Hellebust v. Brownback, s. 93-3164
| Citation | 42 F.3d 1331 |
| Decision Date | 19 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | 93-3238,Nos. 93-3164,s. 93-3164 |
| Parties | Lynn HELLEBUST, John R. Craft, Kansas Natural Resource Council, and Common Cause of Kansas, Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants/Appellees, v. Sam BROWNBACK, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture; Jay Armstrong; Victor Krainbill; Alvin Epler; Altis Ferree; Thayne Larson; Ralph H. Rindt; F.E. Bliss; Lois Schlickau; Floyd O. Coen; Bob L. Moore; Anne Marie Worley; Art Howell, in their capacities as members of the Kansas Board of Agriculture, Defendants-Counter-Claimants/Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
William J. Craven (Donn J. Everett of Everett, Seaton, Miller, and Bell, Manhattan, KS, with him on the briefs), Lecompton, KS, for plaintiffs-counter-defendants/appellees.
David D. Plinsky, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., with him on the briefs), Topeka, KS, for defendants-counter-claimants/appellants.
Before MOORE, LAY, * and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
This appeal involves the constitutionality of the procedure of electing members to the Kansas State Board of Agriculture (Board). Challenged here is the district court's order declaring the current statutory method violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoining the Board from conducting further elections until the Kansas State Legislature enacts a scheme consistent with the principles set out in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Hellebust v. Brownback, 824 F.Supp. 1511 (D.Kan.1993) (Hellebust I ). Finding no error in the district court's analysis of the constitutional violation or its choice of a remedy, we affirm.
Because the district court's order fleshes out the facts and history of this case, id. at 1512-14, we shall simply note its skeletal frame for our review. By statute, Kan.Stat.Ann. Secs. 74-502 and 74-503, delegates from Kansas agricultural organizations 1 attend the Board's annual meeting where they elect either all twelve Board members, or fewer, depending upon when terms expire. Board members then elect their Secretary. Plaintiffs charged this method violates the principle of one person, one vote because the Board, a state governmental agency, exercises broad authority affecting arguably all Kansans and is not limited solely to agriculture or agribusiness interests.
In their effort to persuade the district court otherwise, defendants, Sam Brownback, Secretary of the Board, and its twelve members contended not only that the election process is constitutional; but, also, in the absence of the legislature as a necessary party, the court should defer to that body to remedy the present system. Rejecting both arguments, the district court subsequently declared the terms of the present Board and Secretary expired and appointed the Governor of the State of Kansas receiver for the Board. Hellebust v. Brownback, 824 F.Supp. 1524, 1527 (D.Kan.1993) (Hellebust II ).
Central to its legal conclusion and remedy was the district court's factual finding the Board's reach far extends the fields of agriculture and agribusiness. While the Board insisted the approximately eighty laws which the legislature has entrusted it to enforce are confined to the narrow purposes of the state's agricultural industries, the court found, for example, anyone who pumps gas in Kansas relies on a facility subject to the Board's inspection. Hellebust I at 1514. All meat and dairy inspection is entrusted to the Board whose appointee, the State Dairy Commissioner, has the authority to enter any business premises, conduct inspections, issue subpoenas, and otherwise enforce state regulations on safe dairy and meat products. The Secretary regulates the use of pesticides whether applied to residential lawns or farmlands. The Board's Chief Engineer of the Division of Water Resources controls not only farm and agricultural water uses but also "water rights held by cities, utilities and individuals not connected with agriculture." Id.
With its approximately 330 employees and a budget of about $15 million allocated from the general fund, the district court found the Board Id. at 1513.
The Board challenges these findings and the conclusions of law they propagate, arguing: (1) the district court should have permitted the Kansas legislature to remedy the voting procedures; 2 (2) the legislature is an indispensable party; (3) the Secretary and Board members have been constitutionally appointed by operation of law; (4) the Board cannot independently exercise legislative powers; and (5) the voting procedures are subject only to rational review to uphold their constitutionality. That is, the Board maintains the voting procedure here is preserved by the explicit reservation for "a special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents." Avery v. Midland County, Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 483-84, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 1119-20, 20 L.Ed.2d 45 (1968). The Court articulated this exception in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Stor. Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659 (1973), and Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 68 L.Ed.2d 150 (1981); and the Board urges we apply it here.
Our review must begin with the principle announced in Reynolds and recited in its progeny that "in an election of general interest, restrictions on the franchise other than residence, age, and citizenship must promote a compelling state interest in order to survive constitutional attack." Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 295, 95 S.Ct. 1637, 1642, 44 L.Ed.2d 172 (1975) (citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969)). The breadth of this mandate does not tolerate constitutional distinctions on the basis of the purpose of the election or the function--legislative or administrative--of the elected official. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54-56, 90 S.Ct. 791, 794-95, 25 L.Ed.2d 45 (1970). In the line of cases stemming from Reynolds, "[t]he consistent theme ... is that the right to vote in an election is protected by the United States Constitution against dilution or debasement." Id. 397 U.S. at 54, 90 S.Ct. at 794.
The Court has fashioned a narrow exception to this rule. In Ball, 451 U.S. at 355, 101 S.Ct. at 1812-13, and Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 719, 93 S.Ct. at 1225, the Court held the one person, one vote rule does not apply to units of government having a narrow and limited focus which disproportionately affects the few who are entitled to vote. In Salyer, the Court reasoned the defendant water district had relatively limited authority because it provided only for the acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming in a localized basin. The Court specifically noted the water district offered "no other general public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body." 410 U.S. at 728-29, 93 S.Ct. at 1229-30. Nor did it exercise "what might be thought of as 'normal governmental' authority, but its actions disproportionately affect landowners" in the Tulare Lake Basin. Id. at 729, 93 S.Ct. at 1230.
In Ball, the water district provided additional services, "more diverse and affect[ing] far more people," 451 U.S. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 1818, generating electricity and selling it to Phoenix and other cities to meet most of the district's revenue needs. These added services, however, did not create distinctions which "amount to a constitutional difference." Id. at 366, 101 S.Ct. at 1818. The Court summarized:
[T]he District simply does not exercise the sort of governmental powers that invoke the strict demands of Reynolds. The District cannot impose ad valorem property taxes or sales taxes. It cannot enact any laws governing the conduct of citizens, nor does it administer such normal functions of government as the maintenance of streets, the operation of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare services.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, while an entity's "nominal public character," id. at 368, 101 S.Ct. at 1819, may shield it from the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment and permit a rational relationship analysis, once the line is crossed into the governmental powers arena, one person, one vote applies.
With these distinctions in mind, we turn to the findings of the district court. After reviewing the numerous state laws providing the Board with its supervisory and enforcement authority, the district court stated:
These examples of the Board's regulatory functions, although significant for the determination of this case, are not exhaustive of the powers of the Board to regulate for the benefit of the health, safety, and welfare of the general public. Suffice it to say, the Board exercises basic, general governmental powers.
Hellebust I at 1514-15. That conclusion embraced each of the Board's powers, which the district court discussed, ranging, as noted, from regulating the healthfulness of milk and meat sold in the state to generally regulating all weights and measures, including those commercially used by entities outside the agricultural industry. The court pointed out the Board has "significant" control over the use of water, not only by farmers and ranchers, but also by cities, utilities, and individual non-agricultural users. Id. at 1514....
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