Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lodge

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DICKINSON, Special Judge.
• Citation: Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lodge, 11 S.W. 825, 87 Tenn. 668 (Tenn. 1889)
• Decision Date: 11 May 1889
• Parties: HEISKELL v. CHICKASAW LODGE.

11 S.W. 825

87 Tenn. 668

HEISKELL v. CHICKASAW LODGE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 11, 1889

Appeal from chancery court, Shelby county; B. M. ESTES, Judge.

Heiskell & Heiskell, for appellant.

L. W Finlay, for respondent.

DICKINSON Special Judge.

This bill was filed by the executor of the will of Mrs. Addie B Howell against Chickasaw Lodge No. 8, Independent Order Odd-Fellows, a devisee, and Eva Happoldt and others, who are residuary legatees under said will. The eleventh clause of the will is as follows: "I give the proceeds of my $2,000 Union and Planters' Insurance Company stock to Chickasaw Lodge No. 8, I. O. O. F., the dividends from said stock to be used by said lodge for the benefit of the widows and orphans." It is conceded that this meant Planters' Insurance stock, the decedent owning at her death that amount of stock in said company. It is insisted that this devise is void, on the grounds that the defendant lodge was not incorporated; that it could not, even if incorporated, hold any property except for strictly lodge purposes,--such as providing for a hall and regalia, etc that it could not hold more than $10,000 of property,--conceding its lawful incorporation,--and it already holds in excess of this sum: that the objects of the bounty, "widows and orphans," are too indefinite to be sustained, and that the residuary legatees are entitled to the stock. An additional question is raised by the lodge insisting that only the state can question its powers, and that neither distributees nor residuary legatees can challenge its right to take the bequest, or set up any interest in it. It is proven that the lodge holds property in excess of $10,000 in value. Trusts for charitable uses are favored by courts of equity in this state. Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan, 366. The general principles governing charities are well settled by our courts, but their application must be made to the varying facts of each case; and therein lies the difficulty.

In Green v. Allen, 5 Humph. 204, the first case in which the question of charities came before our court, the rule was thus stated: "If the charity be created, either by devise or deed, it must be in favor of a person having sufficient capacity to take as devisee or donee, or, if it be to not such person, it must be definite in its object, and lawful in its creation, and to be executed and regulated by trustees, before the court of chancery can, by virtue of its extraordinary jurisdiction, interfere in its execution." In that case the bequest was to the "Tennessee Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, for the benefit of institutions of learning under the superintendence and control of said conference, and to the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and to be otherwise disposed of as the Tennessee Annual Conference may decide best in their discretion." The court held that this was "a general, indefinite purpose of charity," and that the conference was not incorporated, and could not, therefore, "be looked upon as having any legal existence whatever," and that the proposed charity was not supported by trustees. The principle established by this case is that where the purpose is too general and indefinite for a chancellor to undertake in his discretion to carry it into effect, and there is no trustee capable of taking, who is charged with the application of the charity, it must fail. Both of these infirmities concurred in that case. If the charity had been clearly defined, and the beneficiaries specially designated, a new question, not involved in that decision--that of sustaining the charity by the appointment of trustees-- would have arisen.

In the next case--that of Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan, 348--the devise was to the treasurer of an incorporated college, to be appropriated to home and foreign missions, and the education of indigent young men for the ministry, under the direction of the "Associate Reformed Synod of the South," an incorporated body. Here the charity was too vague and uncertain for a court of chancery to have undertaken to clothe trustees with the power and discretion for its administration, but there was a legal person made trustee, who was capable of taking the trust, and the discretion as to the application of the bequest was lodged with such trustee, and the charity was sustained. Thus, a charity which would have failed for indefiniteness, was saved because there was a trustee named capable of taking the trust. The converse of this proposition, viz., a definite object, but incapacity in person designated to take the trust, was not passed upon. Judge GREEN, however, thus quotes with approbation from Story's Equity Jurisprudence, § 1191: "Where a charity is definite in its objects, and lawful in its creation, and it is to be executed and regulated by trustees, whether they are private individuals or a corporation, there the administration properly belongs to such trustees, and the king, as parens patria, has no general authority to regulate or control the administration of the funds. In all such cases, however, if there be any abuse or misuse of the funds by such trustees, the court of chancery will interpose, at the instance of the attorney general, or the parties in interest, to correct such abuse or misuse of the funds. But in such cases the interposition of the court is properly referable to its general jurisdiction as a court of equity, to prevent abuses of trust, and not to any original right to direct the management of a charity or the conduct of the trustees. Indeed, if the trustees of the charity should grossly abuse their trust, a court of equity may go to the length of taking it away from them, and commit the administration of the charity to other hands. But this is no more than the court will do, in proper cases, for any gross abuse of other trusts." It will be observed that this is predicated upon the fact that such charity is definite in its objects, and when this is the case the court protects it from abuse. Protecting a charity from abuse, even to the extent of committing it to other trustees of its own appointment, requires the exercise, it would seem, of just as much discretion on the part of the court in respect to the administration of the charity as would the original appointment of such trustees in the event that the trustee named in the will were legally incapable of taking the trust. If the charity were definite enough to be protected from abuse by the appointment of new trustees, it would appear to be sufficiently definite to be saved from failure by the appointment of a trustee in the first instance. In the one instance the court of chancery acts upon the familiar doctrine that trusts are objects of its protection, while in the second instance the equally well-established equity principle that a trust otherwise valid shall not be permitted to fail for want of trustees is invoked.

In Franklin v. Armfield, 2 Sneed, 347, Judge MARSHALL says: "Upon the jurisdiction of the courts of chancery in this state the cases of Green v. Allen, 5 Humph. 204; Oakley v. Long, 10 Humph. 254; and Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan, 361,--have affirmatively settled that such jurisdiction exists in the chancery court in this state, in cases where the charity is created in favor of a 'person having sufficient capacity to take as devisee or donee, or if it be not to such person, where it is definite in its object, lawful in its creation, and to be executed by trustees."' On page 348 it is manifest that Judge MARSHALL understands the words "person having sufficient capacity to take as devisee or donee," used by Judge TURLEY, as referring to the trustee, and not to the beneficiaries under the charity, for he says, "By the will the testator appoints his brothers, James Franklin and William Franklin, trustees for the charity, and prescribes their duties. It is scarcely necessary to say that these persons are capable of taking as devisees in the language of Judge TURLEY." This construction of Judge TURLEY's language admits of no doubt, for he could not have referred to the beneficiaries, for if they were the devisees or donees referred to as capable of taking, then it would be no charity at all, but they would have a personal interest in and ownership of the fund. That in such case "devisee and donee" mean the trustee is evident from the construction put on the same words in Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 192. The rule, as stated by Judge TURLEY, provides for two classes of cases,--where the trustee named has capacity to take; and, second, where, though the trustees have not such capacity, nevertheless the object is definite and lawful, and is to be carried out by trustees. Under the first member of the rule the charity may be upheld by reason of a trustee capable of taking being interposed, though without such trustee it might fail because too indefinite for a court of chancery to undertake of the apply it. Under the second member of the rule, the trust being definite and to be executed by trustees, a court of chancery can, for the reason that it is definite, and is to be executed by trustees who are always amenable to its authority, uphold it, and to this end it may remove the trustee.

In Frierson v. General Assembly, 7 Heisk. 694, it is stated that "the principles settled by our decisions are 'that where the charity is definite in its objects, is lawful, and is to be executed and regulated by trustees, who are appointed for the purpose, it will be upheld."' The court (page 693) further says: "It may be considered now as settled in this state, and we believe in most of the states of the Union, that the jurisdiction rests mainly, if not entirely, upon the ordinary powers of our courts of chancery as to the administration and...