Heisler v. Metropolitan Council

• Decision Date: 03 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-1256.,02-1256.
• Parties: Kathy HEISLER, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 622

339 F.3d 622

Kathy HEISLER, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, Appellee.

No. 02-1256.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 10, 2002.

Filed: July 3, 2003.

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Beth E. Bertelson, argued, Minneapolis, MN (David J. Schaibley, on the brief), for appellant.

Thomas E. Marshall, argued, Minne apolis, MN, for appellee.

Before HANSEN,¹ Chief Judge, MAGILL and BYE, Circuit Judges.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Kathy Heisler filed an employment discrimination case under the Americans With Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, see Minn.Stat. Ann. §§ 363.01-363.20 (West 1991 & Supp.2002), alleging that her employer, the Metropolitan Council failed to accommodate her disability and retaliated against her when she asked for a reasonable accommodation. The district court granted summary judgment to Metropolitan Council and Ms. Heisler appealed. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Ms. Heisler's disability claim but reverse and remand Ms. Heisler's retaliation claim to the district court.

I.

Ms. Heisler began her employment with Metropolitan Council ("Met Council") in 1988, working as a Fare Collection Supervisor. Met Council is a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota that, among other things, oversees public transportation in Minneapolis and St. Paul. Ms. Heisler's position required her to work from 4:30 p.m. until 2:30 a.m., as her duties involved supervising vault pullers, who removed fare boxes from city buses when they returned to the garage in the evening. The bulk of the vault pulling occurred between 5:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. All four of Met Council's Fare Collection Supervisors worked the same hours.

Ms. Heisler has suffered from some form of depression for over twenty years and has been in therapy and on medication for much of that time. In February 1998, she was diagnosed with "major depressive disorder, recurrent, without full inter-episode of recovery, with seasonal pattern." (Appellant's App. at 117.) In March 1998, Heisler's medications were changed in an attempt to better manage her depression. She was also diagnosed with dyssomnia and referred for a sleep disorder evaluation at that time. (Id. at 115.) In June 1998, Heisler was prescribed Ritalin in addition to her existing anti-depressant medications and agreed to resume using ten thousand lux lights, which are bright lights Heisler had in her apartment that simulated sunlight. She was also encouraged to spend more time outside of her apartment in the sunlight and to resume an exercise regimen. (Id. at 114.)

Heisler's depression worsened the following winter, and she was hospitalized for six days in January 1999 after her suicidal ideations increased significantly. Met Council allowed her to take medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. Heisler's doctor released her to return to work for four hours per day on February 12. Met Council accommodated the doctor's restrictions by allowing Heisler to work from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., when the bulk of the vault pulling was completed, and allowed Heisler to use sick leave and vacation leave to remain at full-time pay and benefits.

Heisler's physician released her to work full time beginning March 22 but limited her to day-shift hours because working at night seemed to exacerbate her depression. Her physician recommended continuing the part-time 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. shift until April 2 to give Met Council time to make the accommodation. Heisler's supervisor, Scott Peterson, suggested that Heisler continue the part-time schedule until April 30, with which Heisler agreed. Heisler continued that schedule through June, as Peterson informed her that Met Council was unable to accommodate her request for day-shift work because an essential function of a Fare Collection Supervisor was supervising the vault puller operation that occurred only during the evening and nighttime hours. Met Council provided Heisler with job listings and encouraged her to apply for other open positions through the regular employee selection process. Heisler applied for various day-shift positions, but was not hired for any of them for various reasons.

On June 10, Met Council received notice from Heisler's physician that Heisler needed a one-week FMLA leave of absence beginning June 14, and that as of June 21, Heisler would be cleared to work only between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., as she was disabled from working evening or night shifts. Heisler did not return to work for Met Council after the one-week leave.

On July 8, Met Council informed Heisler that she was being "disqualified" from the position of Fare Collection Supervisor, as she was unable to work the required hours. This effectively discharged Heisler from employment with Met Council. Heisler appealed the discharge and requested a hearing pursuant to the Minnesota Veterans Preference Act, as she had previously served in the military. Following a hearing, the hearing officer determined that Met Council acted reasonably in discharging Heisler for being "incompetent" as defined by the Veterans Preference Act, because she was physically incapable of doing her job. Heisler filed discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and ultimately sued Met Council in federal court. The district court granted Met Council's motion for summary judgment, from which Heisler now appeals.

II.

Heisler's complaint alleged that Met Council refused to accommodate her and retaliated against her for engaging in statutorily protected activity in violation of both the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Met Council, finding that Heisler did not suffer from a disability within the meaning of the ADA or the MHRA. The district court noted that Heisler "assert[ed] in passing that she was also retaliated against," Heisler v. Metropolitan Council, No. 00-2749, 2001 WL 1690052, at *6 n. 11 (D.Minn. Dec.14, 2001), and granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim.² On appeal, Heisler argues that the district court erred in finding she was not disabled and that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim because Met Council did not raise the issue in its summary judgment motion.

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, construing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 639 (8th Cir.2002). The moving party bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and the absence of any issues of material fact. Stone Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 293 F.3d 456, 465 (8th Cir.2002). The burden is then shifted to the non-moving party, who may not rest on the pleadings, but must provide specific facts showing that issues of material fact exist for trial. Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

A. Disability Under the ADA³

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). "To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, [Heisler] must establish that (1)[s]he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2)[s]he is qualified to perform the essential functions of h[er] job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3)[s]he suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination based on disability." Dropinski v. Douglas County, 298 F.3d 704, 706-07 (8th Cir. 2002).

The district court found that Heisler was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, which defines a disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). This threshold inquiry requires an individualized analysis of the effects of the claimed impairment on the individual's life activities. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999); Mathieu v. Gopher News Co., 273 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir.2001). What disables one person does not necessarily disable another. Further, the Supreme Court has instructed that we analyze only those major life activities which the plaintiff asserts are limited by the claimed impairment. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (limiting review to the question of whether reproduction is a major life activity where that was the only issue raised and discussed below). The parties do not dispute that major depressive disorder is a mental impairment. The focus of this appeal is whether Heisler's major depressive disorder substantially limits any of her major life activities.

Under the regulations that guide the interpretation of the ADA, to which we have repeatedly looked for guidance, an impairment is substantially limiting if it renders a person "(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2003). See also ...