Al-Hela v. Trump, Case No. 05-cv-01048(RCL)
| Decision Date | 28 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 05-cv-01048(RCL) |
| Parties | ABDULSALAM ALI ABDULRAHMAN AL-HELA, Petitioner, v. DONALD J. TRUMP et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Petitioner Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman al-Hela is challenging the legality of his detention at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba. Al-Hela was captured in September 2002 and the government has detained him at Guantanamo since 2004. The government contends that al-Hela's detention is lawful under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF]. The AUMF authorizes the President to detain individuals who were part of or substantially supported the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.
Al-Hela argues that his detention is not lawful under the AUMF because he did not join al Qaeda or any other terrorist group, and did not support any such groups. He contends that he was a highly respected businessman, tribal leader, and officer involved in the Yemeni Government's program to deport non-Yemeni Arab veterans of the Afghan-Soviet War who were living in Yemen. Al-Hela also asserts that the AUMF can no longer provide a basis for detention and that his prolonged detention violates the Due Process Clause.
The government filed a Factual Return, which it amended in June 2017. In response, al-Hela filed a Traverse in July 2017. The Court conducted a five-day merits hearing to determine the legality of the petitioner's detention in November 2017. The parties made unclassified and classified opening statements, presented evidence and arguments on the contested issues relating to al-Hela's detention, and delivered classified closing statements. Al-Hela testified at the hearing over the course of two days. Both parties also submitted post-hearing briefs in January 2018. Upon consideration of the record, Factual Return, Traverse, merits hearing, exhibits, and post-hearing briefs, the Court concludes that the government may lawfully detain petitioner under the AUMF because the evidence demonstrates that petitioner more likely than not provided substantial support to al Qaeda and its associated forces. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner is a Yemeni citizen who is currently detained at Guantanamo. He more likely than not traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s during the Afghan-Soviet War to fight in the jihad against the Soviets. [Redacted] In Afghanistan, al-Hela established a relationship with Yasir Tawfiq al-Sirri, who became the leader of a branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) called the Vanguards of Conquest. [Redacted] Al-Hela subsequently returned to Yemen. He engaged in business ventures, established himself as a tribal sheikh, and worked on behalf of Yemen's internal security service, the Political Security Organization (PSO). However, al-Hela also acted outside the scope of Yemen's deportation program and facilitated the travel of Islamic extremists, including members of al Qaeda and its associated force, EIJ. [Redacted] al-Hela was aware of and provided support for several bombing attacks that were planned or carried out by Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) members and associates of Osama bin Laden. Petitioner reportedly provided support for the AAIA's bombing of the British Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen on October 13, 2000; the attempted bomb attack on the Yemeni Minister of Interior on December 24, 2000; and the bombings in Aden, Yemen on January 1 and 2, 2001. [Redacted] Jayul was the mastermind of these attacks, the leader of the AAIA cell that carried out the attacks, and an associate of Osama bin Laden. [Redacted] al-Hela was connected with high-level al Qaeda and EIJ operatives. [Redacted] The government contends that al-Hela's access [Redacted] information stemmed from his connections with high-level al Qaeda operatives close to Osama bin Laden.
Shortly after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, Congress passed—and President George W. Bush signed—the AUMF. The AUMF states:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United Stated by such nations, organizations or persons.
AUMF § 2(a). The D.C. Circuit in al-Bihani held that the AUMF authorizes the President to detain individuals who were part of or substantially supported the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces at the time of their capture. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 865, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010), The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 expressly permits military detention of a "person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces." National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) [hereinafter 2012 NDAA].
Direct participation in hostilities is not required to establish the authority to detain. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 869-73, 881 (); see also Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) (). The AUMF justifies holding a detainee at Guantanamo if he was part of or substantially supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces at the time of his capture. Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.2d 964, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Detention under the AUMF may last for the duration of hostilities. 2012 NDAA § 1021(c)(1); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004); al-Alwi v. Trump, 901 F.3d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
The United States may detain a "person who was part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners." 2012 NDAA § 1021. Courts have not defined what conduct constitutes "substantial support" to justify detention under the AUMF.
In July 2004, shortly after Hamdi, the Government created Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) to determine whether the Guantanamo detainees were enemy combatants. The Department of Defense (DoD) defined the term "enemy combatant" to mean Memorandum from Deputy Sec'y of Def. Paul Wolfowitz re: Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal § a (July 7, 2004): see Harridan v. Bush, 548 U.S. 557, 571 n.1 (2006) (citing this definition).
In 2008, the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene opened the gates for judicial review of the scope of executive detention authority for Guantanamo detainees. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). On remand, Judge Leon adopted the government's prior 2004 CSRT definition of "enemy combatant," concluding that it was consistent with the AUMF and the Constitution. Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134-35 (D.D.C. 2008). On March 13, 2009, the Obama Administration, in a memorandum to the D.C. District Court, "refin[ed]" the government's position regarding its detention authority for "those persons who are now being held at Guantanamo Bay." Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009). The March 2009 Memo asserted that the scope of executive detention authority "is informed by principles of the laws of war," as those principles "inform the understanding of what is 'necessary and appropriate'" under the AUMF. Id. at 1-3. This Memo declared that the government had the authority "to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces." Id. at 1-2.
In 2010, in al-Bihani, the D.C. Circuit rejected the notion that the laws of war limit the government's AUMF authority, and looked to the jurisdictional provisions of the Military Commissions Acts (MCA) of 2006 and 2009 for guidance in construing the scope of detention authority under the AUMF. Al-Bihanai, 590 F.3d at 871-72. In the 2006 MCA, Congress authorized trial by military commission of "unlawful enemy combatants," and defined this term to mean "a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities...
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