Hellyer v. People

• Decision Date: 19 October 1900
• Citation: 58 N.E. 245,186 Ill. 550
• Parties: HELLYER v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

186 Ill. 550

58 N.E. 245

HELLYER

v.PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 19, 1900.

Error to circuit court, Fulton county; John A. Gray, Judge.

John C. Hellyer was convicted of murder, and he brings error.Reversed.

H. W. Masters, for plaintiff in error.

Chiperfield, Grant & Chiperfield, for the People.

HAND, J.

John C. Hellyer was indicted by the grand jury, at the January term, 1900, of Fulton county, for the murder of Cora Peters.The third count of the indictment having been quashed, a trial was had upon the first, second, and fourth counts thereof, which resulted in the conviction of the defendant.The jury fixed the punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for 25 years.A motion for a new trial was overruled, judgment pronounced upon the verdict, proper exceptions taken, and a writ of error sued out from this court to reverse such judgment.

The first count of the indictment charges that the defendant made an assault upon the deceased with a dangerous and deadly weapon, to wit, a blunt instrument, a further, better, or more particular description of the said weapon being to the grand jurors aforesaid unknown.The second count charges that the defendant made an assault upon the deceased in some manner, and by some means, instruments, and weapons, to the grand jurors aforesaid unknown; and the fourth count charges that the defendant made an assault upon the deceased with a dangerous and deadly weapon, a further description of said weapon being to the grand jurors aforesaid unknown.

On the morning of the 23d day of December, 1899, which was Saturday, John C. Hellyer was in the city of Lewistown.In the forenoon of that day he wrote and mailed a letter to Cora Peters, addressed to her at Ipava, a village located about 10 miles southwest of Lewistown, on the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, which railroad also runs through Lewistown, inviting her to meet him in Lewistown.In response to such letter, she went to Lewistown that afternoon by railroad, and was met at the depot by Hellyer.They repaired to a wine room located in the city, where they were together the most of the time until about 10 o'clock in the evening, when they were observed together in said city going south and west towards the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad tracks.On Monday morning, December 25, 1899, the dead body of Cora Peters was found near the southwest abutment, under the south edge of the trestlework which forms a part of the railroad bridge which crosses Spoon river near Steam-Shovel Cut, a flag station located on the west side of Spoon river, about 4 1/2 miles southwest of Lewistown.The banks of Spoon river at the point where crossed by the railroad are lower than the adjoining land, and the river is crossed by the railroad on a bridge with trestlework on either side, the entire bridge, including trestles, being about 700 feet in length.The body, when found, was lying on the left side, parallel with the railroad, the head towards Lewistown.There were slight bruises upon the back, the mouth was somewhat bruised and swollen, and there was a bruised condition over each eye.The post mortem disclosed no other injuries, except a congested condition of the brain.The physicians who held the autopsy agreed death resulted from the injury over the right eye, which caused congestion of the brain.

The defendant, on the trial of the cause, was a witness in his own behalf.He testified that he and Cora Peters left Lewistown together on Saturday evening, December 23d, at about 10 o'clock, expecting to walk on the railroad to Steam-Shovel Cut, where Cora Peters intended to flag the midnight train and return to Ipava, and he to walk therefrom, about 4 1/2 miles in a westerly direction, to his home; that on their way to Steam-Shovel Cut, and as they were crossing the railroad bridge over Spoon river, they were overtaken by a south-bound passenger train; that when the train overtook them they were on the end of the ties on the south side of the track, and near the southwest end of the bridge, Cora Peters being slightly in advance of him; that he was struck by the train, and thrown off and severely injured; that he does not know what became of Cora Peters, but presumes she was precipitated from the bridge at the same time; that he went to his home, and from there to the home of one John Burgland; that on the following Wednesday he heard Cora Peters was dead, and that the sheriff of Fulton county was looking for him; that upon receiving such information he immediately wrote to the sheriff, informing him of his whereabouts, and that he would be at his home that evening, and that the sheriff, in response to such letter, arrested him at his home the following evening.

There was no person other than the defendant who saw Cora Peters after she left Lewistown.No motive was shown why Hellyer should take her life.A passenger train passed over said bridge at about the time Hellyer claims they were overtaken thereon, and the injuries received by Cora Peters, as disclosed after death, could readily have been produced by her falling from the bridge and striking upon the ground or trestlework; the height of the bridge near the point where she was found being at least 10 feet above the ground.The people relied entirely upon circumstantial evidence to secure a conviction.The verdict of the jury, in view of the evidence, would necessarily largely depend upon the weight which they gave to the testimony of the defendant.If they gave credence to his evidence, they would be bound to acquit him.It was therefore very important to him that the jury be correctly instructed as to the law, and especially as to the manner in which they should treat his testimony.

The fifth instruction given at the instance of the people is as follows: ‘The court further instructs you that while the defendant is by law a competent witness in his own behalf in this case, yet his credibility and the weight to be given to his testimony are matters exclusively for the jury to pass upon; and, while they should not disregard his testimony through mere caprice, yet the jury are not bound to believe him, nor are they bound to treat his testimony the same as the testimony of other witnesses, but they may take into consideration the fact that he is the defendant and his interest in the result of the case as such, and give his testimony such weight as, under all the facts and circumstances in evidence in the case, they may think it is entitled to.’This instruction told the jury they were not bound to treat the testimony of the defendant the same as the testimony of other witnesses, which, under the rulings of this court, is not the law.While the jury, when the defendant testifies in his own behalf, may rightfully take into consideration his interest in the result of the suit as affecting his credibility, the law does not authorize the court to place him in a separate and inferior class from all other witnesses by telling the jury they are not bound to treat his testimony the same as the testimony of other witnesses.In the case of Chambers v. People, 105 Ill. 409, we had under consideration an instruction which informed the jury they were not bound to believe the evidence of the defendant in a criminal case and treat it the same as the evidence of other witnesses, although they might take into consideration the fact that he is the defendant, and give his testimony such weight as, under all the circumstances, they think it entitled to.On page 414we say: ‘It cannot * * * be true that the evidence given by the defendant charged with crime is not to be treated the same as the evidence of other witnesses.’And again, on page 415: ‘The law contemplates, and a fair trial requires, that the jury shall enter upon the consideration of the evidence (which, of course, includes the credit to be given to the several witnesses) with unbiased and inquiring, and not with biased or prejudicate, minds.This instruction violates that principle by a sort of first-blush condemnation of the evidence given by the plaintiff in error.* * * If they are not to treat it the same as the evidence of other witnesses, how are they to treat it?The inference of the jury would most probably be that in legal presumption it is inferior, under all circumstances, to other evidence, and of but little importance in ascertaining the truth; whereas, it is for the jurors themselves to determine, under all the...