Helgerson v. United States
Decision Date | 19 June 1970 |
Docket Number | 19848.,No. 19841,19841 |
Citation | 426 F.2d 1293 |
Parties | H. H. HELGERSON and D. F. Helgerson, Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant. Frank C. POWELL, Jr., and Doris Dae Powell, Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Ann E. Belanger, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant; Johnnie M. Walters, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson and William A. Friedlander, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., and William F. Clayton, U. S. Atty., Sioux Falls, S. D., on the brief.
Robert C. Heege, of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, S. D., for appellees.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Chief Judge, and MATTHES and GIBSON, Circuit Judges.
In these actions separately instituted and later consolidated, appellees seek refunds of Federal income taxes paid for the years 1961 and 1962. Taxpayers in each case are husband and wife, having filed joint Federal income tax returns for the years in question. All parties agreed that the only issue for determination was whether each pair of taxpayers was entitled to deduct on their 1961 and 1962 joint returns, as ordinary and necessary nonbusiness expenses under 26 U.S.C. § 212, certain attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in litigation instituted in connection with the sale of shares of stock in a corporation, or whether such expenses must be capitalized and added to the basis of the stock. By memorandum opinion of January 27, 1969, reported sub nom. Powell v. United States, 294 F.Supp. 977 (D.S.D.1969), Chief Judge Nichol found in favor of appellees' claims, and judgments were subsequently entered for $8,383.33 plus interest in our No. 19,841 and for $26,678.98 plus interest in our No. 19,848. The Government has appealed, and we reverse. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The facts are established by stipulation. On December 3, 1960, Frank C. Powell, Jr., Doris Dae Powell, and H. H. Helgerson (hereafter the Stockholders)1 granted an option to The Gibralter Life Insurance Company of America (hereafter Gibralter) to purchase 38,388 shares of the capital stock of The National Life of America (hereafter National), a South Dakota life, health, and accident insurance corporation, for the purchase price of $2,591,190, to be paid in three installments. In conjunction with the option, the Stockholders executed a Stock Purchase Agreement and Addenda thereto with Gibralter, paragraph 3 of Section I of which reads as follows:
Prior to the expiration date specified in the Option, the Stockholders granted an extension thereof to Gibralter. On May 31, 1961, Gibralter assigned its rights under the Option to one J. S. Shively, president of Inter-Continental Corporation, a Texas corporation. Shortly thereafter, the Stockholders entered into a Memorandum Agreement with Gibralter and Inter-Continental Corporation, as Shively's designee, the substance of which was to substitute Inter-Continental for Gibralter in the earlier Stock Purchase Agreement, Addenda, and Option, and otherwise to reaffirm the provisions of those instruments.
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, the initial net payment of $727,585.00 was made by Inter-Continental Corporation on or before June 15, 1961. The stock was placed in escrow and the proxies and resignations of the three Stockholders were delivered to Shively and Inter-Continental Corporation. On July 13, 1961, the Insurance Commissioner for the State of South Dakota took custody of the securities of National to prevent consummation of a $2,815,516.25 investment contemplated by the new management of National, referred to in the briefs as the Shively group. This action in turn precipitated a mandamus proceeding in the appropriate circuit court of South Dakota by National against the Insurance Commissioner. The Stockholders intervened in support of the Commissioner. The record does not disclose the disposition of this state action.
Under date of September 5, 1961, the Stockholders gave "Notice of Default" to Inter-Continental Corporation and Shively. Referring to paragraph 3 of the original Stock Purchase Agreement, the Stockholders specified several acts taken or contemplated by the Shively group which the Stockholders alleged were inimical to and would adversely affect the value of the stock of National, still held in escrow. The notice charged the Shively group with authorizing investments in property of dubious value, with authorizing loans secured by insufficient collateral, with selling bonds at less than the amortized value thereof, with failing to maintain proper books and records or to devote full and adequate time to the proper management of National, and with proposing a merger of National with the Texas Reserve Insurance Company, to the detriment of National's interests. Inter-Continental Corporation and Shively replied in great detail to the default notice, controverting each of the substantive charges.
On September 30, 1961, the Stockholders brought suit in a South Dakota circuit court against J. S. Shively, Inter-Continental Corporation, National, two other corporations, and four other named individuals. The record does not reveal the allegations in nor the remedy sought by the Stockholders' complaint. We are informed from the briefs that it was a class action, brought by the Stockholders for their own benefit and for the benefit of National and its stockholders and policyholders, and we presume that it related closely to the charges made in the "Notice of Default."
During the pendency of the state court action, the controversy was settled. The Stockholders entered into an agreement with all other parties to the state suit. All pending and future claims were released, all pending court actions were to be dismissed with prejudice, and on June 2, 1962, the balance of the purchase price for the stock in National was paid to the Stockholders, including interest, under the terms of the Stock Purchase Agreement and Memorandum of Agreement.
The attorneys' fees and expenses in controversy here were incurred by the Stockholders in connection with their intervention in the mandamus proceedings, the circuit court suit, the unsuccessful removal proceedings in the United States District Court, and the final consummation of the 1962 agreement terminating the controversy. None of the items deducted, which were stipulated to be reasonable and necessary, was incurred for services or expenses with respect to negotiation of the Option, Stock Purchase Agreement, Addenda, or Memorandum of Agreement.
In granting judgment for appellees, the district court held that the expenses incurred "clearly arose from a business rather than a personal matter, i.e., the conservation of the value of the stock that the taxpayers held as security resulting from the sale of the controlling interest in National." 294 F.Supp. at 978. We believe that the controlling case law in this area, as recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Woodward v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 U.S. 572, 90 S.Ct. 1302, 25 L.Ed.2d 577 (April 20, 1970, aff'g 410 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1969), and United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580, 90 S.Ct. 1307, 25 L.Ed.2d 585 (April 20, 1970), rev'g 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969), requires us to reverse and direct the district court to enter judgment of dismissal.2
The statutory provision under which appellees claim nonbusiness expense deductions, 26 U.S.C. § 212, provides: "In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year (1) for the production or collection of income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income; * * *." We reviewed the historical background of § 212 in Woodward v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 410 F.2d at 317-318. We noted there that "capital expenditures are not deductible under § 212, just as they are not deductible under § 162." Id. at 318. The Supreme Court reiterated this basic principle in its affirming opinion.
397 U.S. at 574, 90 S.Ct. at 1304 (footnotes omitted). See Spangler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 323 F.2d 913, 918-919 (9th Cir. 1963); Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(n).
The threshold inquiry must be whether the litigation fees and expenses here involved were capital expenditures. Again, we are guided by fundamental doctrine: "It has long been recognized, as a general matter, that costs incurred in the...
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