Helena Chem. Co. v. Uribe

• Decision Date: 20 September 2012
• Docket Number: 30,792.,Sept. 20, 2012.,Nos. 31,080,, No. 33,875.,Certiorari Denied, Dec. 5, 2012,s. 31,080
• Citation: 293 P.3d 888
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
• Parties: HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Arturo URIBE, Defendant–Appellee, and Pamela Uribe, Linda Thomas, individually and as representative of Thomas & Wan, L.L.P., and Thomas & Wan, L.L.P., Defendants. Helena Chemical Company, Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross–Appellant, v. Arturo Uribe, Defendant/Appellant/Cross–Appellee.

293 P.3d 888

HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Arturo URIBE, Defendant–Appellee,andPamela Uribe, Linda Thomas, individually and as representative of Thomas & Wan, L.L.P., and Thomas & Wan, L.L.P., Defendants.

Helena Chemical Company, Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross–Appellant,

v.Arturo Uribe, Defendant/Appellant/Cross–Appellee.

Nos. 31,080, 30,792.

Certiorari Denied, Dec. 5, 2012, No. 33,875.

Sept. 20, 2012.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Jackson Walker L.L.P., Robert L. Soza, Jr., Elena P. Villaseñor, San Antonio, TX, The Simons Law Firm L.L.P., Frank M. Bond, Faith Kalman Reyes, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Freedman Boyd Hollander Goldberg Ives & Duncan P.A., Sara Berger, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} Helena Chemical Company (Helena) filed suit against Arturo Uribe and others for prima facie tort and defamation. A jury awarded nominal damages on Helena's claims of defamation and prima facie tort. Additionally, it awarded punitive damages, as to which the district court granted a remittitur. Uribe appeals; Helena cross-appeals.

{2} We hold that the district court did not err in entering judgment in favor of Helena on its claim of defamation and that the court properly awarded a remitted amount of punitive damages as to that claim. In regard to prima facie tort, we hold that the court erred in entering a judgment based on the jury's general verdict because the jury's answers to the special interrogatories were inconsistent with that verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and the punitive damages award as it pertains to Helena's prima facie tort claim. Finally, we hold that the court did not err in reducing Helena's bill of costs. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

BACKGROUND

{3} Helena was a crop protection company that blended, stored, and distributed fertilizers and other nutrients to local farmers. In 1989 Helena purchased property in Mesquite, New Mexico from another crop protection company and began operations there. In 2002 Uribe moved to Mesquite into a house directly across the street from the Helena facility. Beginning in 2002 and continuing into 2008, Uribe made various Helena-related statements and presentations in the media, to the Legislature, and at Mesquite community meetings. Additionally, Uribe attempted to interfere with Helena's attempts to communicate with the public, including discouraging community members from attending Helena's open-house, which had been designed to educate the community about Helena's operations. In response to these and other of Uribe's actions, Helena filed suit for defamation and prima facie tort.

{4} A jury awarded nominal damages of $1.00 each on Helena's claims of defamation and prima facie tort. Additionally, it awarded Helena a lump-sum of punitive damages in the amount of $75,000. Upon Uribe's motion, the court remitted the punitive damages amount to $10,000. The court attributed $5,000 of this sum to the defamation claim and $5,000 of the sum to the prima facie tort claim. Following entry of the final judgment, the court awarded costs to Helena in the amount of $9,000, an amount far below what Helena sought as recoverable costs. Additional facts and procedural occurrences are discussed, as needed, within the body of this Opinion.

{5} Uribe argues that the district court erred in entering judgment in favor of Helena on its defamation and prima facie tort claims. In regard to defamation, he contends that the court erred by instructing the jury under the theory that Helena was a private rather than a public plaintiff; that, as a matter of law, none of his statements were defamatory; and that Helena failed to present sufficient evidence of defamation. In regard to prima facie tort, Uribe argues that the court erred in entering a judgment consistent with the general verdict in favor of Helena because the jury's answers to special interrogatories were inconsistent with that verdict. Also, in regard to prima facie tort, Uribe contends that Helena failed to present sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Uribe's final argument is that the court erred in granting an award of punitive damages.

{6} We affirm the district court's judgment as it relates to defamation and the corresponding punitive damages. We reverse that aspect of the court's judgment pertaining to prima facie tort including the $5,000 punitive damages associated with that claim.

{7} Helena argues, in its cross-appeal, that the court erred in remitting the punitive damages award and also that the court erred in reducing its bill of costs. We affirm the district court's determination on these issues. A third argument, regarding the court's refusal to submit each separate defamatory claim to the jury, is not considered because it is made contingent upon our reversal of the judgment in favor of Helena on defamation.

DISCUSSIONI. DEFAMATION

A. Public Figure (Jury Instruction) Issue

{8} Uribe argues that the district court erred in “failing to issue the proper jury instruction for defamation” and that the court should have instructed the jury that Helena was to be treated as a public figure.

{9} In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 n. 1, 279–80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that “[t]he constitutional guarantees [of freedom of speech and press] require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false [.]” Later, in Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, the Court extended its New York Times rule to include “public figure[s] who [are] not ... public official [s].” Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. 130, 133–34, 155, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Non-public” (private person) defamation plaintiffs, on the other hand, may establish liability based on a “lesser standard” of ordinary negligence. Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 402, 649 P.2d 462, 470 (1982). “Whether a person is a public figure is a question of law for the court.” Id. at 399, 649 P.2d at 467.

{10} In this case, as to the allegedly defamatory communications, the jury was instructed to determine whether “Uribe [knew] that the communication(s) were false or negligently fail[ed] to recognize that they were false[.]” Thus, the instructions were consistent with a private-person standard of proof of defamation. See id. at 402, 649 P.2d at 470 (recognizing that non-public defamation plaintiffs may establish liability based on ordinary negligence). The record reflects that Uribe agreed, in a pretrial order, to this standard of proof. Nevertheless, after the close of evidence, Uribe requested the court to instruct the jury on a public-figure theory of defamation.

{11} In its order denying the requested public-figure instructions, the district court stated the following:

1. The [c]ourt entered its [pretrial o]rder March 25, 2010, which [pretrial o]rder was agreed to by the parties. Neither party raised an issue of treating ... Helena as a public figure in the [pretrial o]rder.

2. Except for possible punitive damage issues, the parties have completed the presentation of trial evidence to the jury.

3. The parties rested on Friday, April 2, 2010.

4. When it appeared that the [c]ourt's instructions to the jury were not likely to be completed before 5:00[ ]p[.]m[.], the [c]ourt gave the jury the option to recess and return [on] Wednesday, April 7, 2010[,] for instructions and closing arguments, and the jury elected to recess.

5. The attorneys for ... Helena submitted a new set of proposed jury instructions by e-mail [on] Monday, April 5, 2010[,] at 4:25 p[.]m.

6. The attorneys for ... Uribe submitted a new set of proposed instructions by e-mail[ ][on] Monday, April 5, 2010[,] at 5:50 p[.]m., after the [c]ourt had closed.

7. In his new set of proposed instructions, ... Uribe, for the first time since the case has been pending, raised the issue of ... Helena as a public figure and asked the [c]ourt to instruct the jury on a theory of defamation of ... Helena as a public figure rather than a private figure.

Citing Rule 1–016(E) NMRA, the court concluded that “[t]he [pretrial o]rder controls the course of the action and may be modified only to prevent manifest injustice.” See id. (stating that after a pretrial conference is held, an order shall be entered reciting any action taken, and that order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified by a subsequent order; and explaining that such order shall be modified “only to prevent manifest injustice”). The court further concluded that Uribe's request was, “in substance, a motion to amend” the pretrial order, that allowing such an amendment would cause Helena to “suffer manifest injustice[,]” and that Uribe's request was “untimely and should be denied.”

{12} Uribe's argument in this Court is void of any discussion of whether the district court abused its discretion either by characterizing the requested instruction as a motion to amend the pretrial order or by denying the motion for the reasons stated in the order. See Fahrbach v. Diamond Shamrock, Inc., 1996–NMSC–063, 122 N.M. 543, 550, 928 P.2d 269, 276 (stating that a district court's decision whether to amend a pretrial order is reviewed for abuse of discretion). Because Uribe does not attack the court's findings and conclusions in this regard, we deem the court's order to be conclusive. Rule 12–213(A)(4) NMRA (stating that the appellant's brief in chief “shall set forth a specific attack on any finding, or such finding shall be deemed conclusive”).

{13} In addition to requesting that this Court affirm the district court on the basis of its order rejecting the instructions, Helena contends that “public figure is an affirmative defense that must be raised...