Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co.
| Decision Date | 22 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-3888,80-3888 |
| Citation | 709 F.2d 1031 |
| Parties | Edmond HELAIRE, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, v. MOBIL OIL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee, CHERAMIE BOAT TRUCKS, et al., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TELEDYNE MOVABLE OFFSHORE, INC., Third Party Defendant-Appellee, v. HIGHLANDS INSURANCE CO., et al., Third Party Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Charles Hanemann, Houma, La., for Mobil Oil Co.
James R. Carter, William A. Porteous, III, New Orleans, La., for Highlands, American, St. Paul, Citadel & Underwriters.
Anthony D. Moroux, Lafayette, La., for Helaire.
Joseph J. Weigand, Jr., Houma, La., for Teledyne and Argonaut Ins.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
Before WILLIAMS and JOLLY, Circuit Judges, and WILL(fn*), District Judge.
This appeal arises from injuries sustained by Edmond Helaire, a roustabout employed In a jury trial, Cheramie was exonerated, and Mobil was found 100% liable for Helaire's injuries. 1 The court additionally entered judgment for Cheramie on Mobil's claim for indemnity, but granted Mobil recovery over from Cheramie's underwriters 2 pursuant to a policy of protection and indemnity insurance in which Mobil had been named as an additional insured. All the parties appeal. Mobil argues that the trial court's jury instructions were improper and prejudicial; the underwriters claim that the court erred in dismissing the state law negligence claim, and Helaire contends that the court's failure to award prejudgment interest was an abuse of discretion.
by Teledyne Movable Offshore, Inc., while unloading casing onto a fixed platform owned by Mobil Oil Corporation from an offshore supply vessel owned by Cheramie Brothers Boat Company, Inc., and chartered by Mobil. Helaire brought suit in district court against Mobil and Cheramie as vessel owners, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. Secs. 901 et seq., and upon a state law negligence claim pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2315. The district court, 497 F.Supp. 633, granted Mobil's motion for directed verdict on the state claim and submitted to the jury only those claims against Mobil under the LSHWCA.
We affirm the judgment of the district court with respect to the exoneration of Cheramie Brothers, the dismissal of the state law negligence claim, and the indemnification order. However, we find that the court's instructions incorrectly stated the standard of owner liability under Sec. 905(b) and that this error was potentially prejudicial to Mobil. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment on the issue of Mobil's liability and remand for a new trial.
Edmond E. Helaire was employed as a roustabout, or general laborer, by Teledyne Movable Offshore, Inc. upon a Mobil Oil Corporation fixed platform located in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Texas. Teledyne, an independent contractor, had been hired by Mobil to drill a well in furtherance of Mobil's search for oil and gas on the Continental Shelf. Through a charter agreement, Mobil had arranged with Cheramie Brothers to provide an offshore supply vessel for the transportation of material between land and the platform. While Mobil was responsible for the procurement and transportation of casing to be used in the well, work done on the platform was carried out by Teledyne, whose employees were responsible for the handling of all material, including loading and unloading the boats. Helaire worked under the direct supervision of the Teledyne crane operator and toolpusher as part of the crew furnished by Teledyne under its agreement with Mobil. Mobil, as owner of the platform, provided on-sight supervision through its drilling supervisor, or "company man."
On the night of February 11, 1977, the M/V Bo-Truc No. 25 arrived with a load of casing to be delivered on the platform. Seas were rough and it was raining. The vessel was tied up on a mooring under the platform's crane. A crew of roustabouts was then called to unload the casing, 3 but these attempts were ultimately abandoned because of the high seas and poor visibility. At 6 o'clock the following morning, Helaire and a co-worker were lowered to the deck of the supply vessel, still moored in the same place, again to attempt the unloading. Generally, the unloading required that the roustabouts place hooks in both ends of each joint of casing so that the crane operator could then lift the joints onto the platform for stacking and later use. In order
to attach these hooks, it was necessary for the men to move from one end of the casing to the other on the surface of the casing, which was only twelve to thirteen inches wide. Helaire testified that he complained to his supervisor, the Teledyne crane operator, about the difficulty in accomplishing the unloading because the casings were wet and the vessel was pitching in the heavy seas. He asked that the unloading be suspended until conditions improved, but he was ordered to continue work. While carrying the hooks forward to place them in the ends of the joints, Helaire lost his balance on the slippery casing and fell, injuring his knee. His suit against Mobil and Cheramie and this appeal followed.
The underwriters and Mobil argue on cross appeal that the trial court's instructions, based on Secs. 343 and 343(A) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts constituted reversible error. Specifically, they argue that the United States Supreme Court case of Scindia Steam Navigations Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981), decided subsequent to the jury's verdict in this case, altered the duty of vessel owners to longshoremen and their employees during unloading operations. Under Scindia, they assert that a finding of liability is predicated only in those cases where the owner has actual knowledge of an open and obvious danger as well as actual knowledge that the stevedore is doing nothing to correct the danger. 4 Because the trial court's instructions included liability in cases where Mobil, by the exercise of reasonable care, should have anticipated the harm of the obvious and open danger, the owner was subjected to a stricter standard than that established by Scindia as the applicable interpretation of the law.
The question before us, therefore, is whether liability of a vessel owner with respect to open and obvious dangers once stevedoring operations have begun is less extensive under Sec. 905(b) of the LSHWCA than under the traditional tort rules. If the situations under which an owner can be found liable for injuries to a third party are restricted under the interpretation of Sec. 905(b) announced in Scindia, we must reverse and remand. If not, any error resulting from the erroneous instructions was harmless. Fed.R.Civ.P. 61.
Prior to 1972, a longshoreman injured in the course of his employment had several bases upon which he could recover for his injuries. First, he could receive compensation payments from his employer, regardless of the fault of his employer, the stevedore. In addition, the longshoreman could bring an action against the owner of the vessel and could recover if he could prove that he had been injured either because the owner was negligent or because the ship was unseaworthy. No showing of fault on the part of the owner was necessary to support the unseaworthiness claim. Even if the unsafe condition had been created by the stevedore, the shipowner was liable for the longshoreman's injuries. See generally Scindia Steam Navigations Company v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981); Pluyer v. Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines, Ltd., 664 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir.1982); Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd., 656 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir.1981). In 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act, and substituted negligence for unseaworthiness as a standard of liability of the shipowner and abolished the shipowner's right of indemnity against the stevedore. See 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(b). Since the 1972 amendments, liability is imposed upon the owner only for the failure of the vessel or its owner to exercise reasonable care. 5
Although it was clear that the amendments imposed a negligence standard in place of a standard of liability without fault, the specifics of that standard were left to be "resolved through the application of accepted principles of tort law and the ordinary process of litigation". S.Rep. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972); H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 4698. Pursuant to this legislative charge, the process of defining the precise contours of shipowner liability under Sec. 905(b) has been a matter of serious concern to the courts. Not unexpectedly, the circuits disagreed as to the standards to be applied, particularly in cases where the stevedore, the employer of the injured longshoreman, had also been negligent. This Court, along with the Second and Fourth Circuits, adopted the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), Secs. 343 and 343A. 6 See Gay v. Ocean Transport and Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir.1977). With respect to conditions which are open and obvious to the stevedore in control of the operations, the vessel owner would not be absolved of responsibility if the owner "should anticipate the harm despite such ... obviousness [of the defect]" and still failed to correct it. Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd., 634 F.2d 236, 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816, 102 S.Ct. 93, 70 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981). The First and Third Circuits rejected the Restatement approach, holding that the owner could be negligent only if it were participating in the activity and the stevedore were not in exclusive control of the work area. 7
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gonzalez v. U.S., Civil Action No. B-06-196.
...Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 170, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981); Futo, 742 F.2d at 213 (citing Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir.1983)). The Fifth Circuit has recognized certain duties a vessel has under Scindia with regard to a contractor's employees, even......
-
Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp.
...that the law imposed a duty upon a time charterer outside the narrow circumstances articulated in Brown. Although Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir.1983), primarily concerned a separate issue, we held that a particular entity's negligence "was based on its actions or omission......
-
Tauzier v. East
...Laei s z , 896 F.2d 964, 970 (5th Cir.1990) ).31 Id. at 11 (citing Scindia , 451 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. 1614 ).32 Id. (quoting 709 F.2d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir.1983) ).33 Id. at 11–12 (citing Hill v. Texaco, Inc. , 674 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir.1982) ; Morris v. Compagnie Maritime D es Chargeurs R......
-
Randall v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
...charter agreement." Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Ma-Ju Marine Servs., Inc., 830 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir.1987); see also Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1031, 1041-42 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that a time charterer could be liable under Sec. 905(b) of the LHWCA for ordering a worker to unload equip......
-
CHAPTER 11 DON'T LOSE SIGHT OF THE BIG PICTURE -- MAKING SURE THE INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE PROVISIONS IN YOUR VARIOUS CONTRACTS FIT TOGETHER
...Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 127.001, et seq.; see also § V.B., infra. [72] .Lanasse, 450 F.2d at 580; Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1031, 1042 (5th Cir. 1983); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. McMoRan Offshore Exploration Co., 877 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub n......
-
CHAPTER 7 A STRATEGIC LOOK AT THE BIGGER PICTURE -RISK ALLOCATION IN OIL AND GAS OPERATIONAL AGREEMENTS
...See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 127.001, et seq.; see also § V.B., infra. [58] Lanasse, 450 F.2d at 580; Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1031, 1042 (5th Cir. 1983); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. McMoRan Offshore Exploration Co., 877 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied su......