Hellen v. Hellen

• Decision Date: 25 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2012AP1916.,2012AP1916.
• Citation: 2013 WI App 69,348 Wis.2d 223,831 N.W.2d 430
• Parties: Ruth HELLEN, Plaintiff–Appellant, State of Wisconsin, Department of Health Services, Subrogated–Plaintiff, v. Rebecca HELLEN, Jack Linney and American Family Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants–Respondents.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

348 Wis.2d 223

831 N.W.2d 430

2013 WI App 69

Ruth HELLEN, Plaintiff–Appellant,State of Wisconsin, Department of Health Services, Subrogated–Plaintiff,

v.Rebecca HELLEN, Jack Linney and American Family Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants–Respondents.

No. 2012AP1916.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 11, 2013.

Opinion Filed April 25, 2013.

On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Alexander J. Smith of Alexander J. Smith Law Offices, Beloit.

On behalf of the defendant-respondent, Rebecca Hellen, the cause was submitted on the brief of Michael P. Crooks of Peterson, Johnson and Murray, S.C., Madison.

On behalf of the defendant-respondent, Jack Linney, the cause was submitted on the brief of Barbara M. Olivas and Karen M. Gallagher of Coyne, Schultz, Becker & Bauer, S.C., Madison.

On behalf of the defendant-respondent, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, the cause was submitted on the brief of Patricia J. Epstein and Sheila M. Sullivan of Bell, Moore & Richter, S.C., Madison.

Before SHERMAN, BLANCHARD and KLOPPENBURG, JJ.

BLANCHARD, J.

[348 Wis.2d 226]¶ 1 In this case, we are called upon to interpret and apply the equine immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.481 (2011–12).¹ The basic facts are that Ruth Hellen was injured as a result of contact with a horse named Whisper as Ruth held Whisper's lead rope and Ruth's daughter-in-law, Rebecca Hellen, prepared to ride Whisper. The circuit court concluded on summary judgment that the equine immunity statute applies to bar Ruth's claims against Rebecca and Whisper's owner, Jack Linney. Ruth appeals the resulting order and a subsequent order denying her motion for reconsideration.

¶ 2 The statute grants immunity, subject to exceptions, to a person for his or her acts or omissions “related to his or her participation in equine activities if a person participating in the equine activity is injured....” Wis. Stat. § 895.481(2). “Equine activity” is defined to include, among many other activities, “riding” an equine or “assisting” a rider. See§ 895.481(1)(b)4., 5., and 9. However, immunity is not available for a person who “[p]rovides an equine to a person and fails to make a reasonable effort to determine the ability of the person to engage safely in an equine activity....” § 895.481(3)(b).

[348 Wis.2d 227]¶ 3 Ruth argues that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of the statute in two respects. First, Ruth argues that the court incorrectly interpreted and applied the statute to conclude that, at the time of Ruth's accident, Rebecca was engaged in conduct “related to” Rebecca's participation in the equine activity of riding, so that statutory immunity would apply. Second, Ruth argues that the court incorrectly interpreted and applied the statute to conclude that Rebecca did not “provide” an equine to Ruth, so that the above statutory exception precluding immunity would not apply. We disagree with Ruth's first argument, but we agree with her second. We therefore reverse the circuit court's orders and remand for further proceedings, which will include an inquiry into whether Rebecca made a reasonable effort to determine Ruth's ability to engage safely in an equine activity.

BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Rebecca regularly rode horses owned by Linney. On the day Ruth was injured, Ruth accompanied Rebecca to the farm where the horses were kept. As Rebecca prepared to ride Whisper, Rebecca asked Ruth if she wanted to hold Whisper's lead rope.² As Ruth held Whisper's lead rope, Rebecca began the process of saddling Whisper. As part of that process, Rebecca proceeded to “blanket” Whisper.³ Whisper apparently moved forward and stepped on one of Ruth's feet, causing Ruth to lose her balance and fall to the ground. Ruth suffered a fractured hip as a result.

¶ 5 Ruth brought a negligence claim against Rebecca, based in part on an allegation that Rebecca handled Whisper at the time of the accident in a manner that presented a danger to Ruth. In addition, Ruth brought a related claim against Linney, based on a theory of respondeat superior. Ruth also named Linney's insurer, American Family Insurance Company, as a defendant.

¶ 6 Rebecca moved for summary judgment based on the equine immunity statute. Ruth and Linney moved for summary judgment on the issue of respondeat superior. American Family moved for a declaratory judgment on the issue of insurance coverage.

¶ 7 The circuit court concluded that the equine immunity statute applies to bar Ruth's negligence claim against Rebecca. Based on that conclusion, the court further concluded that all other issues, including respondeat superior and coverage, are moot. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment against Ruth and in favor of Rebecca, Linney, and American Family. As indicated above, Ruth appeals the resulting order and the subsequent order denying her motion for reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the circuit court. Mettler v. Nellis, 2005 WI App 73, ¶ 7, 280 Wis.2d 753, 695 N.W.2d 861. We need not repeat all of those standards here. For current purposes, it is enough to say that summary judgment is appropriate when no material facts are in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. Here, our decision does not turn on any factual dispute but on the proper interpretation and application of the equine immunity statute.

¶ 9 The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Barritt v. Lowe, 2003 WI App 185, ¶ 6, 266 Wis.2d 863, 669 N.W.2d 189. We construe statutory language based on its common and ordinary meaning. Id. If the language is plain and unambiguous, our analysis stops there. Kangas v. Perry, 2000 WI App 234, ¶ 8, 239 Wis.2d 392, 620 N.W.2d 429. In conducting this analysis, we read statutory language not in isolation but as it relates to the statute as a whole. Id. In addition, we interpret statutes whenever possible to avoid unreasonable or absurd results. Hines v. Resnick, 2011 WI App 163, ¶ 12, 338 Wis.2d 190, 807 N.W.2d 687.

¶ 10 The equine immunity statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Civil liability exemption; equine activities. (1) In this section:

....

(b) “Equine activity” means any of the following:

1. Shows, fairs, competitions, performances or parades that involve any breeds of equines and any equine disciplines, including combined training, competitive trail riding, cutting, dressage, driving, endurance trail riding, English or western performance riding, grand prix jumping, horse racing, hunter and jumper shows, hunting, polo, pulling, rodeos, 3–day events and western games.

2. Equine training or teaching.

3. Boarding of equines.

4. Riding, inspecting or evaluating an equine belonging to another, regardless of whether the owner of the equine receives monetary or other consideration for the use of the equine or permits the riding, inspection or evaluation of the equine.

5. Riding, training or driving an equine or being a passenger on an equine.

6. Riding, training or driving a vehicle pulled by an equine or being a passenger on a vehicle pulled by an equine.

7. Assisting in the medical treatment of an equine.

8. Shoeing of an equine.

9. Assisting a person participating in an activity listed in subds. 1. to 8.

....

(g) “Spectator” means a person who attends or watches an equine activity but does not participate in the equine activity or perform any act or omission related to the equine activity that contributes to the injury or death of a participant in the equine activity.

(2) Except as provided in subs. (3) and (6), a person, including an equine activity sponsor or an equine professional, is immune from civil liability for acts or omissions related to his or her participation in equine activities if a person participating in the equine activity is injured or killed as the result of an inherent risk of equine activities.

(3) The immunity under sub. (2) does not apply if the person seeking immunity does any of the following:

....

(b) Provides an equine to a person and fails to make a reasonable effort to determine the ability of the person to engage safely in an equine activity or to safely manage the particular equine provided based on the person's representations of his or her ability.

....

(3m) A person whose only involvement in an equine activity is as a spectator shall not be considered to be participating in the equine activity.

Wis. Stat. § 895.481.

¶ 11 As indicated above, Ruth argues that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of the statute in two respects. First, Ruth argues that the court incorrectly interpreted and applied the statute to conclude that, at the time of the accident, Rebecca was engaged in conduct “related to” Rebecca's participation in the equine activity of riding. Second, Ruth argues that the court incorrectly interpreted and applied the statute to conclude that Rebecca did not “provide” an equine to Ruth. We address these arguments in turn. Because we agree with Ruth's second argument, we reverse and remand for further proceedings, which will include an inquiry into whether Rebecca made a reasonable effort to determine Ruth's ability to engage safely in an equine activity. Under the circumstances here, that inquiry will determine whether the exception precluding immunity contained in Wis. Stat. § 895.481(3)(b), referenced above, applies. In addition, as explained below, the court on remand will have the opportunity to address other remaining issues.

A. Conduct “Related to” Participation in Equine Activity

¶ 12 Ruth's first argument pertains to Wis. Stat. 895.481(2), the immunity-granting provision. As reflectedabove, § 895.481(2) provides, subject to exceptions, that a person, here Rebecca, is immune for acts or omissions “related to ... her participation in equine activities if a person [here, Ruth]...