Helfferich v. Sherman

• Decision Date: 29 February 1912
• Parties: WILLIAM HELFFERICH, a minor, by his guardian ad litem, J. W. Smith, Plaintiff and appellant, v. D. E. SHERMAN, Defendant and respondent.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

28 S.D. 627, 134 N.W. 815 (1912)

WILLIAM HELFFERICH, a minor, by his guardian ad litem, J. W. Smith Plaintiff and appellant v D. E. SHERMAN, Defendant and respondent. South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from Circuit Court, Brule County, SD Hon. Frank B. Smith, Judge Reversed Emil J. Woerth Attorneys for appellant. Opinion filed February 29, 1912

CORSON, J.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment entered in his favor against the defendant and from the order denying a new trial. The action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract by the defendant, bearing date of September 1, 1910, and by the terms of which the plaintiff was employed for a period of one year, and from which employment he was wrongfully discharged by the defendant. The defendant by its answer admitted the discharge of the plaintiff and pleaded justification therefor. Under the instructions of the court, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $37.50.

The errors assigned are, in substance, that the court erred in instructing the jury that if they found for the plaintiff his damages would be $37.50, and no more; the court's instruction being in effect that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only for the 15 days subsequent to his discharge, and up to the time of the commencement of the action. It is contended by the appellant that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages sustained by him during the entire balance of his term of one year under the contract. As before stated, the contract was in writing, under and by the terms of which the plaintiff was employed for a period of one year, and was to receive $60 per month during the months of December, January, and February, and $75 per month the remainder of the year, as automobile repairer.

The court instructed the jury, among other things, as follows:

"If, however, the plaintiff was discharged without good cause, then he is entitled to recover damages, and damages simply from the time he was discharged, which was the 22d of November, up until the time this action was commenced, which was the 5th day of December, 14 or 15 days, I think it is, in all. He cannot recover any prospective damages in the future. His action was commenced long before the contract was to have expired on September 1st. He elected to bring his action upon the 5th day of December. He can recover no damages after that time. His damages would be whatever would be due him for wages from the time he was discharged on the 21st of November until the 5th day of December. That is all he would be entitled to. It couldn't exceed $37.50. That is, providing you find he was wrongfully discharged."

The court was also requested to give the following instruction by plaintiff's counsel, but refused to do so:

"You are further instructed that, if you find the plaintiff has been wrongfully discharged, then you must find for the plaintiff and assess his damage, the measure of which will be furnished by the written contract; it will be the stipulated wages provided for by the written contract for its entire unexpired period, ... less what plaintiff has earned thereunder, and less such amount as the plaintiff might reasonably be able to earn up to the date of its expiration."

The jury, by finding a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $37.50, in effect found that he was wrongfully discharged from his employment; and hence the only question presented in this case is as to the court's instruction and his refusal to give the instruction requested. We are of the opinion that the court clearly erred in refusing to give plaintiff's requested instruction, and in the instruction given to the jury on its own motion. The decisions as to the measure of damages in this class of cases are hopelessly in conflict, and we shall not attempt in this decision to review the various decisions bearing upon this subject.

It is contended by the appellant:

"That a wrongfully discharged employee may recover for any loss suffered by him during the entire unexpired term of employment, though he sues before the expiration of the time provided for in the contract, and trial is had before that time."

After a careful review of many of the authorities cited by counsel, we are of the opinion that his contention is clearly correct.

In the recent case of Webb v. Depue, 152 Mich. 698, 116 N.W. 560, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 813, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in an analogous case, held, as appears by the second headnote, that: "The damages for breach of a contract of employment are not limited to the wages which have accrued at the time of trial in the nisi prius court."

In that case, it appears from the statement of facts that the action was commenced in the justice court, and judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff; that the defendant appealed the case to the circuit court, where it was tried by a jury. The trial court made a ruling limiting the plaintiff's right of recovery to the damages that had accrued up to the time of the trial in the justice court, a period of 17 days, to which ruling of the trial court the plaintiff excepted. In its opinion the court says:

"We now come to the important question, and that is, Was the trial court right in relation to the measure of damages? ... The precise question is a new one in this state."

The court then proceeds to review the authorities, and reaches the conclusion that the trial court erred in its ruling, and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages to the extent of the amount that might have been earned for the entire period for which she and her daughter were employed.

In Cutter v. Gillette, 163 Mass. 95, 39 N.E. 1010, the learned Supreme Court of Massachusetts held, as appears from the headnote, that:

"In an action for breach of contract of hiring, brought before the expiration of the contract period, the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for the unexpired portion of such period subsequent to the time of trial."

In its opinion the court discusses the question very fully, and, in view of the importance of the question, we take the liberty of quoting quite largely from the opinion of that learned court:

"The remaining question is whether the jury should have been allowed to assess damages for the period of time subsequent to the trial. The plaintiff was hired for five years from April 25, 1892, and was discharged about the middle of July, 1892. He brought suit on November 10, 1892, and the verdict was rendered on March 15, 1894. The verdict assessed at the sum of $3,180.95 the plaintiff's whole damages for breach of the contract of hiring, and stated that of this amount $1,392.95 was the damage to the time of trial. The defendant concedes that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for an entire breach, so far as such damages can be...