Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp.
Decision Date | 08 March 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93-3880,93-3880 |
Citation | 18 F.3d 446 |
Parties | Ruby HELM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, as receiver for Great American Savings of Oak Brook, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Everett J. Cygal, Edward R. Vrdolyak, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellant.
Arthur F. Radke, Martin B. Carroll, Hefter & Radke, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, COFFEY, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
Is the Resolution Trust Corporation an "agency" of the United States for the purpose of Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)? Unless it is, the appeal, filed more than 30 (but fewer than 60) days after the entry of judgment in the district court, must be dismissed.
Rule 4 does not define "agency." A definitional provision applicable to all of Title 28 of the United States Code reads:
The term "agency" includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense.
28 U.S.C. Sec. 451. Because the Rules of Appellate Procedure address questions of jurisdiction and judicial administration closely related to the subject of Title 28, this definition is equally applicable to the Rules. One court of appeals suggested in In re Hoag Ranches, 846 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.1988), that the definition in Sec. 451 should be expanded in some cases and contracted in others in response to the perceived "purpose" of Rule 4(a)(1) to provide additional time for consultation among public officials who must decide whether to ask the Solicitor General's approval to take an appeal. Although the court did not suggest a source of authority for ad hoc modifications--or discuss the fact that Rule 4(a)(1) affords the 60 day period to private litigants when an agency is a party to the case--it must have had in mind the language that "the context [may show] that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense." Context clauses offer some, albeit quite limited, scope for reconciling tension among different statutory provisions. They do not, however, authorize judges to give effect to extra-statutory goals; the "context" refers to the linguistic context. Rowland v. California Men's Colony, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 716, 720, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993). See also Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30-31, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 2384-85, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315-17, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 2407-08, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988). Nothing in Rule 4 suggests a special understanding of "agency" or implies that the statutory definition is unsuitable. Jurisdictional rules should be as clear and mechanical as possible. "The time of appealability, having jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear." Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988). We therefore shall stick with Sec. 451, without modifications.
The Resolution Trust Corporation is a "corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest". Although Congress did not fund the RTC with public monies, see 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1441a(b)(2), it conducts business at the behest and for the account of the national government and is "an instrumentality of the United States." 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1441a(b)(1)(A). Indeed, the RTC is for most purposes an "agency" independent of its status as a public...
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