Helen West v. Roadway Express, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | 82-LW-4308,10263 |
| Parties | Helen West, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant v. Roadway Express, Inc., Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee and Otto E. Liipfert et al., Defendants. Case |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Before VICTOR, P.J., BELL and QUILLIN, JJ.
Mrs Helen West, plaintiff below and cross-appellant before this court, was an employee of Roadway Express, Inc. (hereinafter Roadway) for many years. She began her employment in 1955 and, except for a brief interval, served that company continuously until 1976, when she was discharged.
In 1966, plaintiff began working as secretary to Otto E Liipfert, who had been recently promoted to Vice President of Field Operations. Liipfert repeatedly rated her performance as exceptional and outstanding. By 1974, plaintiff was the second highest paid secretary in the Akron executive offices.
In late 1974 or early 1975, Liipfert informed plaintiff that she was to report to William Spitznagel who was to be the new Executive Vice President of Field Operations at Roadway. Liipfert moved up to President of Roadway at the same time.
In November 1975, plaintiff was informed by Spitznagel to report directly to Mr. Charles Gielow, a subordinate of Spitznagel.
On June 24, 1976, plaintiff was discharged by Spitznagel. The reasons assigned for her dismissal were that her performance and her attitude were not in conformity with company standards.
Contending that her discharge was wrongful and motivated by her rejection of an alleged sexual proposition made to her by Liipfert during the summer of 1974, plaintiff sued Roadway Spitznagel and Liipfert for damages in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. We do not discuss here the aspects of plaintiff's complaint filed in U.S. District Court.
Plaintiff's complaint, filed January 12, 1978, claimed damages predicated upon two theories of recovery.
First, plaintiff contended that in order to induce her to resign voluntarily, she was subjected to sexual harassment of a malicious nature, which action on the part of defendants Liipfert and Spitznagel constituted not only an interference with her right to privacy; but an intentional and malicious infliction of emotional and physical distress upon her; an interference with her employment relationship with Roadway; an invasion of her civil rights and liberties; and a discriminatory practice in violation of R.C. 4112.02 and Section 2000e-2 et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code.
Secondly, she contended that the harassment resulted first in the reassignment of her employment duties, then demotion and finally, loss of her employment through termination. This claim, as opposed to the tort theories underlying her first contention, was based on the theory of contract. It was plaintiff's position that she was a party to an implied contract which assured her continuing employment with Roadway until she became 65 years of age.
The answer filed by defendants generally denied the allegations made by Mrs. West but, in addition, set forth a number of defenses which would bar plaintiff's claims for relief. These included the defense of the Statute of Frauds, The Statute of Limitations, Res judicata, waiver, and lack of jurisdiction.
The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint was granted in part by the trial judge. The order of the court dismissed plaintiff's discrimination practice cause of action under R.C. 4112.02 and Section 2000e-2 et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code, but overruled the motion with respect to the remaining claims.
Prior to trial, defendants also moved the court for summary judgment. The court's ruling on the motion found for defendants on plaintiff's claim for invasion of privacy and/or interference with plaintiff's private activities, and on her claim for malicious interference with her contract of employment. The court's order was subsequently followed by another, which, based upon the summary judgment ruling, dismissed plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants, as well as her claim for punitive damages. These orders are the foundations of plaintiff's cross-appeal.
The trial court's finding on the motion for summary judgment as it relates to the contractual issue is of pertinence to our consideration and thus, is inserted verbatim at this point:
Plaintiff's remaining claim for wrongful discharge based on an implied contract was preserved for trial and resulted in a jury verdict in the amount of $287,000 rendered in favor of Mrs. West. This judgment is the subject of the Roadway appeal.
Assignment of Error I.
The trial court erred in submitting to the jury an issue of liability on a claim of an implied contract between the parties for assured employment until retirement and in not granting a dismissal upon motion of the appellant.
The established law in Ohio is that in the absence of an employment contract for a fixed and definite period, an employee may be terminated at the will of the employer for such cause as the employer believes valid. Henkel v. Educational Research Council (1976), 45 Ohio St. 2d 249. Spain v. Luxaire, Inc. (Lorain Co. Ct. App. No. 2800, Decided January 24, 1979) unreported.
Generally, even a contract for permanent employment or for life employment is construed to be nothing more than an indefinite hiring terminable at will, unless the express terms of the contract and/or other circumstances surrounding (the agreement clearly manifest the parties' intent to bind each other for life. Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W. 2d 587 op. cit. Henkel v. Educational Research Council, supra, at 255. See also, Annot., 60 ALR 3d 226 (1974), and 35 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 638, Master and Servant, Section 14.
Although plaintiff concedes that this is a correct and current statement of the law in Ohio, she nevertheless contends that Roadway's booklets, brochures, documents, manuals, retirement benefits, stock plans, statements of company policy, and company practice created an implied contract that employment with Roadway was permanent until retirement age 65, subject to termination only for good cause.
It is clear from the record that there was never an express contract, written or oral, between plaintiff and Roadway. We shall, therefore, examine the evidence that the trial court and the jury found to create an implied contract of employment.
When plaintiff required Roadway in 1956, she, as well as other new employees, was given a booklet entitled "General Information for Office and Administrative Personnel' (plaintiff's exhibit no. 43). The booklet contained an introductory statement signed by R.W. Corns, then executive vice president of the company, which provided, in part, that:
The booklet concluded with the following:
* * * We are very glad that you have chosen Roadway for your career. We extend to you our very best wishes and sincerely hope that your association with us will be a long and happy one.
A letter to Roadway's salaried employees from Galen J. Roush, then Chairman of the Board of Roadway, which accompanied a booklet explaining the company's new stock bonus plan, (plaintiff's exhibit no. 35) stated that:
The booklet itself provided that:
However, it is interesting to note that the booklet also stated that:
Roadway also established a voluntary stock purchase plan available to all Roadway employees. Additionally, Roadway provided a retirement plan, a medical care plan, a life and accident insurance plan, a long term disability plan, and a dental and vision care plan to its employees.
In addition, plaintiff produced documents and testimony which suggested that Roadway had established a practice of discharging employees only for good cause. Joseph May, who had held the position of director of employee relations at Roadway, testified that he had tried to discourage terminations without cause, and that:
To continue reading
Request your trial