Hellmann v. Collier

• Decision Date: 24 April 1958
• Docket Number: No. 36,36
• Citation: 141 A.2d 908,217 Md. 93
• Parties: Claude B. HELLMANN, Secretary of State, State of Maryland, v. Louis W. COLLIER.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 93

217 Md. 93

141 A.2d 908

Claude B. HELLMANN, Secretary of State, State of Maryland, v. Louis W. COLLIER.

No. 36.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 24, 1958.

Opinion Filed May 21, 1958.

Charles B. Reeves, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellant.

James B. McClaskey, Baltimore (David J. Preller, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

For reasons to be stated in an opinion to be filed later, it is Ordered by the Court of Appeals of Maryland this 24th day of April, 1958, that the order of the Baltimore City Court be, and it is hereby affirmed, the appellant to pay the costs.

Opinion

PRESCOTT, Judge.

We have previously filed a per curiam order which affirmed the ruling of Judge Tucker in this case in the Baltimore City Court. We shall now state our reasons for doing so.

The petitioner below, Louis W. Collier, desired to seek the nomination of the Republican Party for the office of United States Representative for the Fourth Congressional District of Maryland. He filed, in proper time, his certificate of candidacy with the appellant, the Secretary of State of Maryland, who refused to certify the candidacy to the Board of Supervisors of Elections for Baltimore City on the ground that the petitioner was a resident of the Second Congressional District of Maryland, it being conceded that Mr. Collier possessed all of the necessary qualifications to seek the said nomination, other than residence in the Fourth Congressional District, and Mr. Collier admits that he is not a resident of that District.

Chapter 739, section 1, of the Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland of 1957 (Article 33, sec. 158(c) of the Code (1957)) reads as follows: '(c) Residence of candidate. Every candidate for election to the House of Representatives shall be a resident of the congressional district in which he seeks election.' It was because of this statute that the appellant refused to certify the candidacy of the appellee, which refusal resulted in this mandamus proceeding praying that the appellant be compelled to do so. It is obvious that if the above quoted section 158(c) be a valid and constitutional enactment of law by the Legislature of this State, as contended by the appellant, the appellant is correct in refusing to certify the appellee's candidacy, and it is equally plain that if said enactment be invalid and unconstitutional, the appellee is entitled to have his candidacy properly certified; therefore our inquiry is to determine the constitutionality of said statute.

We have repeatedly held that the general rule of the construction of a statute is that every presumption favors its validity and reasonable doubt is enough to sustain. This Court is very reluctant to defeat the will of the Legislature by declaring its legislation void, if, by any construction, it can possibly be maintained. Leonardo v. Board of County Commissioners 214 Md. 287, 299, 134 A.2d 284; Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 94, 102 A.2d 821.

Pertinent sections of the Federal Constitution read, in part, as follows:

Article VI, Cl. 2: 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; * * *.'

Article I, Sec. 2, Cl. 2: 'No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.'

Article I, Sec. 4, Cl. 1: 'The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.'

Article I, Sec. 5, Cl. 1: 'Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members * * *.'

A careful reading of Article I, section 2, above, will disclose that there are two aspects that must be considered in determining the constitutionality of section 158(c): (a) does Article I, section 2, because of its wording '(n)o Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age of twenty-five Years' et cetera merely prescribe the minimal qualifications for that office to which the states may superadd others, or does it actually state all of the qualifications that a state may require of a Representative; and (b) is the requirement that a candidate reside in a specified district an additional qualification to that portion of said section which provides that a Representative shall 'be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen'?

(a)

This question seems to be fully answered in the case of Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 198, 76 A.2d 332. This Court, in that case, held that a state statute, which required of a candidate for the office of Representative an oath under the Subversive Activities Act (Art. 85 A, sec. 15, Code (1957)), was ineffective as applied to a candidate for that office, on the ground that a state cannot, in any manner, impose additional qualifications to those named in the Federal Constitution upon a candidate for Representative. See, also, 1 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, (4th ed.), sec. 625; 1 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States, (2d ed.) sec. 337. Cf. Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189, 223.

Because, under Article I, sec. 5, it would ultimately have controlling effect, it is interesting to observe how Congress has treated the matter. In 1856, Messrs. Marshall and Trumbull, state judges, were elected to the House of Representatives by their respective districts in the State of Illinois. However, the Governor refused to issue them credentials, because the Illinois constitution prohibited state judges from being elected to any office in the federal government. Having received a majority of the votes in their respective districts, they requested the House of Representatives to seat them and invalidate the Illinois constitutional restriction. The House Committee report ably and fully dealt with the question we are now considering, agreed with the arguments of Marshall and Trumbull, and pertinently said:

'The qualifications of a Representative, under the Constitution, are that he shall have attained the age of 25 years, shall have been seven years a citizen of the United States, and, when elected, an inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen. It is a fair presumption that, when the Constitution prescribes these qualifications as necessary to a Representative in Congress, it was meant to exclude all others. And to your committee it is equally clear that a State of the Union has not the power to superadd qualifications to those prescribed by the Constitution for Representatives, to take away from 'the people of the several States' the right given them by the Constitution to choose, 'every second year,' as their Representative in Congress, any person who has the required age, citizenship, and residence.'

The House sustained the report of the committee by a vote of 125 to 5, but only Marshall was seated, since the undaunted Mr. Trumbull had, in the meantime, been elected to the Senate. The Senate debated the propriety of seating Mr. Trumbull, and, by a vote of 35 to 8, it approved his qualifications and refused to give effect to the Illinois restrictions. 1 Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, secs. 415, 416; 1 Bartlett, Cases of Contested Elections, pp. 167, 168, 169. In 1884, the House reaffirmed the position it had taken in the case of Messrs. Marshall and Trumbull. See Wood v. Peters, 1 Hinds' op. cit., sec. 417.

From the above, it would appear that no state has the power to fix the qualifications of Representatives in Congress (see, also, McCrary, American Law of Elections (4th ed.), sec. 326); so our inquiry narrows to answering (b).

(b)

In so far as reported decisions are concerned, this question seems to be novel; but it has been considered by learned and renowned constitutional scholars and textwriters, and by Congress.

Pursuant to the authority contained in Article I, section 4, above quoted, Congress in 1842 (5 Stat. 491, Ch. 47) provided for the election of Representatives by districts. This authority was conferred on Congress in order 'to secure fair...