entitled "Proof of title in action for declaratory judgment ...," permits a party to seek a declaratory judgment "[w]hen the issue of ownership of immovable property or of a real right therein is presented." While Plaintiffs did not entitle their lawsuit as a "Petition for a Declaratory Judgment" or use the term "declaratory judgment," it is clear that the suit seeks declaratory relief. In their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs expressly request a judgment recognizing them as owners in indivision of the property. "[E]very pleading must be construed as to do substantial justice [...] Accordingly, courts look beyond mere headings and terminology used on or in pleadings to determine the circumstances and the true nature of the suit." Cambrie Celeste LLC v. Starboard Mgmt., LLC , 16-1318, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/6/17), 231 So.3d 79, 84, writ denied , 17-2041 (La. 2/2/18), 235 So.3d 1110. See also Parker v. Machen , 567 So.2d 739, 743 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990) (where the "action was closely akin to one for declaratory judgment," the judgment "understood as declarative of the ownership of the land, was appropriate under the broad relief contemplated by art. 3654.").

A review of the Petition, as amended, reflects that it clearly sets forth the Plaintiffs’ claims with sufficient particularities to inform Mr. Sims of the nature of those claims to allow him to prepare his defenses. We find no error in the trial court's denial of the dilatory exception of vagueness or ambiguity of the petition.

No cause of action

Mr. Sims combines his argument on the exception of vagueness and ambiguity with the exception of no cause of action. The only argument he makes which is exclusive to the exception of no cause of action is that " La. R.S. 47:2286 does not permit a Tax Sale to be nullified without an Action of Nullity being filed" and thus, "the trial court erred in denying Mr. Sims’ Exception of No Cause of Action." In denying this exception, the trial court found that "the petition and the supplemental and amending petition have set forth a cause of action for a declaratory judgment."

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