Heiser v. Rodway

• Decision Date: 19 November 1976
• Docket Number: No. 11759,11759
• Citation: 247 N.W.2d 65
• Parties: Keith HEISER and Carolynn Heiser, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Lynn RODWAY, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 65

247 N.W.2d 65

Keith HEISER and Carolynn Heiser, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Lynn RODWAY, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 11759.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Nov. 19, 1976.

Phillip O. Peterson, Frieberg & Frieberg, Beresford, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Eugene J. Irons, Myrabo & Irons, Canton, for defendant and respondent.

WINANS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment in an unlawful detainer action brought pursuant to SDCL 21--16--1(4). The jury found for the defendant and in accordance with the verdict the trial court adjudged that the defendant was entitled to retain possession of a certain parcel of real property by virtue of an oral lease between the parties. We affirm.

Plaintiffs, Keith and Carolynn Heiser, are the owners of that farm realty described as:

The Southeast Quarter (SE 1/4) of Section Thirty-four (34), Township Ninety-seven (97), Range Fifty (50), Lincoln County, South Dakota.

In January of 1973 they entered into a written agreement to lease this land to the defendant, Lynn Rodway. Under the lease, defendant was entitled to possession of the famr land for one year commencing March 1, 1973; plaintiffs were to receive 2/5 of any crops raised as rent. Upon expiration of the written lease on March 1, 1974, no written lease had been executed for the following year. Defendant remained in possession, however, and farmed the land during the 1974 season pursuant to an oral lease entered into by the same parties sometime during the spring of 1974. The parties agreed that the terms of the 1973 written lease would apply; this oral lease was to terminate on March 1, 1975.

On September 6, 1974, defendant had a conversation with plaintiff Carolynn Heiser, the contents of which constitute the crux of this lawsuit. It is defendant's contention, and the jury found, that the parties entered into an oral lease for the 1975 farming season at that time, subject to the same terms as the prior two leases. The evidence shows that shortly after that conversation, defendant plowed and fertilized part of the acreage, acts not required by the 1974 oral lease.

Plaintiffs contend that no new lease was entered on September 6, and that even if there was such a lease, it was terminated on October 14, 1974 when they sent the following letter to the defendant:

'Due to the poor returns on our farm the past two years--we are forced to seek a new renter. Each time there has been an excuse, such as weather--bad seed--weeds etc. But the fact is, we cannot afford to invest more in this operation with so little return.

Dad's farm is not that different from ours and yet the production, or at least the amount the lessor received, has been greater by a Great margin Both years.

Do not plow any ground--I noticed you did the small grain land Without informing us first this, also, was in contradiction to what we had said 'let us know Before you proceed with Any & all farming operations.'

This is a formal notice of the termination of any written or spoken contract for the farming of our land(.)' (Emphasis in original).

In a telephone conversation which transpired shortly after defendant's receipt of this letter, the plaintiffs offered to reimburse defendant for the work he had done that fall.

Plaintiffs' contention is that after March 1, 1975, defendant unlawfully continued to hold over after the termination of the 1974 oral lease. Written notice to quit was given on May 9, 1975, and an unlawful detainer action was commenced on May 28, by summons and complaint. The action did not come to trial until July 7, 1975. After hearing all the evidence, the judge denied plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict and submitted all issues to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant on all issues and after plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied, judgment was entered. It is from that judgment dismissing plaintiffs' cause of action and finding defendant entitled to possession that plaintiffs appeal.

Plaintiffs' cause of action is based upon SDCL 21--16--1(4). That section provides that a civil action for detainer is maintainable:

'Where a lessee in person or by subtenants holds over after the termination of his lease or expiration of his term . . .'

Plaintiffs contend that the lease expired on March 1, 1975, and that continued possession by defendant after that date is unlawful detainer. They assign as error the decision by the trial court to admit evidence of events after Mrach 1; the refusal to direct a verdict in their favor; and the court's refusal to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The gist of these assignments of error is that certain defenses raised by defendant are not cognizable in an unlawful detainer action and that because these defenses were not proper, plaintiffs were entitled to prevail as a matter of law.

Evidence admitted over plaintiffs' objection consisted mainly of testimony about preparation, planting, and cultivation of the land; testimony of defendant's investment; and assertions of unreasonable delay in instituting the action. The trial court allowed the testimony and permitted the issues to go to the jury. We do not think it was error to do so.

Plaintiffs assert that these matters are equitable in nature and therefore not permitted in an action for unlawful detainer. They cite a series of Minnesota cases to that effect. See Carlson v. Cohen, 1974, 302 Minn. 531, 223 N.W.2d 810; Miller v. Benner, 1972, 293 Minn. 400, 196 N.W.2d 293; William Weisman Holding Co. v. Miller, 1922, 152 Minn. 330, 188 N.W. 732. There is a distinction in these decisions, as there is in the case of Knight v. Boner, 1969, Wyo., 459 P.2d 205, also cited by plaintiffs, that makes their principle inapplicable to the situation before this court. These cases involved actions before a court which was without jurisdiction to consider equitable issues. This action, however, was commenced in circuit court; such courts have jurisdiction over both equitable actions and actions at law by virtue of SDCL 16--6--8.

This court held in Aegerter v. Hayes, 1929, 55 S.D. 337, 226 N.W. 345, 347 that '(t)he equitable rights of parties cannot be litigated in this form of action (unlawful detainer).' The cases cited in support of that proposition, however, do not lend credence to the broad swath the rule appears to cut. ¹ We must therefore examine the rationale behind the prohibition urged on the court, to ascertain whether the policy reflected is an adequate representation of modern jurisprudence in this state.

The primary concern in an unlawful detainer action is the question of immediate right to possession. Raich v. Weisman, 1931, 58 S.D. 4, 234 N.W. 664; Aegerter v. Hayes, supra. Chapter 21--16 is designed as a speedy remedy to provide possession to the person rightfully entitled to it. It is a summary action intended to prevent protracted litigation because of the introduction of collateral issues not connected with the question of possession. Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 1970, 46 Ill.2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833. Because of the summary nature of the action, some jurisdictions have ruled that equitable matters are not cognizable in an unlawful detainer action. See, e.g., Berg v. Wiley, 1975, Minn., 226 N.W.2d 904; Knight v. Boner, supra; people's Mortgage Corp. v. Wilton, 1926, 234 Mich. 252, 208 N.W. 60. Other jurisdictions permit inquiry into equitable considerations. See, e.g., Snuffin v. Mayo, 1972, 6 Wash.App. 525, 494 P.2d 497; Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, supra; Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 1970, 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 84 Cal.Rptr. 756. We find the reasoning of the latter jurisdictions more persuasive; we hold that inquiry may be made into equitable considerations in an unlawful detainer action, as long as those considerations are relevant to the right of possession.

The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity was abolished in this state by statute. All relief is now available in one form of action known as the 'civil action.' SDCL 15--6--2. While it is true that the 'essential and inherent differences between legal and equitable relief are still recognized and enforced in our system of jurisprudence. . . . ' Holzworth v. Roth, 1960, 78 S.D. 287, 289--90, 101 N.W.2d 393, 394, it is no longer necessary that separate actions be maintained to enforce correlative rights simply because some are legal and others equitable. Defendant has raised equitable issues relevant to the question of rightful possession. We are aware that to admit evidence of such matters even on a limited basis will interfere with the summary nature of the remedy. We agree with the court in Rosewood Corp., supra, however, when it holds that interference is warranted.

'The fusion of the practice and procedure in suits at law and in equity accomplished by the Civil Practice Act is, in our opinion, sufficient to permit necessary equitable relief in these proceedings, rather than to force upon defendants a separate proceeding where the same relief will be forthcoming.

(T)he right . . . to be heard on relevant matters, . . . as well as the desirable purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits, is, and must be, superior to the desire to provide a speedy remedy for possession.' 263 N.E.2d at 838--39.

It is our opinion that evidence pertinent to the issue of possession is properly admissible in an unlawful detainer action, even though the evidence is equitable in nature. ²

There is authority for the proposition that the existence of an oral lease is a proper consideration in this type of action. In Aegerter, supra, this court stated that one of the only theories that defendant in that unlawful detainer action could rely on was the existence of an oral lease for an additional year. Although the evidence in that case would have supported a verdict either way, the court pointed out that the question was never submitted to the jury. It is evident that the court thought that such an issue was proper for jury...